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The Amerasia Papers

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws

Published: 1970

Total Pages: 1152


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The Amerasia affair was the first of the great spy cases of the postwar era. Unlike the Hiss or Rosenberg case, it did not lead to an epic courtroom confrontation or the imprisonment or execution of any of the principals, and perhaps for this reason, it has been largely ignored by historians. Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh provide a full-scale history of the first public drama featuring charges that respectable American citizens had spied for the Communists. It is a story with few heroes, many villains, and more than a few knaves. In June 1945, six people associated with the magazine Amerasia were arrested by the FBI and accused of espionage on behalf of the Chinese Communists. But only Philip Jaffe, editor of Amerasia, and Emmanuel Larsen, a government employee, were convicted of any offense, and their convictions were merely for unauthorized possession of government documents. Klehr and Radosh are the first researchers to have obtained the FBI files on the Amerasia case, including transcripts of wiretaps on the telephones, homes, and hotel rooms of the suspects, and they use this material to re-create the actual words and actions of the defendants.
Morgan and his contributors develop the concept of the Information Regime as a way to understand the use, abuse, and control of information in East Asia during the Cold War period. During the Cold War, war itself was changing, as was statecraft. Information emerged as the most valuable commodity, becoming the key component of societies across the globe. This was especially true in East Asia, where the military alliances forged in the wake of World War II were put to the most severe of tests. These tests came in the form of adversarial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as pressures within their alliances, which eventually caused the People’s Republic of China to break with from Moscow, while Japan for a time during the 1950s and 1660s seemed poised to move away from Washington. More important than military might, or economic influence, was the creation of "information regimes" – swathes of territory where a paradigm, ideology, or political arrangement were obtained. Information regimes are not necessarily state-centric and many of the contributors to this book focus on examples which were not so. Such a focus allows us to see that the East Asian Cold War was not really "cold" at all, but was the epicentre of an active, contentious birth of information as the defining element of human interaction. This book is a valuable resource for historians of East Asia and of developments in information management in the twentieth century.
On February 1, 1943, the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service, a forerunner of the National Security Agency, began a small, very secret program, later codenamed VENONA. The original object of the VENONA program was to examine, and possibly exploit, encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications. These messages had been accumulated by the Signal Intelligence service (later renames the U.S. Army Signal Security Agency and commonly called "Arlington Hall" after the Virginia location of its headquarters) since 1939 but had not been studied previously. American analysts discovered that these Soviet communications dealt with not only diplomatic subjects but also espionage matters. Six public releases of VENONA translations and related documents have been made. These releases covered the following topics and are discussed in this monograph: Soviet atomic bomb espionage; New York KGB message of 1942 and 1943; New York and Washington KGB message of 1944 and 1945; San Francisco and Mexico City KGB messages, GRU New York and Washington message, Washington Naval GRU messages; KGB and GRU messages from Europe, South America, and Australia; Messages inadvertently left out of the previous five updates of previously issued translations. Updates to some translations by restoring names that had been protected for privacy reasons.
Shows how Japanese anxiety about overpopulation was used to justify expansion, blurring lines between migration and settler colonialism. This title is also available as Open Access.
Communism was never a popular ideology in America, but the vehemence of American anticommunism varied from passive disdain in the 1920s to fervent hostility in the early years of the Cold War. Nothing so stimulated the white hot anticommunism of the late 1940s and 1950s more than a series of spy trials that revealed that American Communists had co-operated with Soviet espionage against the United States and had assisted in stealing the technical secrets of the atomic bomb as well as penetrating the US State Department, the Treasury Department, and the White House itself. This book, first published in 2006, reviews the major spy cases of the early Cold War (Hiss-Chambers, Rosenberg, Bentley, Gouzenko, Coplon, Amerasia and others) and the often-frustrating clashes between the exacting rules of the American criminal justice system and the requirements of effective counter-espionage.
"This general history, based on archival and monographic sources, some of which were not available to earlier writers, is designed to be a balanced and comprehensive synthesis. Seldom does a historian come upon a richer mix of colorful personalities, dramatic action, Byzantine intrigue, and momentous historical issues." "The impact of Americans on China during the war was enormous. Much of U.S. activity in China, because of inadequate knowledge of China's culture, government, and military capabilities, was harmful to China and Chiang's regime. Moreover, U.S. efforts to induce Chiang to make reforms designed to improve his regime's war effort and chances for post-war survival were ineffective." "The sulfurous American General Joseph Stilwell, assigned to serve as Chiang's chief of staff, underestimating the fighting ability of the Japanese and disregarding Chiang's advice, followed a strategy in the first Burma campaign that contributed to the loss of Chiang's best divisions and the chance of holding north Burma. Stilwell's obsessive demand for a new Burma campaign involved him in bitter controversies with Chiang, the British, and U.S. Air Commander Claire Chennault." "When the British demanded that Stilwell be removed from Burma, he, with Roosevelt's support, demanded that Chiang turn over to him the command of China's armed forces, which was equivalent to control of China. But Americans could not enforce this demand on Chiang, who expelled Stilwell from China. Ambassador Patrick Hurley then attempted to arrange a coalition government between Chiang and the Communists, a proposal Chiang rejected." "At Roosevelt's insistence, Chiang allowed America to send U.S. personnel, the "Dixie Mission," to the Communist headquarters at Yennan. Mao Tse-Tung convinced Foreign Service Officer John Service and others that he sought a cooperative relationship with America (in order, among other reasons, to reduce his dependence on Russia). Before Stilwell's dismissal Americans had decided to arm the Communists, but the removal of Stilwell defeated that purpose, and U.S. aid continued to go exclusively to Chiang. It appeared that the ideological preferences of Americans brought about a postponement of cooperation with the ultimately victorious Chinese Communists, despite an eventual common interest in keeping Soviet influence in East Asia in check." "This comprehensive study is illustrated and includes a chronology, glossary, bibliography and index."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved