Download Free Intelligence Service Psychology Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Intelligence Service Psychology and write the review.

In this seminal work, published by the C.I.A. itself, produced by Intelligence veteran Richards Heuer discusses three pivotal points. First, human minds are ill-equipped ("poorly wired") to cope effectively with both inherent and induced uncertainty. Second, increased knowledge of our inherent biases tends to be of little assistance to the analyst. And lastly, tools and techniques that apply higher levels of critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex problems.
The Psychology of Spies and Spying tells the story of the people involved in spying: the human sources (agents) who betray their country or organisation and the professional intelligence officers who manage the collection and reporting process
This book analyzes how the Egyptian intelligence community has adapted to shifting national security threats since its inception 100 years ago. Starting in 1910, when the modern Egyptian intelligence system was created to deal with militant nationalists and Islamists, the book shows how the security services were subsequently reorganized, augmented and centralized to meet an increasingly sophisticated array of challenges, including fascism, communism, army unrest, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, conservative Arab states, the Muslim Brotherhood and others. The book argues that studying Egypt’s intelligence community is integral to our understanding of that country’s modern history, regime stability and human rights record. Intelligence studies have been described as the ‘missing dimension’ of international relations. It is clear that intelligence agencies are pivotal to understanding the nature of many Arab regimes and their decision-making processes, and there is no published history of modern Egyptian intelligence in either a European language or in Arabic, though Egypt has the largest and arguably most effective intelligence community in the Arab world. This book will fill a clear gap in the intelligence literature and will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, Middle Eastern politics, international security and IR in general.
Intelligence was a central element of the Cold War and the need for it was expected to diminish after the USSR's collapse, yet in recent years it has been in greater demand than ever. The atrocities of 11 September and the subsequent "war on terrorism" now call for an even more intensive effort. Important questions arise on how intelligence fits into the world of increased threats, globalization and expanded international action. This volume contains the recent work on this subject by Michael Herman, British intelligence professional for 35 years and Oxford University academic. It compares intelligence with other government information services, and discusses the British intelligence system and the case for its reform. It also addresses the ethical issues raised by intelligence's methods and results: "do they on balance make for a better world or a worse one?". Other chapters explore a wide range of intelligence topics past and present, including the transatlantic relationship, the alliance strategies of Norway and New Zealand, Mrs Thatcher's "de-unionization" of British Sigint, and personal memories of the British Cabinet Office in the 1970s. Michael Herman argues for intelligence professionalism as a contribution to international security and for its encouragement as a world standard. The modern challenge is for intelligence to support international cooperation in ways originally developed to advance national interests, while at the same time developing some restraint and international "rules of the game", in the use of intrusive and covert methods on its traditional targets. The effects of 11 September on this challenge are discussed in a thoughtful afterword.
In response to the increasingly ubiquitous, asynchronous, and pervasive use of cyber technology in everyday life, unique threats to cybersecurity (CS) have emerged requiring innovative and systemic solutions. Of the potential threats, Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS) presents one of the most acute generalized vulnerabilities facing the broader Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Defense (DoD), and United States Government. While security systems and networks have attempted to adapt to meet these evolving threats, internal organizational structures, culture, and human behavior often lag behind due to the inherent challenges in changing these dynamic variables. It is crucial that scientific disciplines identify systemic and innovative behavioral countermeasures that are informed by sub-disciplines of the psychology and CS literature. Innovative strategies involve collaboration amongst experts from the domains of social psychology, game theory, Bayesian statistics, and the IC, which will be discussed in-depth. A special issue that pulls from cross-disciplinary professionals will have a broad impact for the IC and DOD eliciting wide readership and spurring needed innovation._____________________________________________________________________ "Cultivating a culture of innovation, though difficult, is important for any enduring organization. It's downright essential for the US Intelligence Community, which must stay one step ahead of adversaries on surveillance technologies and tradecraft to be effective. This collection of articles brings together insightful research and analysis from diverse domains, moving us closer to the deeper appreciation of innovation and culture that is so urgently needed."David Priess, Ph.D., former Central Intelligence Agency officer and author, The President's Book of Secrets
The U.S. intelligence community (IC) is a complex human enterprise whose success depends on how well the people in it perform their work. Although often aided by sophisticated technologies, these people ultimately rely on their own intellect to identify, synthesize, and communicate the information on which the nation's security depends. The IC's success depends on having trained, motivated, and thoughtful people working within organizations able to understand, value, and coordinate their capabilities. Intelligence Analysis provides up-to-date scientific guidance for the intelligence community (IC) so that it might improve individual and group judgments, communication between analysts, and analytic processes. The papers in this volume provide the detailed evidentiary base for the National Research Council's report, Intelligence Analysis for Tomorrow: Advances from the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The opening chapter focuses on the structure, missions, operations, and characteristics of the IC while the following 12 papers provide in-depth reviews of key topics in three areas: analytic methods, analysts, and organizations. Informed by the IC's unique missions and constraints, each paper documents the latest advancements of the relevant science and is a stand-alone resource for the IC's leadership and workforce. The collection allows readers to focus on one area of interest (analytic methods, analysts, or organizations) or even one particular aspect of a category. As a collection, the volume provides a broad perspective of the issues involved in making difficult decisions, which is at the heart of intelligence analysis.
This volume pulls together and republishes, with some editing, updating, and additions, articles written during 1978-86 for internal use within the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. Four of the articles also appeared in the Intelligence Community journal Studies in Intelligence during that time frame. The information is relatively timeless and still relevant to the never-ending quest for better analysis. The articles are based on reviewing cognitive psychology literature concerning how people process information to make judgments on incomplete and ambiguous information. I selected the experiments and findings that seem most relevant to intelligence analysis and most in need of communication to intelligence analysts. I then translated the technical reports into language that intelligence analysts can understand and interpreted the relevance of these findings to the problems intelligence analysts face. The result is a compromise that may not be wholly satisfactory to either research psychologists or intelligence analysts. Cognitive psychologists and decision analysts may complain of oversimplification, while the non-psychologist reader may have to absorb some new terminology. Unfortunately, mental processes are so complex that discussion of them does require some specialized vocabulary. Intelligence analysts who have read and thought seriously about the nature of their craft should have no difficulty with this book. Those who are plowing virgin ground may require serious effort. I wish to thank all those who contributed comments and suggestions on the draft of this book: Jack Davis (who also wrote the Introduction); four former Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analysts whose names cannot be cited here; my current colleague, Prof. Theodore Sarbin; and my editor at the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, Hank Appelbaum. All made many substantive and editorial suggestions that helped greatly to make this a better book.