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The first anthology explicitly dedicated to Hegel's linguistic thought, Hegel and Language presents various facets of a new wave of Hegel scholarship. The chapters are organized around themes that include the possibility of systematic philosophy, truth and objectivity, and the relation of Hegel's thought to analytic and postmodern approaches to language. While there is considerable diversity among the various approaches to and assessments of Hegel's linguistic thought, the volume as a whole demonstrates that not only was language central for Hegel, but also that his linguistic thought still has much to offer contemporary philosophy. The book also includes an extensive introductory survey of the linguistic thought of the entire German Idealist movement and the contemporary issues that emerged from it.
This book brings together for the first time two philosophers from different traditions and different centuries. While Wittgenstein was a focal point of 20th century analytic philosophy, it was Hegel’s philosophy that brought the essential discourses of the 19th century together and developed into the continental tradition in 20th century. This now-outdated conflict took for granted Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s opposing positions and is being replaced by a continuous progression and differentiation of several authors, schools, and philosophical traditions. The development is already evident in the tendency to identify a progression from a ‘Kantian’ to a ‘Hegelian phase’ of analytical philosophy as well as in the extension of right and left Hegelian approaches by modern and postmodern concepts. Assessing the difference between Wittgenstein and Hegel can outline intersections of contemporary thinking.
In this bold new book, Jim Vernon develops the general theory of language implicitly contained in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel. Vernon offers novel readings of Hegel's central works in order to explain his views on some long neglected topics and as such demonstrates that his accounts of representation, the concept and the speculative sentence can be used to create sophisticated theories of language acquisition, universal grammar and linguistic practice. Hegel's defence of a scientific philosophy that is necessary and universal seems to eliminate the need for a philosophical linguistics. Since thought is demonstrably objective in itself, questions about the language through which it is expressed appear to be external to philosophy. This has caused many commentators to neglect the real problems that the historical and cultural associations of language pose for the adequate expression of universal thought. Others, exploiting this apparent inadequacy, have argued that the lack of rigorous linguistic analysis in Hegel's philosophy is its greatest, and perhaps fatal, flaw. Although the very idea of a Hegelian linguistics is controversial, this book argues that there are resources within the texts of Hegel for developing a general theory of language as the reciprocal grounding of a universal grammatical form and a particular lexical content. Moreover, it uses this theory to resolve the apparent tension between the necessity of Hegelian philosophy and the contingency of its linguistic expression. In the light of Hegel's critical relation to contemporary debates in Continental and Anglo-American philosophy, coupled with the central role that philosophy of language plays in both streams, this important new study offers the first comprehensive, integrated and fully developed analysis of Hegel's theory of language.
This study of Hegel and Nietzsche evaluates and compares their work through their common criticism of the metaphysics for operating with conceptual oppositions such as being/becoming and egoism/altruism. Dr Houlgate exposes Nietzsche's critique as employing the distinction of Life and Thought, which itself constitutes a metaphysical dualism of the kind Nietzsche attacks. By comparison Hegel is shown to provide a more profound critique of metaphysical dualism by applying his philosophy of the dialectic, which sees such alleged opposites as defining components of a dynamic. In choosing to study a theme so fundamental to both philosophers' work, Houlgate has established a framework within which to evaluate the Hegel-Nietzsche debate; to make the first full study of Nietzsche's view of Hegel's work; and to compare Nietzsche's Dionysic philosophy with Hegel's dialectical philosophy by focusing on tragedy, a subject central to the philosophy of both.
This book develops an argument for a historicist and non-foundationalist notion of rationality based on an interpretation of Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. The book examines two notions of rationality—a universal versus a constitutive conception – and their significance for educational theory. The former advanced by analytic philosophy of education as a form of conceptual analysis is based on a mistaken reading of Wittgenstein. Analytic philosophy of education used a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language to set up and justify an absolute, universal and ahistorical notion of rationality. By contrast, the book examines the underlying influence of the later Wittgenstein on the historicist turn in philosophy of science as a basis for a non-foundationalist and constitutive notion of rationality which is both historical and cultural, and remains consistent with wider developments in philosophy, hermeneutics and social theory. This book aims to understand the philosophical motivation behind this view, to examine its intellectual underpinnings and to substitute this universal conception of rationality by reference to a Hegelian interpretation of the later Wittgenstein that emphasizes his status as an anti-foundational thinker.
