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"Building international partnerships is a central element of U.S. strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy recognizes that the proliferation problem is far too large, complex, and important for any one nation to tackle alone. Meaningful and sustained progress in combating WMD requires active collaboration among all states that have a stake in managing the problem and the will and capacity to contribute. Current policies build on a foundation of global cooperation that dates back decades, even as they reflect significant changes in emphasis to adapt to contemporary proliferation challenges."--P. 1.
Limited resources, access, and incomplete knowledge of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats create a need for working with appropriate partner countries around the world to address these challenging threats. This monograph outlines and then applies a four-step process for developing regional approaches to building partner capacity (BPC) to combat WMD.
This unique book is a compendium of eight outstanding reports from the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Center). The reports include: Part 1: Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction" * Part 2: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead * Part 3: International Partnerships to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction * Part 4: Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons? * Part 5: Eliminating Adversary Weapons of Mass Destruction: What's at Stake? * Part 6: Iraq and After: Taking the Right Lessons for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction * Part 7: The Future Nuclear Landscape * Part 8: The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 The phrase "weapons of mass destruction, "for example, is an amorphous one, changing meaning according to the whims of the speaker. Raising the specter of WMD is more a way by which politicians assign blame or take a stand on seemingly objective moral standards than a way by which they assess a particular weapons system. Because many analysts find fault with existing definitions, they offer new definitions that differ in some radical way from those commonly accepted.8 Still others, believing that the traditional definitions for WMD are intellectually problematic, propose dropping the term altogether. Recognizing these disagreements, the 2004 British government review of Iraq WMD intelligence offered the following comment: There is a considerable and long-standing academic debate about the proper interpretation of the phrase "weapons of mass destruction." We have some sympathy with the view that, whatever its origin, the phrase and its accompanying abbreviation is now used so variously as to confuse rather than enlighten readers. In important ways, the world is at a nuclear crossroads. The complex and dynamic nuclear landscape presents us with challenges along at least four axes: regional nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, great power nuclear relations, and the security implications of increased interest in nuclear energy. These problems are interrelated in ways that the national security community does not fully understand. Strategy and policy frameworks do not address them in sufficiently integrated fashion. New conceptual thinking is required to develop a more unified understanding of and approach to managing the risks and opportunities posed by these 21st-century nuclear challenges. Today, more than at any other time in the nuclear era, nuclear capacity and potential (knowledge, technology, and materials) are accessible to a growing number of actors with more ambitious goals. The result is a high degree of nuclear latency that challenges traditional thinking about nuclear threats. Whereas 30 or 40 years ago, only a handful of countries were assumed to know how to acquire nuclear weapons, as many as 35 or 40 nations currently are believed to be in the know, and many more could become so based on their participation in civilian nuclear energy programs.
The government's first Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs were created in 1991 to eliminate the former Soviet Union's nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and prevent their proliferation. The programs have accomplished a great deal: deactivating thousands of nuclear warheads, neutralizing chemical weapons, converting weapons facilities for peaceful use, and redirecting the work of former weapons scientists and engineers, among other efforts. Originally designed to deal with immediate post-Cold War challenges, the programs must be expanded to other regions and fundamentally redesigned as an active tool of foreign policy that can address contemporary threats from groups that are that are agile, networked, and adaptable. As requested by Congress, Global Security Engagement proposes how this goal can best be achieved. To meet the magnitude of new security challenges, particularly at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, Global Security Engagement recommends a new, more flexible, and responsive model that will draw on a broader range of partners than current programs have. The White House, working across the Executive Branch and with Congress, must lead this effort.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a new urgency in efforts to deal with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear proliferati on. The potential acquisition and use by terrorist groups of such weaponry was suddenly a much increased threat. The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction subsequently encouraged some twenty-two countries and the European Union to pledge up to $20 billion to address this challenge. The creation of the Global Partnership was the first time so many countries agreed to collaborate on a range of non-proliferation, security and nuclear safety programmes, as well as commit such an amount of resources to them. Based on extensive primary research, this Whitehall Paper assesses the success and shortcomings to date of the Global Partnership, and suggests how the mechanism can be bolstered and taken forward.
NATO was hugely successful in facing off the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But has it been equally successful in addressing the "new threats" of the post-Cold War era? This new study assesses the organization’s political and military initiatives, and how its outreach to Russia, Ukraine, and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean regions, devoted considerable attention to WMD proliferation risks. It also probes the political factors, both inside and outside NATO, as well as resource constraints, which have limited the alliance's "added value" in the international community's effort to combat proliferation. The events of 11 September 2001 and bitter intra-alliance controversy over the 2003 Iraq intervention have highlighted questions regarding NATO's future role, and even its continued viability. This is a serious reflection on how the alliance should figure in the fight against WMD and terrorist threats and an examination of today’s key issues, including the use of force in international relations and the possibility of constructing new, post-Cold War collective security rules. This is the first study to evaluate, critically and in-depth, how a long-standing security organization has adapted - and must continue to adapt - to the global security challenges of our time. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of international politics, military history and all readers interested in the future of NATO and international security.