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Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate Counter-Intelligence (CI) offices at DoE and the Nat. Nuclear Security Admin. into a single CI office under DoE control. DoE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. At the same time, in 2006, DoE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counter-Intelligence into a new DoE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. This report analyzes both consolidations -- the first authorized by Congress at DoE¿s request; the second initiated by DoE -- and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Dept.¿s CI program. Congress must determine whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Dept.¿s CI program.
After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. In permitting DOE to consolidate the two offices, Congress reversed its 1999 authorization to establish a separate NNSA CI office -- a decision that at the time was prompted by congressional concerns over repeated departmental security and counterintelligence lapses. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Department reasoned that combining the disciplines of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence under one integrated office would foster synergistic cooperation that would lead to a more strategic and ultimately more effective counterintelligence program. This report analyzes both consolidations -- the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE -- and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities. Congress could maintain the status quo or choose from several alternative organizational approaches, some of which continue to be discussed despite the most recent organizational changes to the Department's CI program. Such alternatives range from maintaining the consolidated DOE/NNSA CI office but reversing DOE's decision to combine its formerly independent offices of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, to eliminating both consolidations. Congress also could exercise several oversight options, ranging from conducting classified CI briefings to commissioning a formal assessment of DOE's current CI reorganization. This report will be updated as warranted.
Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA, Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA's counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual-office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches are discussed in this report. One approach, reportedly approved but not yet initiated, would merge DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear weapons programs, and DOE's CI office under the control of a new DOE intelligence agency. As part of an anticipated second phase, NNSA's CI office would be consolidated under the DOE's intelligence agency. Proponents assert that such a consolidation would improve command, control, and communications. Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under the control of the NNSA administrator. Proponents argue that a semi-autonomous agency such as NNSA, by virtue of its independence, is better able to implement CI measures than is DOE. Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office under a new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity. A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence programs. A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. Proponents suggest that the current structure is required for counterintelligence to receive focused attention at DOE's weapons labs.
Troubled by reported lapses in security and counterintelligence (CI) at the Department of Energy (DOE), the Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs (P.L. 106-65). Within NNSA, Congress created the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement CI policy at NNSA facilities. DOE retained a separate Office of Counterintelligence, which develops CI policy for DOE and NNSA, but, implements it only at non-NNSA facilities. Though representing separate organizations, the two CI offices share resources and personnel for some programs. Although DOE has taken steps to strengthen CI practices, some observers have questioned whether the Department's bifurcated CI structure is the most effective in countering continuing efforts by foreign intelligence services, friendly and hostile, to target DOE and NNSA facilities.
The role of intelligence in US government operations has changed dramatically and is now more critical than ever to domestic security and foreign policy. This authoritative and highly researched book written by Jeffrey T. Richelson provides a detailed overview of America's vast intelligence empire, from its organizations and operations to its management structure. Drawing from a multitude of sources, including hundreds of official documents, The US Intelligence Community allows students to understand the full scope of intelligence organizations and activities, and gives valuable support to policymakers and military operations. The seventh edition has been fully revised to include a new chapter on the major issues confronting the intelligence community, including secrecy and leaks, domestic spying, and congressional oversight, as well as revamped chapters on signals intelligence and cyber collection, geospatial intelligence, and open sources. The inclusion of more maps, tables and photos, as well as electronic briefing books on the book's Web site, makes The US Intelligence Community an even more valuable and engaging resource for students.
Bringing a dose of reality to the stuff of literary thrillers, this masterful study is the first closely detailed, comparative analysis of the evolution of the modern British and American intelligence communities. Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States: A Comparative Perspective is an intensive, comparative exploration of the role of organizational and political culture in the development of the intelligence communities of America and her long-time ally. Each national system is examined as a detailed case study set in a common conceptual and theoretical framework. The first volume lays out that framework and examines the U.S. intelligence community. The second volume offers the U.K. case study as well as overall conclusions. Particular attention is paid here to the fundamentally different concepts of what "intelligence" entails in the United States and United Kingdom, as well as to the nations' different approaches to managing change- and information-intensive activities. The impact of these differences is demonstrated by examining the evolution of the two intelligence communities from their inceptions prior to World War II through their development during the Cold War and the transformations that have taken place since, especially in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks and 2003 invasion of Iraq.
"The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic marks the most significant, singular global disruption since World War II, with health, economic, political, and security implications that will ripple for years to come." -Global Trends 2040 (2021) Global Trends 2040-A More Contested World (2021), released by the US National Intelligence Council, is the latest report in its series of reports starting in 1997 about megatrends and the world's future. This report, strongly influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, paints a bleak picture of the future and describes a contested, fragmented and turbulent world. It specifically discusses the four main trends that will shape tomorrow's world: - Demographics-by 2040, 1.4 billion people will be added mostly in Africa and South Asia. - Economics-increased government debt and concentrated economic power will escalate problems for the poor and middleclass. - Climate-a hotter world will increase water, food, and health insecurity. - Technology-the emergence of new technologies could both solve and cause problems for human life. Students of trends, policymakers, entrepreneurs, academics, journalists and anyone eager for a glimpse into the next decades, will find this report, with colored graphs, essential reading.
Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between ¿domestic intell.¿ ¿ law enforcement info. collected within the U.S. ¿ and ¿foreign intell.¿ ¿ military, political, and economic intell. collected outside the country. Today, threats posed by terrorist groups are now national security threats. This report provides a conceptual model of how to frame HSINT, including geographic, structural/statutory, and holistic approaches. The report argues that there is, in effect, a Homeland Security Intell. Community. State and local leaders believe there is value to centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that assists them in preventing and responding to local manifestations of terrorist threats to their people, infrastructure, and other assets. Illus.
From the author of The Wizards of Langley, this definitive survey of the US intelligence community is now fully updated with new material