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This book presents the theory of the validity of legal norms, aimed at the practice of law, in particular the jurisdiction of the constitutional courts. The postpositivist concept of the validity of statutory law, grounded on a critical analysis of the basic theories of legal validity elaborated up to now, is introduced. In the first part of the book a contemporary German nonpositivist conception of law developed by Ralf Dreier and Robert Alexy is analysed in order to answer the question whether the juristic concept of legal validity should include moral standards or criteria. In the second part, a postpositivist concept of legal validity and an innovative model of validity discourse, based on the juristic presumption of the validity of legal norms, are proposed. The book is a work on analytical legal theory, written from a postpositivist, detached point of view.
This book features essays that investigate the nature of legal validity from the point of view of different traditions and disciplines. Validity is a fascinating and elusive characteristic of law that in itself deserves to be explored, but further investigation is made more acute and necessary by the production, nowadays, of soft law products of regulation, such as declarations, self-regulatory codes, and standardization norms. These types of rules may not exhibit the characteristics of formal law, and may lack full formal validity but yet may have a very real impact on people's lives. The essays focus on the structural properties of hard and soft legal phenomena and the basis of their validity. Some propose to redefine validity: to allow for multiple concepts instead of one and/or to allow for a gradual concept of validity. Others seek to analyze the new situation by linking it to familiar historical debates and well-established theories of law. In addition, coverage looks at the functions of validity itself. The discussion considers both international law as well as domestic law arrangements. What does it mean to say that something is valid? Should we discard validity as the determining aspect of law? If so, what does this mean for our concept of law? Should we differentiate between kinds of validity? Or, can we say that rules can be "more" or "less" valid? After reading this book, practitioners, scholars and students will have a nuanced understanding of these questions and more. Chapter 6 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.
Critical human interests are affected on a daily basis by appeal to past decisions deemed to be 'legally valid'. They include statutes, deportation orders, judgments, mortgage contracts, patents and wills. Through the technique of validity, lawyerly reasoning settles morally pressing matters in a way that largely bypasses moral argument. Legal philosophy has paid considerable attention to validity criteria, but it has neglected to explore validity's point: whether, and if so how, the pervasive technique of validity can contribute to a legal system's ability to realise justice and human rights. This book shows that validity can help a political community to foster justice precisely because validity does not primarily turn on moral considerations. Validity serves to both allocate, and limit, a distinct kind of power, a power that is key to forging valuable forms of enterprise and commitment in pursuit of individual and collective self-direction. By entrusting the capacity to decide to those who, in justice, ought to bear it, validity can enable persons and institutions to rally the resources and opportunities that only large-scale behavioural convergence can afford, thereby weaving a fabric of just relationships within the systemic framework of law.
The essays in this book treat important aspects of most of the major themes in contemporary philosophy of law and legal theory. All reveal the distinctive authenticity of the author's work, for he is not only a reputable legal theorist but an internationally known scholar of private law, and for many years chair of the Bielefelder Kreis, an international group of legal theorists who have jointly authored major works comparing methodologies of statutory interpretation and precedent.
This study of legal validity is an expanded and thoroughly revised version of my B.Phil. thesis in philosophy at Oxford University in 1969. I am grateful to Professor R. M. Hare, Dr. P. M. Hacker, and Mr. L. J. Cohen for their patient criticism of earlier drafts, and to Professor Donald H. Regan for several suggestions at a later stage. I owe a much larger debt to Professor H. L. A. Hart for his detailed comments on the completed thesis. His help has been especially gener ous in light of the fact that I have so often disagreed with him. It should not be assumed that those from whose advice I have benefited share the views expressed in this essay. I am responsible for any mistakes it may contain. In the footnotes I have used the following abbreviations: CL - Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) GT - Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945) PT - Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1967) LJ - Ross, On Law and Justice (1958).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
This book grew out of the conviction that the original concepts of the Poznań School of Legal Theory are still perfectly suited for application today, in the era of moral pluralism and multicentric legal systems. Moreover, since we are in the midst of a period of heated disputes over the grounds of the normativity of law, and are confronting controversies about the basis for the legitimacy of court decisions, over the results of legal interpretation, and concerning the coherence of legal systems, it would seem that the legal-theoretical proposals put forward by the circle of Poznań legal theorists, supported as they are by firm methodological foundations, have not by any means lost their value.
In this groundbreaking book, Scalia and Garner systematically explain all the most important principles of constitutional, statutory, and contractual interpretation in an engaging and informative style with hundreds of illustrations from actual cases. Is a burrito a sandwich? Is a corporation entitled to personal privacy? If you trade a gun for drugs, are you using a gun in a drug transaction? The authors grapple with these and dozens of equally curious questions while explaining the most principled, lucid, and reliable techniques for deriving meaning from authoritative texts. Meanwhile, the book takes up some of the most controversial issues in modern jurisprudence. What, exactly, is textualism? Why is strict construction a bad thing? What is the true doctrine of originalism? And which is more important: the spirit of the law, or the letter? The authors write with a well-argued point of view that is definitive yet nuanced, straightforward yet sophisticated.