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Judicial control of public administration is essential for the realisation of the rule of law and democracy. To date, there is virtually no effective judicial protection in Afghanistan. However, a study of Afghan legal history suggests that the country has certain - currently underdeveloped - institutions that could be used as the basis for the creation of judicial control. Based on a historical study, the book elaborates the pluralist legal culture of Afghanistan, rooted in tribal and Islamic legal conceptions alongside a State legal system. The author proposes practical solutions for the development of judicial control of public administration in Afghanistan. Dr. Mirwais Ayobi has more than a decade of experience as an assistant professor of law and political science in Afghanistan. His work focuses on administrative law, constitutional law, public administration and judicial review.
Afghanistan's constitution was approved by consensus on January 4, 2004, and President Hamid Karzai acceded to it in Kabul on January 26, 2004. The norms of adherence to the tenets of Islam's holy religion, as well as Islamic constitutionalism, shall not be altered. Modifying people's fundamental rights is only allowed to improve them. Articles 149 and 150 of the Constitution cover the duties and obligations of the legislative organ in amending other articles of the Constitution. It is made up of a preamble and 162 articles organized into 12 chapters. Chapter I: State; Chapter II: Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens; Chapter III: The President; Chapter IV: Government; Chapter V: National Assembly; Chapter VI: Loya Jirga; Chapter VII: The Judiciary; Chapter VIII: Administration; Chapter IX: State of Emergency; Chapter X: Amendments; Chapter XI: Miscellaneous Provisions; Chapter XII: Transitional Provisions.
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan vaguely describes the powers of the Supreme Court (the Court) to interpret the constitution and exercise judicial review. It also describes an independent commission for the supervision of the implementation of the constitution (the Commission), whose powers are ambiguous and seem to overlap with those of the Court. The political branches of the government have taken advantage of these constitutional ambiguities and adopted legislation that vested judicial review and constitutional interpretation powers in two rival institutions, the Court and the Commission, thereby containing the power of the regular judiciary. This Article explores the implications of this fragmented system of judicial review in Afghanistan. It argues that this fractured system of judicial review has severely undermined the powers of the Court, and it has impeded the ability of both the Court and the Commission to issue binding judicial review opinions. Both entities have instead developed a practice of advising the political branches of the government, and, in the process, they have issued a large number of advisory opinions, letting the executive and the legislature treat the Court and the Commission as consultative bodies rather than co-equal and independent branches of the government. This Article offers the first detailed examination of Afghanistan's judicial review system. In addition, it adds a critical and timely case study to the scholarship on the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes. Specifically, this history and analysis provide evidence to support claims made by Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa that authoritarian presidents try to restrain the power and authority of the regular judiciary by setting up competing institutions with overlapping jurisdiction over constitutional matters instead of creating a unified hierarchical institutional mechanism. This Article further illustrates that Ginsburg and Moustafa's theory might be extended to powerful, not necessarily authoritarian, executives who may also contain the power of the regular judiciary by intentionally engineering competing institutions to resolve constitutional disputes.
Since reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan began in 2001, the U.S. government, the international community, and the Afghan government have made improving Afghanistan's justice system a priority. Key documents have noted the importance of the justice sector, including the U.S. government's Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan and the Afghan Government's National Priority Programs focus on strengthening Afghan rule of law and Afghan citizens' access to justice. The Department of State (State) has invested in a variety of rule of law programs since 2005, including programs managed by its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to train Afghan justice sector personnel. State also serves as the lead coordinator for U.S. justice sector development efforts in Afghanistan, responsible for coordinating the activities of several U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Justice. INL has spent approximately $205.5 million on its Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) to provide training to Afghan justice sector officials, to develop a case management system to track cases throughout Afghanistan's justice system, and to build the capacity and administrative skills of officials within Afghan ministries
How, despite the enormous investment of blood and treasure, has the West's ten-year intervention left Afghanistan so lawless and insecure? The answer is more insidious than any conspiracy, for it begins with a profound lack of understanding of the rule of law, the very thing that most dramatically separates Western societies from the benighted ones in which they increasingly intervene. This volume of essays argues that the rule of law is not a set of institutions that can be exported lock, stock and barrel to lawless lands, but a state of affairs under which ordinary people and officials of the state itself feel it makes sense to act within the law. Where such a state of affairs is absent, as in Afghanistan today, brute force, not law, will continue to rule.
This global encyclopedic work serves as a comprehensive collection of global scholarship regarding the vast fields of public administration, public policy, governance, and management. Written and edited by leading international scholars and practitioners, this exhaustive resource covers all areas of the above fields and their numerous subfields of study. In keeping with the multidisciplinary spirit of these fields and subfields, the entries make use of various theoretical, empirical, analytical, practical, and methodological bases of knowledge. Expanded and updated, the second edition includes over a thousand of new entries representing the most current research in public administration, public policy, governance, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations, and management covering such important sub-areas as: 1. organization theory, behavior, change and development; 2. administrative theory and practice; 3. Bureaucracy; 4. public budgeting and financial management; 5. public economy and public management 6. public personnel administration and labor-management relations; 7. crisis and emergency management; 8. institutional theory and public administration; 9. law and regulations; 10. ethics and accountability; 11. public governance and private governance; 12. Nonprofit management and nongovernmental organizations; 13. Social, health, and environmental policy areas; 14. pandemic and crisis management; 15. administrative and governance reforms; 16. comparative public administration and governance; 17. globalization and international issues; 18. performance management; 19. geographical areas of the world with country-focused entries like Japan, China, Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Russia and Eastern Europe, North America; and 20. a lot more. Relevant to professionals, experts, scholars, general readers, researchers, policy makers and manger, and students worldwide, this work will serve as the most viable global reference source for those looking for an introduction and advance knowledge to the field.
In the context of a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan during September-November 2009, the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government figured prominently. In his December 1, 2009, speech announcing a way forward in Afghanistan, President Obama stated that the Afghan government would be judged on performance, and "The days of providing a blank check are over." The policy statement was based, in part, on an assessment of the security situation furnished by the top commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, which warned of potential mission failure unless a fully resourced classic counterinsurgency strategy is employed. That counterinsurgency effort is deemed to require a legitimate Afghan partner. The Afghan government's limited writ and widespread official corruption are believed by U.S. officials to be helping sustain a Taliban insurgency and complicating international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. At the same time, President Hamid Karzai has, through compromise with faction leaders, been able to confine ethnic disputes to political competition, enabling his government to focus on trying to win over those members of the ethnic Pashtun community that support Taliban and other insurgents.