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El Sr. Wackeneim, en Francia, quería hacer parte de un espectáculo conocido como "lanzamiento del enano", en el cual los clientes de una casa nocturna habrían de lanzarlo a la mayor distancia posible. La Sra. Evans, en el Reino Unido, después de perder los ovarios, quería que le implantaran en su útero embriones fecundados con sus óvulos y el semen de su ex esposo, de quien se había divorciado. La familia de la Sra. Englaro, en Italia, quería suspender los procedimientos médicos y dejarla morir en paz, después de diecisiete años en estado vegetativo. Al Sr. Ellwanger, en Brasil, le gustaría continuar publicando textos en que se niega el Holocausto. El Sr. Lawrence, en Estados Unidos, deseaba mantener relaciones homosexuales con su compañero sin ser considerado un criminal. A la Sra. Lais, en Colombia, le gustaría que le reconocieran su derecho a ejercer sus actividades como trabajadora sexual, también conocidas como prostitución. El Sr. Gründgens, en Alemania, pretendía impedir la reedición de un libro basado en la vida de su padre y que consideraba una ofensa a su reputación. La Sra. Grootboom, en Sudáfrica, en situación de gran pobreza, solicitaba al poder público un techo para ella y para su familia.
Ningún otro concepto del vocabulario jurídico-político, presente desde la primera ética cristiana, ha tenido un resurgimiento contemporáneo tan intenso como la dignidad humana. Sin embargo, no contamos con una definición canónica o más o menos incontrovertible que esclarezca su contenido normativo y sus implicaciones prácticas. La obra de Waldron, aunque prolífica en la materia, se condensa fundamentalmente en este libro, que desarrolla su original concepción de la dignidad humana: un concepto moral que implica un estatus jurídico, político y social de alto rango que debe reconocérsele a toda persona independientemente de razones pragmáticas o consecuencialistas. En su versión contemporánea, se origina en la democratización del elevado estatus social que antes se reservaba solo a aquellos nacidos en contextos privilegiados por la noble ascendencia. La particularidad de su propuesta radica en avanzar hacia las formas como la dignidad opera, en tanto concepto jurídico, desde la jurisprudencia y no solo desde la elevada abstracción filosófica. A partir de ahí se determinan su naturaleza, contenido y sus relaciones con otros conceptos, como autonomía. Esta primera antología de los principales trabajos de Waldron sobre un concepto medular del constitucionalismo contemporáneo, como dignidad humana, es de gran relevancia para la teoría política y la dogmática jurídica en los países de habla hispana. La dignidad es el fundamento de igual consideración y respeto, así como de los valores que, en una sociedad pluralista, luchamos constantemente por resguardar.
Immanuel Kant is often considered to be the source of the contemporary idea of human dignity, but his conception of human dignity and its relation to human value and to the requirement to respect others have not been widely understood. Kant on Human Dignity offers the first in-depth study in English of this subject. Based on a comprehensive analysis of all the passages in which Kant uses the term ‘dignity’, as well as an analysis of the most prominent arguments for a value of human beings in the Kant literature, the book carefully examines different ways of construing the relationship between dignity, value and respect for others. It takes seriously Kant’s Copernican Revolution in moral philosophy: Kant argues that moral imperatives cannot be based on any values without yielding heteronomy. Instead it is imperatives of reason that determine what is valuable. The requirement to respect all human beings is one such imperative. Respect for human beings does not follow from human dignity—for this would violate autonomy—but is an unconditional command of reason. Following this train of thought yields a unified account of Kant’s moral philosophy.
At the beginning of the nineties, there was an expectation within the human rights community that the next decade would be a period of consolidation for the international human rights regime. This did not happen. In fact, the human rights regime underwent dramatic changes in response to new circumstances. We have tried to highlight both the achievements and the challenges ahead in this Manual, the result of a joint project under the auspices of HumanitarianNet, a Thematic Network on Humanitarian Development Studies leaded by the University of Deusto (Bilbao, the Basque Country, Spain), and the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation (EIUC, Venice, Italy).
Unlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under American constitutional law. Under "strong-form" judicial review, as in the United States, judicial interpretations of the constitution are binding on other branches of government. In contrast, "weak-form" review allows the legislature and executive to reject constitutional rulings by the judiciary--as long as they do so publicly. Tushnet describes how weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce constitutional norms on their own. With that background, he turns to social welfare rights, explaining the connection between the "state action" or "horizontal effect" doctrine and the enforcement of social welfare rights. Tushnet then draws together the analysis of weak-form review and that of social welfare rights, explaining how weak-form review could be used to enforce those rights. He demonstrates that there is a clear judicial path--not an insurmountable judicial hurdle--to better enforcement of constitutional social welfare rights.
In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton announced that the "age of big government is over." Some Republicans accused him of cynically appropriating their themes, while many Democrats thought he was betraying the principles of the New Deal and the Great Society. Mark Tushnet argues that Clinton was stating an observed fact: the emergence of a new constitutional order in which the aspiration to achieve justice directly through law has been substantially chastened. Tushnet argues that the constitutional arrangements that prevailed in the United States from the 1930s to the 1990s have ended. We are now in a new constitutional order--one characterized by divided government, ideologically organized parties, and subdued constitutional ambition. Contrary to arguments that describe a threatened return to a pre-New Deal constitutional order, however, this book presents evidence that our current regime's animating principle is not the old belief that government cannot solve any problems but rather that government cannot solve any more problems. Tushnet examines the institutional arrangements that support the new constitutional order as well as Supreme Court decisions that reflect it. He also considers recent developments in constitutional scholarship, focusing on the idea of minimalism as appropriate to a regime with chastened ambitions. Tushnet discusses what we know so far about the impact of globalization on domestic constitutional law, particularly in the areas of international human rights and federalism. He concludes with predictions about the type of regulation we can expect from the new order. This is a major new analysis of the constitutional arrangements in the United States. Though it will not be received without controversy, it offers real explanatory and predictive power and provides important insights to both legal theorists and political scientists.