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This original book systematically examines Japan’s defense engagement with its strategic partners since the end of the Cold War based on Japan’s national security strategy. The author maps three defense engagement activities: military exercises, capacity building, and defense equipment transfer and technology cooperation – and subsequently evaluates these against the three national security objectives: deterrence, cooperative security, and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. The book asks two important research questions: why is Japan active in defense engagement with the armed forces of its strategic partners? And, what purposes do Japan’s self-defense forces pursue? Through the ten carefully selected cases of strategic partners: Australia, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, ASEAN, the UK, France, NATO, and the EU, the book follows a structured, cross-case comparison based on the analytical framework developed for the research. It also discusses the evolution of Japan’s postwar defense policy, providing a solid background for the case studies. The book overall argues that, while the Japan-US alliance is still the most indispensable, Japan’s strategic partnerships are a valuable instrument of deterrence that contributes to Japan’s national security objectives. In order to more effectively pursue these objectives and thus secure the national interest, Japan must pursue a purpose-driven defense engagement.
Examining the pivotal relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, as it has changed and endured into the Indo-Pacific Era
Most recently, Japan’s Defence Minister Kishi said the international community must be aware of a possible Crimea-style invasion of Taiwan by China. With the objective of realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific, the six-nation naval exercise that took place near Okinawa and the South China Sea among Japan, the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, and New Zealand between 2 and 9 October for air defence, anti-submarine warfare, communications, and replenishment-at-sea must be understood against the background of this intense military environment.
This is an in-depth analysis of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and its implications for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. It moves away from the official line that the alliance is a vital aspect of Japan's security policy and introduces issues and arguments that are often overlooked: American security policy has failed to achieve its goals; Japan's interests are not fully served by the alliance; the alliance itself is a source of instability in the region; and the arrangement has placed constraints on Japan's own political development. The author measures current developments in U.S. foreign policy against Japan's role in the region and Japan's own political development. He assesses the consequences of the alliance for the current regional situation in Northeast Asia, looks at future policy options for Japan, and makes the case for a neutralist security policy.
This wide-ranging collection seeks to reassess conventional understanding of Japan’s Asia-Pacific War by defamiliarizing and expanding the rhetorical narrative. Its nine chapters, diverse in theme and method, are united in their goal to recover a measured historicity about the conflict by either introducing new areas of knowledge or reinterpreting existing ones. Collectively, they cast doubt on the war as familiar and recognizable, compelling readers to view it with fresh eyes. Following an introduction that problematizes timeworn narratives about a “unified Japan” and its “illegal war” or “race war,” early chapters on the destruction of Japan’s diplomatic records and government interest in an egalitarian health care policy before, during, and after the war oblige us to question selective histories and moral judgments about wartime Japan. The discussion then turns to artistic/cultural production and self-determination, specifically to Osaka rakugo performers who used comedy to contend with state oppression and to the role of women in creating care packages for soldiers abroad. Other chapters cast doubt on well-trod stereotypes (Japan’s lack of pragmatism in its diplomatic relations with neutral nations and its irrational and fatalistic military leadership) and examine resistance to the war by a prominent Japanese Christian intellectual. The volume concludes with two nuanced responses to race in wartime Japan, one maintaining the importance of racial categories while recognizing the “performance of Japaneseness,” the other observing that communities often reflected official government policies through nationality rather than race. Contrasting findings like these underscore the need to ask new questions and fill old gaps in our understanding of a historical event that, after more than seventy years, remains as provocative and divisive as ever. Defamiliarizing Japan’s Asia-Pacific War will find a ready audience among World War II historians as well as specialists in war and society, social history, and the growing fields of material culture and civic history.
The book studies the development of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. As strategic competition grows, the lessons from the pandemic, the deepening Sino-US rivalry, and the United States losing grip on the current world strategic environment all compel Japan to focus its attention on the Indo-Pacific region. The volume examines Japan's foreign policy through an analysis of its strategic agenda, economic calculations, maritime security concerns, and soft power policies. It looks at Japan’s relations with United States, Australia, India, Vietnam, Africa, South Korea, Indonesia, and the United States in the context of Japan’s bilateral and multilateral arrangements. An important contribution to the study of politics in the Indo-Pacific region, the book will be an indispensable resource for students and researchers of political science, international relations, foreign policy, geopolitics, security studies, strategic studies, as well as area studies – namely East and Southeast Asian studies and Indo-Pacific studies.
After decades of solely relying on the United States for its national security needs, over the last decade, Japan has begun to actively develop and deepen its security ties with a growing number of countries and actors in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe, a development that has further intensified under the Shinzo Abe administration. This is the first book that provides a comprehensive analysis of the motives and objectives from both the Japanese and the partner-countries’ perspectives, and asks what this might mean for the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, and what lessons can be learned for security cooperation more broadly. This book is for those interested in Japan’s security policy beyond the US-Japan security alliance, and non-US centred bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. It is an ideal textbook for undergraduate and graduate level courses on regional security cooperation and strategic partnerships, and Japanese foreign and security policy.
In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War — especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China’s rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. There are a number of noteworthy “updates” which include: • A deliberate move from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” as the primary geo-strategic and geo-economic area of interest and responsibility for the three countries; • An increased emphasis on creating and sustaining a “balance of power” in favour of the rules-based order; and • A greater emphasis on the liberal aspects of a preferred order including the importance of rule-of-law and limitations on how governments wield their power, and greater separation of political and strategic objectives on one hand with commercial activities on the other. While operationalization of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept is at an early stage, trilateral strategic cooperation between the U.S., Japan and Australia is significant and quickly deepening. On the other hand, and with respect to misalignment and inconsistency, the economic policies of the Trump administration are causing considerable frustration. The three countries have also been strong supporters for the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping which also includes India. However, and notwithstanding some apprehension in Southeast Asia, about where the “Quad” is heading, the latter grouping is only still a fledgling one and its shape and development will depend on the extent to which the four countries become concerned about China’s activities in both Oceans. Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies — including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India — with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, the paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN’s court in terms of the future of its regional “centrality”.