Pendlebury alleges that abstraction and rationalization have had a strong and malign influence on normative moral philosophy in the 20th century. Criticizing writers such as Hare, Rawls and Scanlon for pursuing a conception of moral philosophy that bears little resemblance to the way in which human beings actually think and conduct themselves, Pendlebury, instead, suggests a ’Virtue Ethics’ inspired by Hegel’s and Aristotle’s accounts of action as a corrective to this trend, showing that moral activity is historically and socially based and must address the formed character of individual agents. This trend, which began with the responses by Locke, Hume and Kant to Descartes’ Meditations, rendered moral philosophy individualistic and psychologistic in contrast to Aristotle and Hegel’s claim that man is essentially a social creature. Pendlebury argues that this should be the starting point of any account and understanding of morality which roots the concept of will in the practical activity involved in being a member of an ethical community rather than an abstract metaphysical entity that is supposedly in the possession of individuals. In providing a critique of modern moral philosophy from this perspective, Pendlebury’s line of enquiry lends much support to ’Virtue Ethics’ as exemplified in the work of Hursthouse and Slote, while taking a more combative approach with those with whom he disputes. In doing so he shows that serious considerations of continental philosophy highlights the richness of moral activity absent from ’analytical’ tradition which for so long has been bent on marginalizing it.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was undoubtedly one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, and perhaps of any century. He was also a fascinating, charismatic, and irritating man. His philosophical ability was recognized almost immediately by Bertrand Russell, and during his lifetime his work influenced first logical positivism and then ordinary language philosophy. Since then it has also become central in post-analytical philosophical thought. Beyond the world of academic philosophy it has inspired playwrights, poets, novelists, architects, filmmakers, and biographers. The A to Z of Wittgenstein's Philosophy is intended for anyone who wants to know more about the philosophy and the life of this enigmatic thinker. The book contains an introductory overview of his life and work, a timeline of the major relevant events in and after his life, an extensive bibliography, and, above all, an A-Z of ideas, people, and places that have been involved in his philosophy and its reception. The dictionary is written with no particular agenda and includes entries on philosophers (and others) who influenced Wittgenstein, those he influenced in turn, and some of the main figures in contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship. Suggestions for further reading are also included, as well as a guide to the literature on Wittgenstein and a bibliography broken down by subject area.
In "I that is We, We that is I", an international group of philosophers explore the many facets of Hegel’s formula which expresses the recognitive and social structures of human life. The book offers a guiding thread for the reconstruction of crucial motifs of contemporary thought such as the socio-ontological paradigm; the action-theoretical model in moral and social philosophy; the question of naturalism; and the reassessment of the relevance of work and power for our understanding of human life. This collection addresses the shortcomings of Kantian and constructivist normative approaches to social practices and practical rationality it involves. It sheds new light on Hegel’s take on metaphysics and puts into question some presuppositions of the post-metaphysical interpretative paradigm.
Hegel's critique of Early German Romanticism and its theory of irony resonates to the core of his own philosophy in the same way that Plato's polemics with the Sophists have repercussions that go to the centre of his thought. The Anti-Romantic examines Hegel's critique of Fr. Schlegel, Novalis and Schleiermacher. Hegel rarely mentions these thinkers by name and the texts dealing with them often exist on the periphery of his oeuvre. Nonetheless, individually, they represent embodiments of specific forms of irony: Schlegel, a form of critical individuality; Novalis, a form of sentimental nihilism; Schleiermacher, a monstrous hybrid of the other two. The strength of Hegel's polemical approach to these authors shows how irony itself represents for him a persistent threat to his own idea of systematic Science. This is so, we discover, because Romantic irony is more than a rival ideology; it is an actual form of discourse, one whose performative objectivity interferes with the objectivity of Hegel's own logos. Thus, Hegel's critique of irony allows us to reciprocally uncover a Hegelian theory of scientific discourse. Far from seeing irony as a form of consciousness overcome by Spirit, Hegel sees it as having become a pressing feature of his own contemporary world, as witnessed in the popularity of his Berlin rival, Schleiermacher. Finally, to the extent that ironic discourse seems, for Hegel, to imply a certain world beyond his own notion of modernity, we are left with the hypothesis that Hegel's critique of irony may be viewed as a critique of post-modernity.