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In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military prematurely abandoned its original sound strategic plan—to secure the resources Japan needed and establish a viable defensible perimeter for the Empire—that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war in the Pacific that could have influenced the course and outcome of World War II. It is therefore a study both of Japanese defeat and of what was needed to achieve a potential Japanese victory, or at the very least, to avoid total ruin. Wood's argument does not depend on signal individual historical events or dramatic accidents. Instead it examines how familiar events could have b
In this provocative history, James B. Wood challenges the received wisdom that Japan's defeat in the Pacific was historically inevitable. He argues instead that it was only when the Japanese military abandoned their original strategic plan to secure resources and establish a viable defensible perimeter that the Allies were able to regain the initiative and lock Japanese forces into a war of attrition they were not prepared to fight. The book persuasively shows how the Japanese army and navy had both the opportunity and the capability to have fought a different and more successful war. If Japan had traveled that alternate military road the outcome of the Pacific War could have been far different from the ending we know so well-and perhaps a little too complacently accept.
This wide-ranging collection seeks to reassess conventional understanding of Japan’s Asia-Pacific War by defamiliarizing and expanding the rhetorical narrative. Its nine chapters, diverse in theme and method, are united in their goal to recover a measured historicity about the conflict by either introducing new areas of knowledge or reinterpreting existing ones. Collectively, they cast doubt on the war as familiar and recognizable, compelling readers to view it with fresh eyes. Following an introduction that problematizes timeworn narratives about a “unified Japan” and its “illegal war” or “race war,” early chapters on the destruction of Japan’s diplomatic records and government interest in an egalitarian health care policy before, during, and after the war oblige us to question selective histories and moral judgments about wartime Japan. The discussion then turns to artistic/cultural production and self-determination, specifically to Osaka rakugo performers who used comedy to contend with state oppression and to the role of women in creating care packages for soldiers abroad. Other chapters cast doubt on well-trod stereotypes (Japan’s lack of pragmatism in its diplomatic relations with neutral nations and its irrational and fatalistic military leadership) and examine resistance to the war by a prominent Japanese Christian intellectual. The volume concludes with two nuanced responses to race in wartime Japan, one maintaining the importance of racial categories while recognizing the “performance of Japaneseness,” the other observing that communities often reflected official government policies through nationality rather than race. Contrasting findings like these underscore the need to ask new questions and fill old gaps in our understanding of a historical event that, after more than seventy years, remains as provocative and divisive as ever. Defamiliarizing Japan’s Asia-Pacific War will find a ready audience among World War II historians as well as specialists in war and society, social history, and the growing fields of material culture and civic history.
The respected British military historian H. P. Willmott presents the first of a three-volume appraisal of the strategic policies of the countries involved in the Pacific War. Remarkable in its scope and depth of research, his thoughtful analysis covers the whole range of political, economic, military, and naval activity in the Pacific. This first volume comprehensively covers events between December 1941 and April 1942, concluding with the Doolittle Raid on April 18. When published in hardcover in 1982, the book was hailed as an eloquent portrayal of great empires on trial that no one should miss. Willmott’s stimulating and original approach to the subject remains unmatched even today.
An accessible, analytical survey of the rise and fall of Imperial Japan in the context of its grand strategy to transform itself into a great power.
 During the first 10 months of the war in the Pacific, Japan achieved air supremacy with its carrier and land-based forces. But after major setbacks at Midway and Guadalcanal, the empire's expansion stalled, in part due to flaws in aircraft design, strategy and command. This book offers a fresh analysis of the air war in the Pacific during the early phases of World War II. Details are included from two expeditions conducted by the author that reveal the location of an American pilot missing in the Philippines since 1942 and clear up a controversial account involving famed Japanese ace Saburo Sakai and U.S. Navy pilot James "Pug" Southerland.
This book argues that American strategists in the Joint Chiefs of Staff were keenly aware of the inseparability of political and military aspects of strategy in the fight against Japan in World War II. They understood that war not only has political sources, it also has political purposes that establish the war's objectives and help to define the nature of the peace to follow. They understood that policy was the 'guiding intelligence' for war, in Clausewitzian terms, and that to attempt to approach strategic problems was nonsensical.
Based on twenty years of research in formerly secret archives, this book reveals for the first time the full significance of War Plan Orange—the U.S. Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, formulated over the forty years prior to World War II.
In Decemeber 1941, WW2 became a truly global war with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, dragging the US into the war both in Europe and Asia. What is not widely known is that war had been going on since 1931 in Asia, provoked by Japan seeking dominance of Asia. Why Japan chose such aggressive course of action is even less well understood. This book seeks to explain how Japan's internal conditions and external relations led her to a war in Asia that would in turn lead to a head-on collision with the US and the Western colonial powers. Japan did not plan for such a general conflict with the entire West. Japan's frustration at the failure to defeat China, however, made her decide that they had no choice but to fight the US also. Japanese strategic thinking was thus still very premature, with Japanese military leaders unable to think through the likely consequences of such a course of action; they certainly did not have flexibility to adjust to changing strategic environment due to change of technology, economic balance and the sheer commitment of the US to the war aim of completely defeating Japan. Neglecting war logistics and obsessed with the idea of decisive fleet action, the Japanese were worn down by the increasing air and naval power of the US and was crushed in the end. Such outcome had been anticipated by the Western Allies in their war studies before the 1940s. Hence the tragedy is Japan's failure to come up with any effective scheme to defeat American strategy. Defeated comprehensively in war of logistics, starving Japanese soldiers acted badly everywhere, a legacy of WW2 in Asia which Japan has to live with even today. Read more: http: //www.quest-publications.com/books/japans-pacific-war/