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The law of neutrality - the corpus of legal rules regulating the relationship between belligerents and States taking no part in hostilities - assumed its modern form in a world in which the waging of war was unconstrained. The neutral State enjoyed territorial inviolability to the extent that it adhered to the obligations attaching to its neutral status and thus the law of neutrality provided spatial parameters for the conduct of hostilities. Yet the basis on which the law of neutrality developed - the extra-legal character of war - no longer exists. Does the law of neutrality continue to survive in the modern era? If so, how has it been modified by the profound changes in the law on the use of force and the law of armed conflict? This book argues that neutrality endures as a key concept of the law of armed conflict. The interaction between belligerent and nonbelligerent States continues to require legal regulation, as demonstrated by a number of recent conflicts, including the Iraq War of 2003 and the Mavi Marmara incident of 2010. By detailing the rights and duties of neutral states and demonstrating how the rules of neutrality continue to apply in modern day conflicts, this restatement of law of neutrality will be a useful guide to legal academics working on the law of armed conflict, the law on the use of force, and the history of international law, as well as for government and military lawyers seeking comprehensive guidance in this difficult area of the law.
Neutrality is a legal relationship between a belligerent State and a State not participating in a war, namely a neutral State. The law of neutrality is a body of rules and principles that regulates the legal relations of neutrality. The law of neutrality obliges neutral States to treat all belligerent States impartially and to abstain from providing military and other assistance to belligerents. The law of neutrality is a branch of international law that developed in the nineteenth century, when international law allowed unlimited freedom of sovereign States to resort to war. Thus, there has been much debate as to whether such a branch of law remains valid in modern international law, which generally prohibits war and the use of force by States. While there has been much debate regarding the current status of neutrality in modern international law, there is a general agreement among scholars as to the basic features of the traditional law of neutrality. Wani challenges the conventional understanding of the traditional neutrality by re-examining the historical development of the law of neutrality from the sixteenth century to 1945. The modification of the conventional understanding will provide a fundamentally new framework for discussing the current status of neutrality in modern international law.
This book brings together twelve of the most important legal philosophers in the Anglo-American and Civil Law traditions. The book is a collection of the papers these philosophers presented at the Conference on Neutrality and Theory of Law, held at the University of Girona, in May 2010. The central question that the conference and this collection seek to answer is: Can a theory of law be neutral? The book covers most of the main jurisprudential debates. It presents an overall discussion of the connection between law and morals, and the possibility of determining the content of law without appealing to any normative argument. It examines the type of project currently being held by jurisprudential scholarship. It studies the different approaches to theorizing about the nature or concept of law, the role of conceptual analysis and the essential features of law. Moreover, it sheds some light on what can be learned from studying the non-essential features of law. Finally, it analyzes the nature of legal statements and their truth values. This book takes the reader a step further to understanding law.
This book offers the most authoritative commentary and analysis of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict available. It is based upon the Joint Service Regulation for the German Ministry of Defence, augmented with extensive international references, and accompanied bycommentary by a team of distinguished and internationally renowned experts. Whilst the past decades have seen consistent development of international law applicable in armed conflict, culminating in a series of International Covenants and Protocols, world events in recent years have made reassessment of the law both a timely and topical concern. This Handbook available for the first time in paperback will serve as an indispensable reference source for practising lawyers and academics working in the field of international humanitarian law and for military personnel worldwide.
lt is a commonplace that law and morality intersect and interpenetrate in all the areas of legal decision-making; that in order to make sense of constitutional, statutory or common-law questions, judges and other legal decision-makers must first resolve certain philosophical issues which include moral judgments of right and wrang_ This is particularly evident with regard to constitutional interpretation, especially when constitutions give a mandate for the protection of the substantive norms and values entrenched as constitutional rights. In these Situations, as a leading contemporary legal philosopher observed, the "Constitution fuses legal and moral issues, by making the validity of a law depend on an answer to complex moral 1 problems". But the need for substantive value elucidation is not confined, of course, only to constitutional interpretation under Bills of Rights. This, however, immediately raises a dilemma stemming from the moral diversity and pluralism of modern liberal societies. How can law remain sensitive to this pluralism and yet provide clear answers to the problems which call for a legal resolution? Sharply conflicting values in modern societies clash in the debates over the death penalty, abortion, homosexuality, separation of state and religion, the scope of the freedom of the press, or affirmative action. lt would often be difficult to discern a broader consensus within which these clashes of values operate, unless this consensus were described in such vague terms as to render it practically meaningless.