Download Free Introduction Of The Principal Pupose Test And Discretionary Benefits Provisions Into Singapores Tax Treaties Not As Black As It Is Painted Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Introduction Of The Principal Pupose Test And Discretionary Benefits Provisions Into Singapores Tax Treaties Not As Black As It Is Painted and write the review.

This comprehensive two-part article addresses the manner in which, and the possible reasons why, Singapore adopted the principal purpose test (PPT) and the discretionary benefits provisions in the OECD's Multilateral Instrument (MLI), and the potential consequences of that decision. Part 1 of the article focuses on the reasons for, and manner of, introducing the PPT while Part 2 examines the potential consequences, with specific reference to channelling highly mobile income to tax havens via Singapore. The author argues that Singapore's introduction of the PPT is unlikely to deter foreign direct investment and jeopardize the country's current attractive business and tax-competitive position. Rather, the way that Singapore introduced the PPT - by way of the MLI together with the discretionary benefits provision - appears to be in line with its policy of granting tax benefits (including treaty benefits) using the tax authority's broad discretionary powers and deploying a purposive approach to interpretation of the law.
This is the second part of a comprehensive two-part article, which addresses the manner in which, and the possible reasons why, Singapore adopted the principal purpose test (PPT) and the discretionary benefits provisions in the OECD's Multilateral Instrument, and the potential consequences of that decision. This part examines hypothetical consequences of the incorporation of the PPT and the discretionary benefits provision into Singapore's tax treaties. The author challenges certain aspects of mainstream scholarship, according to which the introduction of the PPT by offshore financial centres will most likely have a negative impact on efforts to attract foreign direct investment or otherwise jeopardize their business and tax competitive position. He concludes that Singapore's - and other jurisdictions with a similar approach to taxation of income - way of meeting the minimum standard under the OECD's BEPS Action 6 is quite bizarre: on the one hand, it may still allow highly mobile income to be channelled to tax havens and otherwise attract FDIs. On the other hand, it may allow the tax authorities of Singapore's tax treaty partners that are high-tax jurisdictions to deny benefits under their treaties with Singapore to arrangements or transactions with economic substance and non-tax business purpose.
This study contains a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the principal purpose test (PPT) designed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as part of the BEPS Action 6 Final Report, "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances". Unsurprisingly, the PPT was adopted by all signatories to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI), setting out a minimum standard in accordance with the Action 6 Final Report. Once the MLI is ratified by the legislatures of signatories, it will apply to more than 2,000 treaties. From this perspective, not only does the PPT constitute the most important anti-treaty abuse rule under the MLI, but it also secures a 100% match between the tax treaties of the signatories. All the same, one may ask whether the PPT will prevent treaty abuse with a sufficient degree of precision and without giving too much discretion to tax authorities. If this is not the case, the principles of legal certainty and legality of taxation may be jeopardized, and the June 2017 victory of the executives may turn into a failure at the level of legislatures and/or jurisprudence in the near future. This article represents an attempt to map this unexplored terrain by undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the PPT in Action 6 and in the MLI with a view to examining the potential challenges arising from its legal implementation and application in respect of the PPT. Where appropriate throughout the article, alternative solutions will be proposed.
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the framework of the principal purpose test (PPT) included in the Multilateral Convention (MLI) designed by the OECD as part of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 6 Final Report, "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances", included in the BEPS Project. This article maps the primary and secondary elements generally used in a general antiavoidance rule (GAAR) to check the feasibility of these concepts in the PPT. Potential weaknesses are pointed out, as well as challenges for its legal implementation, application and interpretation. The article assesses the feasibility of the main features of the PPT as a general anti-treaty avoidance rule (GATAR) to be included in the tax treaties of the states and jurisdictions that joined the MLI. From this perspective, whether the PPT will prevent treaty abuse, treaty avoidance or aggressive tax planning without creating uncertainty and shifting too much discretionary power to tax administrations is one of the issues. Ultimately, the strengths of this provision will depend on the legislatures and courts in the near future.
