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A distinguished and experienced appellate court judge, Richard A. Posner offers in this new book a unique and, to orthodox legal thinkers, a startling perspective on how judges and justices decide cases. When conventional legal materials enable judges to ascertain the true facts of a case and apply clear pre-existing legal rules to them, Posner argues, they do so straightforwardly; that is the domain of legalist reasoning. However, in non-routine cases, the conventional materials run out and judges are on their own, navigating uncharted seas with equipment consisting of experience, emotions, and often unconscious beliefs. In doing so, they take on a legislative role, though one that is confined by internal and external constraints, such as professional ethics, opinions of respected colleagues, and limitations imposed by other branches of government on freewheeling judicial discretion. Occasional legislators, judges are motivated by political considerations in a broad and sometimes a narrow sense of that term. In that open area, most American judges are legal pragmatists. Legal pragmatism is forward-looking and policy-based. It focuses on the consequences of a decision in both the short and the long term, rather than on its antecedent logic. Legal pragmatism so understood is really just a form of ordinary practical reasoning, rather than some special kind of legal reasoning. Supreme Court justices are uniquely free from the constraints on ordinary judges and uniquely tempted to engage in legislative forms of adjudication. More than any other court, the Supreme Court is best understood as a political court.
Explores the contributions of international courts and tribunals in terms of performance by offering a comparative analysis of international courts.
A Discussion paper from the BJS-Princeton Project.
This open access book is about the perception of the independence of the judiciary in Europe. Do citizens and judges see its independence in the same way? Do judges feel that their independence is respected by the users of the courts, by the leadership of the courts and by politicians? Does the population trust the judiciary more than other public institutions, or less? How does independence of the judiciary work at the national level and at the level of the European Union? These interrelated questions are particularly relevant in times when the independence of the judiciary is under political pressure in several countries in the European Union, giving way to illiberal democracy. Revealing surveys among judges, lay judges and lawyers - in addition to regular surveys of the European Commission - provide a wealth of information to answer these questions. While the answers will not please everyone, they are of interest to a wide audience, in particular court leaders, judges, lawyers, politicians and civil servants.
World Bank Technical Paper no. 430.QUOTEMany countries are undertaking legal and judicial reforms as part of their overall development programs; there is increasing recognition that economic and social progress requires consolidation of democracy as well as respect for the rule of law and human rights; without these development is not sustainable.QUOTEMany developing countries find that their judiciaries are inconsistent in conflict resolution and carry a large backlog of cases, thus stifling private-sector growth, eroding individual and property rights, and perhaps even violating human rights. Delays affect both the fairness and the efficiency of the system. They impede the public's access to the courts, which, in effect, weakens democracies, the rule of law and the ability to enforce human rights. This paper aims to describe and explain the performance of court systems in a sample of developing and developed countries in order to provide data to those designing or evaluating reforms. The study also seeks to show areas in which international comparison of judicial performance can be fruitful, suggesting indicators that can be used in such comparisons. Finally, it endeavors to provide comparisons of performance within individual countries over time.
When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues that in developing democracies the political benefits of manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so. The instability of the political context and its institutions causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control. Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory, Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for studying manipulation of high courts.
This book provides decisive guidance on the techniques in counting and classifying cases, which are applicable in any court system and also advances the use of sophisticated equilibrium modeling techniques in determining the optimal quantity of cases and timelines from filing to disposition. Crucially, this book also provides a detailed exposition on the application of twenty-nine statistical formula subdivided into twelve productivity metrics, eight time lag metrics, five civil case activity efficiency metrics, and four judicial resource management metrics. These metrics provide a solid basis for the effective management and mobilization of judicial resources. The book also uses regression analyses in analyzing the factors which explain court productivity in the Jamaican court system and found decisively that the single most important factor explaining court productivity in the civil and criminal jurisdictions of the parish courts was the demand for judicial services, suggesting that judges respond positively to increased demand by increasing output.
In the United States, some populations suffer from far greater disparities in health than others. Those disparities are caused not only by fundamental differences in health status across segments of the population, but also because of inequities in factors that impact health status, so-called determinants of health. Only part of an individual's health status depends on his or her behavior and choice; community-wide problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, inadequate housing, poor public transportation, interpersonal violence, and decaying neighborhoods also contribute to health inequities, as well as the historic and ongoing interplay of structures, policies, and norms that shape lives. When these factors are not optimal in a community, it does not mean they are intractable: such inequities can be mitigated by social policies that can shape health in powerful ways. Communities in Action: Pathways to Health Equity seeks to delineate the causes of and the solutions to health inequities in the United States. This report focuses on what communities can do to promote health equity, what actions are needed by the many and varied stakeholders that are part of communities or support them, as well as the root causes and structural barriers that need to be overcome.
This edited volume examines the very essence of the function of judges, building upon developments in the quality of justice research throughout Europe. Distinguished authors address a gap in the literature by considering the standards that individual judgments should meet, presenting both academic and practical perspectives. Readers are invited to consider such questions as: What is expected from judicial reasoning? Is there a general concept of good quality with regard to judicial reasoning? Are there any attempts being made to measure the quality of judicial reasoning? The focus here is on judges meeting the highest standards possible in adjudication and how they may be held to account for the way they reason. The contributions examine theoretical questions surrounding the measurement of the quality of judicial reasoning, practices and legal systems across Europe, and judicial reasoning in various international courts. Six legal systems in Europe are featured: England and Wales, Finland, Italy, the Czech Republic, France and Hungary as well as three non-domestic levels of court jurisdictions, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The depth and breadth of subject matter presented in this volume ensure its relevance for many years to come. All those with an interest in benchmarking the quality of judicial reasoning, including judges themselves, academics, students and legal practitioners, can find something of value in this book.
Judges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision-makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In the authors' view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional “legalist” theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes.