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Political and legal order in Palestine was severely shaken by the rioting of August 1929 and 1933. As Britain struggled to find a balance between Arab and Jewish demands the middle years of the Mandate proved to be crucial for the survival of the Jewish National Home. The period was also highly significant for the development of the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement, and for the shaping of British policy in response to the emerging international issues which threatened its hegemony in the Middle East.
One of the major questions facing the world today is the role of law in shaping identity and in balancing tradition with modernity. In an arid corner of the Mediterranean region in the first decades of the twentieth century, Mandate Palestine was confront
Concerns about the place of Islam in Palestinian politics are familiar to those studying the history of the modern Middle East. A significant but often misunderstood part of this history is the rise of Islamic opposition to the British in Mandate Palestine during the 1920s and 1930s. Across the empire, imperial officials wrestled with the question of how to rule over a Muslim-majority countries and came to see traditional Islamic institutions as essential for maintaining order. Islam under the Palestine Mandate tells the story of the search for a viable Islamic institution in Palestine and the subsequent invention of the Supreme Muslim Council. As a body with political recognition, institutional autonomy and financial power, the council was designed to be a counterweight to the growing popularity of nationalism among Palestinians. However, rather than extinguishing the revolutionary capacity of the colonized, it would become a significant opponent of British rule under its highly controversial president, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Making extensive use of primary sources from British and Israeli archives, this book offers an innovative account of the Supreme Muslim Council's place within a colonial project that aimed to control Palestinian religion and politics. Roberts argues against the standard view that the council's creation was an act of appeasement towards Muslim opinion, showing how British actions were guided by techniques of imperial administration used elsewhere in the empire.
The British Army's devastating effectiveness against colonial rebellion is exposed in this military history of Britain's pacification of the Arab revolt in Palestine.
The Palestinian national movement gestated in the early decades of the twentieth century, but it was born in the Great Revolt of 1936–39, a period of sustained Arab protest against British policy in the Palestine mandate. In The Crime of Nationalism, Matthew Kraig Kelly makes the unique case that the key to understanding the Great Revolt lies in what he calls the crimino-national domain—the overlap between the criminological and the nationalist dimensions of British imperial discourse, and the primary terrain upon which the war of 1936–39 was fought. Kelly's analysis amounts to a new history of one of the major anticolonial insurgencies of the interwar period and a critical moment in the lead-up to Israel's founding. The Crime of Nationalism offers crucial lessons for the scholarly understanding of nationalism and insurgency more broadly.
'Empires of Intelligence' argues that colonial control in British and French empires depended on an elabroate security apparatus. Thomas shows the crucial role of intelligence gathering in maintaining imperial control in the years before decolonization.
In this fresh and controversial account of Britain's end of empire, Grob-Fitzgibbon reveals that the British government developed a successful strategy of decolonization following the Second World War based on devolving power to indigenous peoples within the Commonwealth.
During the British Mandate for Palestine (1922–1948), Arabs and Jews repeatedly used the law to gain leverage and influence international opinion, especially in three dramatic and largely forgotten trials involving two issues: the interplay between conflicting British promises to the Arabs and Jews during World War I, and the parties’ rights and claims to the Wailing Wall. Focusing on how all three parties – Arab, Jewish, and British – used the law and the legal process to advance their objectives during the Mandate years, this volume reveals how the parties availed themselves – with varying degrees of success – of the law and the legal process. The book examines various legal arguments they proffered, and how that early tendency to resort to the law as a tool, a resource, and a weapon in the conflict has continued to this day. The research relies almost entirely on primary source documents, including transcripts of the public and secret testimony before the Shaw, Lofgren, and Peel Commissions, diaries, letters, government files, and other original sources. This study explores the origins of many of the fundamental legal arguments in the Arab–Israeli conflict that prevail to this day. Filling a gap in research, this is a key text for scholars and students interested in the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lawfare, and the Middle East.
This book tells the story of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Palestine Police Force (PPF) in the historical context which impacted the CID's missions, methods, and composition. At first, the CID was engaged in providing technical assistance for criminal investigation. Following the PPF's poor performance in the Arab Revolt in 1929, a commission of inquiry, headed by Sir Herbert Dowbiggin, recommended adding intelligence gathering and surveillance of political elements to police functions. Teams were set up and a Special Branch established. From 1932 the CID deployed a network of "live sources" among the Arabs and issued intelligence summaries evaluating Arab and Jewish political activity. Post-1935 the security situation deteriorated: Arab policemen and officials joined the Arab side, thus drying-up sources of information; the British therefore asked for assistance from the Jewish population. In 1937 Sir Charles Tegart recommended that the CID invest in obtaining raw intelligence by direct contacts in the field. In 1938 Arthur Giles took command and targeted both the Revisionist and Yishuv movements. Although the CID did not succeed in obtaining sufficient tactical information to prevent Yishuv actions, Giles identified the mood of the Jewish leadership and public -- an important intelligence accomplishment regarding Britain's attitude towards the Palestine question. But British impotence in the field was manifested by the failure to prevent the bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. Towards the end of the Mandate, as civil war broke out following the UN General Assembly resolution of November 1947, the CID was primarily engaged in documenting events and providing evaluations to London whose decision-makers put high value on CID intelligence as they formulated political responses. With Forewords by Professor Yoav Gelber (Univeristy of Haifa and Professor John Ferris (University of Calgary).