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This paper tests for contagion in emerging debt markets following Russia and Argentina's government defaults. Using techniques that have been previously suggested for contagion tests in stock markets we find that debt and stock markets respond differently to financial crises. Volatilities and correlations do not increase significantly during default episodes and no evidence supporting spillover effects is found. However, we find evidence of contagion in extreme returns during both crisis periods as well as in the entire sample period. We conclude that contagion in emerging bond markets is more likely driven by their high linkages than by crisis episodes.
No sooner had the Asian crisis broken out in 1997 than the witch-hunt started. With great indignation every Asian economy pointed fingers. They were innocent bystanders. The fundamental reason for the crisis was this or that - most prominently contagion - but also the decline in exports of the new commodities (high-tech goods), the steep rise of the dollar, speculators, etc. The prominent question, of course, is whether contagion could really have been the key factor and, if so, what are the channels and mechanisms through which it operated in such a powerful manner. The question is obvious because until 1997, Asia's economies were generally believed to be immensely successful, stable and well managed. This question is of great importance not only in understanding just what happened, but also in shaping policies. In a world of pure contagion, i.e. when innocent bystanders are caught up and trampled by events not of their making and when consequences go far beyond ordinary international shocks, countries will need to look for better protective policies in the future. In such a world, the international financial system will need to change in order to offer better preventive and reactive policy measures to help avoid, or at least contain, financial crises.
Financial markets are today so interconnected that they are fragile to contagion. Massive investment funds with very short horizons in -and out- flows can generate contagion effects between markets. Since 2010, investors are willing to get a liquid exposure to the EM sovereign debt. As a consequence, some asset management firms started to propose products to track the performance of this asset class. However in that case, the fund manager faces a mismatch of liquidity between assets and liabilities and needs some tools to manage the liquidity of his investments. The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of contagion looking at common market liquidity problems to detect funding liquidity problems. Using the CDS Bond Spread basis as a liquidity indicator and a state space model with time-varying volatility specification, we show that during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, there exist pure contagion effects both in terms of price and liquidity on the emerging sovereign debt market. This result has strong implication since the main risk for an asset manager is to get stuck with an unwanted position due to a dry-up of market liquidity.
Using secondary market debt prices and country credit ratings, this paper provides evidence of contagion in emerging markets. It shows that fundamentals are unable to explain the cross-country comovement of creditworthiness in Latin American countries. It also shows that contagion cannot be explained by big news events, such as Brady announcements, and that it is asymmetric, being stronger for negative innovations in creditworthiness. In contrast, in a control group composed of US corporate bond prices and credit ratings of a group of medium size OECD countries, fundamentals explain all the observed correlation. The paper presents a simple model trying to explain this puzzle. It combines illiquid countries with investors who potentially need liquidity in order to change their portfolio. The basic intuition is that if investors require liquidity and they do not find it in one country, then they will seek funds in a second country. Under two alternative equilibrium definitions, the model shows that the probability of repayment of one country is negatively affected by the degree of illiquidity of other countries--an apparently country-specific characteristic.
Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: In recent years academics and policy makers have become more and more interested in the phenomenon of contagion, a concept involving the transmission of a financial crisis from one country to one or more other countries. During the 1990s world capital markets witnessed a number of financial crises. In 1992 the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis hit the European continent. Several countries in Latin America have been rocked during the 1994-95 Tequila crisis, and the Asian Flu spread through East Asian countries in 1997-98 with dramatic social implications. Later in 1998 the famous hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) had to file for bankruptcy and the Russian debt failure shocked international capital markets and increased volatility on a global scale. The crisis spread to as far as Brazil in early 1999 and developed markets have become victims as well. The question asked by academics and policy makers is how countries should behave in order to avoid contagion. To answer this question it is necessary to understand the different channels of contagion in greater detail and how a crisis can be transmitted from one country to another. The objective of this paper is to highlight those channels and to present a number of models and theories of contagion, which have recently been developed by academics. In general, there are several strands of theories in the literature that try to explain the transmission of crises. During the mid and late 1990s fundamental-based contagion and spillovers became popular among researchers and policy makers. Furthermore, financial linkages have been known to contribute to contagion. In contrast, in recent years, portfolio flows of international investors moved into the focus of academics. The advocates of fundamental-based contagion and spillovers argue that trade linkages between countries are responsible for contagion. For instance, a devaluation of a country's currency may lead to a negative change in fundamentals of its trading partners. On the other hand, contagion due to financial linkages is mainly explained by the fact that countries share the same banks and therefore have common creditors. A crisis in one country then leads to a deteriorating balance sheet of those common creditors. This in turn may force banks to withdraw money out of other countries in order to avoid further losses, a fact that leads to contagious sellouts. The role of international portfolio flows, which is [...]
The recent global financial crisis was the first in recent history that was triggered by problems in the financial system of the mature economies. Existing work on financial crisis in emerging market countries, however, almost exclusively focus on the role of financial frictions in the domestic economy. In contrast, we propose a two-country DSGE model to investigate the transmission of a global financial crisis that originates from financial frictions in the rest of the world. We find that the scale of financial spillovers from the global to the domestic economy and trade openness are key determinants of the severity of the financial crisis for the domestic economy. Our results also suggest that the welfare ranking of alternative monetary policy regimes is determined by the degree of financial contagion, the degree of trade openness as well as the scale of foreign currency denominated debt in the domestic economy.
This book aims to integrate the notions of contagion in epidemiology and contagion in financial market crises to discover why emerging markets are so susceptible to financial crises. The author first provides a brief introduction of the contagious spill-over of recent financial market crises and models the pattern of these crises. He finds that the contagion between crises in emerging markets, such as that of the crises in Russia and Brazil in 1998-1999, is explicable, despite the fact that at first sight they appear to have little in common. Finally, Friedrich Sell integrates these findings to outline a proposal for a 'new international financial architecture'.
This paper investigates the factors behind the 1994 and 1997 crises and whether these can explain the 1998 crisis. The study reveals that: (i) variables used in an Early Warning System model developed by IMF staff scored well in predicting the 1998 crisis out-of-sample; (ii) all three crisis episodes can be well explained by a parsimonious set of core fundamentals and liquidity related variables; and (iii) the presence of an IMF-supported program significantly reduced the depth of crises. The results suggest that as a rule of thumb countries should hold reserves to the tune of short-term debt to avoid contagion-related crises, provided their current deficits are modest and their real effective exchange rates are not significantly misaligned.
Recent financial crises suggest the importance of the diffusion mechanism, at an international level, of emerging bonds markets shocks. Using extreme value analysis for the sovereign debt spreads of emerging markets, the present paper explores the extreme dependence of the colombian risk premium to international financial markets. The architecture of capital markets can lead a collapse of emerging markets, arranging that fundamentals do not determine the position liquidation totally. The relation between the colombian country risk and the United States asset markets shows that an increase in global uncertainty defines a quot;flight to qualityquot; and therefore an additional increase in the contagion probability for the emerging markets bonds.
The essays in this volume analyze causes of financial crises in emerging markets and different policy responses.