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Philosophical aspects of law and jurisprudence are investigated from various points of view. This collection represents the analytic approach to legal philosophy. However, this approach is not extreme in the sense that it is limited exclusively to linguistic matters. The concept of norm as a directive of conduct is the central category analyzed in particular essays. The structure of directives as well as their semantic and pragmatic roles are studied. Pragmatic functions of directives are linked with their functioning as speech acts. Moreover, existence and validity of norms are analyzed. The author also touches on general methodological problems of legal theory and philosophy, particularly their relations to social sciences. The collection covers material interesting for philosophers, lawyers and social scientists.
Conklin's thesis is that the tradition of modern legal positivism, beginning with Thomas Hobbes, postulated different senses of the invisible as the authorising origin of humanly posited laws. Conklin re-reads the tradition by privileging how the canons share a particular understanding of legal language as written. Leading philosophers who have espoused the tenets of the tradition have assumed that legal language is written and that the authorising origin of humanly posited rules/norms is inaccessible to the written legal language. Conklin's re-reading of the tradition teases out how each of these leading philosophers has postulated that the authorising origin of humanly posited laws is an unanalysable externality to the written language of the legal structure. As such, the authorising origin of posited rules/norms is inaccessible or invisible to their written language. What is this authorising origin? Different forms include an originary author, an a priori concept, and an immediacy of bonding between person and laws. In each case the origin is unwritten in the sense of being inaccessible to the authoritative texts written by the officials of civil institutions of the sovereign state. Conklin sets his thesis in the context of the legal theory of the polis and the pre-polis of Greek tribes. The author claims that the problem is that the tradition of legal positivism of a modern sovereign state excises the experiential, or bodily, meanings from the written language of the posited rules/norms, thereby forgetting the very pre-legal authorising origin of the posited norms that each philosopher admits as offering the finality that legal reasoning demands if it is to be authoritative.
This is the first comprehensive account of the modern international law of treaty interpretation expressed in 1969 Vienna Convention, Articles 31-33. As stated by the anonymous referee, it is the most theoretically advanced and analytically refined work yet accomplished on this topic. The style of writing is clear and concise, and the organisation of the book meets the demands of scholars and practitioners alike.
Talk about law often includes reference to ideals of justice, equality or freedom. But what do we refer to when we speak about ideals in the context of law? This book explores the concept of ideals by combining an investigation of different theories of ideals with a discussion of the role of ideals in law. A comparison of the theories of Gustav Radbruch and Philip Selznick leads up to a pragmatist theory of legal ideals, which provides an interesting new position in the debate about values in law between legal positivists and natural law thinkers. Attention for law's central ideals enables us to understand law's autonomous character, while at the same time tracing its connection to societal values. Essential reading for anyone interested in the role of values or ideals in law.
Authors Costa and Zolo share the conviction that a proper understanding of the rule of law today requires reference to a global problematic horizon. This book offers some relevant guides for orienting the reader through a political and legal debate where the rule of law (and the doctrine of human rights) is a concept both controversial and significant at the national and international levels.
Studies in Legal Logic is a collection of nine interrelated papers about the logic, epistemology and ontology of law. All of the papers were written after the publication of the author’s Reasoning with Rules and supplement the issues addressed therein. Some of the papers are new; others have been revised substantially after the publication of their original versions. The emphasis is on analysis, not on logical technicalities. Studies in Legal Logic contains chapters about the nature of norms, the role of coherence in the law, the nature of defeasibility, the role of dialectics in law and artificial intelligence, the statics and dynamics of the law, and the consistency of rules. Moreover, it contains a new, simplified and yet more powerful version of Reason-based Logic and extensive examples of how it can be used for the analysis of legal reasoning. The examples deal with legal theory construction, case-based reasoning, and judicial proof.
The intertwinement of EC law and national law may create unforeseeability in situations where EC law invades the national cases. This study contributes to the contemporary discussion, which wrestles with questions such as: What have been the visions and objectives for European integration in the last decades? How to describe European Union as a political entity and a legal system? What is the relationship between legal certainty, rule of law, various general principles and human rights?
Methods of Legal Reasoning describes and criticizes four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics. The book takes the unusual approach of discussing in a single study four different, sometimes competing concepts of legal method. Sketched this way, the panorama allows the reader to reflect deeply on questions concerning the methodological conditioning of legal science and the existence of a unique, specific legal method.
How can the power of constitutional judges to overturn parliamentary choices on the basis of their own reading of the constitution, be reconciled with fundamental democratic principles which assign the supreme role in the political system to parliaments? This time-honoured question acquired a new significance when the post-commumst countries of Central and Eastern Europe, without exception, adopted constitutional models in which constitutional courts play a very significant role, at least in theory. Can we learn something about the relationship between democracy and constitutionalism in general, from the meteoric rise of constitutional tribunals in the post-communist countries? Can the discussions and controversies relating to constitutional review which have been going on for decades in more established democracies illuminate the sources of the strength of constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe? These questions lie at the center of this book, which focuses on the question of constitutional review in postcommunist states, from a theoretical and comparative perspective. The chapters contained in the book outline the conceptual framework for analyzing the sources, the role and the legitimacy of constitutional justice in a system of political democracy. From this perspective, it assesses the experience of constitutional justice in the West (where the model originated) and in Central and Eastern Europe, where the model has been implanted after the fail of Communism.
Martin van Hees presents a new approach to the study of law - legal reductionism - which combines elements of legal positivism, new institutionalism and decision theory. From legal positivism Van Hees derives some fundamental insights into the nature of legal systems, but he also revises some of its key tenets. He argues that law can be reduced to facts; moreover, he re-establishes the relation between law and morality by arguing that law and positive morality are inherently related. He subsequently uses decision-theoretic tools to develop and defend his reductionist methodology. The second part of the study applies the resulting approach to an analysis of legal freedom. By showing that legal reductionism allows us to analyse the value of liberal legal systems, Van Hees makes a forceful case for including the study of law in moral and political philosophy. The book is accessible to a wide readership, including legal and moral philosophers, political theorists and social scientists.