This article focuses on the principal purpose test (PPT) and the limitation on benefits (LOB) provision as two divergent treaty anti-abuse measures presented by BEPS Action 6 and the Multilateral Instrument (MLI). It first traces the evolution of both these measures. Thereafter, it discusses the diverse interpretations of the PPT and studies the double-step application of the LOB in light of the US approach and comments on the merit of a standalone application of each measure as opposed to their combined application in a treaty. The article subsequently observes that while Action 6 recommended a combined application of both measures, the country choices in the MLI show a polarized global implementation of these measures. Most countries (the European Union being at the forefront) prefer a standalone application of the PPT (without the LOB), while the US rejects the PPT and continues to exclusively apply the LOB provision. Lastly, the author proposes a solution to bridge this global divide.
In this article, the author sets out his views on the abuse of tax treaties and the effectiveness of the provisions contained in article 29(9) of the OECD Model regarding the principal purpose test (PPT), together with a consideration of some of the drawbacks of the PPT.
Due to the introduction of the Multilateral Convention (MLI), an ever-growing number of the world's international tax treaties will contain a treaty-based anti-avoidance rule known as the principal purpose test (PPT). These PPT provisions will almost certainly play an extremely important role in preventing international tax avoidance. With the introduction of such broad and powerful anti-avoidance rules comes the risk of individual countries, through their revenue authorities and their courts, developing divergent and state-centric views as to the interpretation of the PPT. This risk is quite considerable, and there are many reasons why a harmonized basis of interpretation may not, in reality, emerge. If courts pursue an individual and diverse approach to the interpretation of the PPT, the same transaction will be viewed as being effective in one jurisdiction and ineffective in another. From a broader perspective, this is undesirable, and it should not occur for policy and interpretative reasons. Why is the case for interpreting the PPT consistently, with a common meaning, so compelling? There is one major reason, and it is an obvious one: the PPT can now be found in thousands of treaties, and it is exactly the same test in all of these. It is clear that an international autonomous meaning is intended to be introduced through the uniform adoption of the PPT. A universal interpretation may be possible if courts and revenue authorities apply a consistent approach to interpretation. The approach, detailed in this article, suggests that international tax treaties should be interpreted in accordance with (i) the ordinary meaning of the text of the PPT; (ii) due consideration of the context and the MLI's object and purpose; and (iii) consideration of how the MLI, as a successive treaty, relates to the covered tax agreement (CTA) that it amends. This article analyses the PPT rule from a normative position and sets out an appropriate basis for the approach to interpreting the PPT. Using all available sources and reports, including examples of the application of the test, this article provides a comprehensive framework for interpreting the PPT and answers the following questions, amongst others: (i) How is the PPT designed to override other provisions in the CTA (including other general anti-avoidance rules)? (ii) Is the substantive test based on an objective assessment of the arrangement or transaction or on the subjective position/mind of the taxpayer? (iii) Does the proviso place an onus of proof upon the taxpayer?
Explains process of importing goods into the U.S., including informed compliance, invoices, duty assessments, classification and value, marking requirements, etc.
Developing countries lose billions each year through bribery, misappropriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. Much of the proceeds of this corruption find 'safe haven' in the world's financial centers. These criminal flows are a drain on social services and economic development programs, contributing to the impoverishment of the world's poorest countries. Many developing countries have already sought to recover stolen assets. A number of successful high-profile cases with creative international cooperation has demonstrated that asset recovery is possible. However, it is highly complex, involving coordination and collaboration with domestic agencies and ministries in multiple jurisdictions, as well as the capacity to trace and secure assets and pursue various legal options—whether criminal confiscation, non-conviction based confiscation, civil actions, or other alternatives. This process can be overwhelming for even the most experienced practitioners. It is exceptionally difficult for those working in the context of failed states, widespread corruption, or limited resources. With this in mind, the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative has developed and updated this Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide for Practitioners to assist those grappling with the strategic, organizational, investigative, and legal challenges of recovering stolen assets. A practitioner-led project, the Handbook provides common approaches to recovering stolen assets located in foreign jurisdictions, identifies the challenges that practitioners are likely to encounter, and introduces good practices. It includes examples of tools that can be used by practitioners, such as sample intelligence reports, applications for court orders, and mutual legal assistance requests. StAR—the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative—is a partnership between the World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime that supports international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds. StAR works with developing countries and financial centers to prevent the laundering of the proceeds of corruption and to facilitate more systematic and timely return of stolen assets.