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Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.
Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.
Establishes guidance on the provision of joint and national intelligence products, services, and support to military operations. Describes the org. of joint intelligence forces and the national Intelligence Community, intelligence responsibilities, command relationships, and national intelligence support mechanisms. Provides info. regarding the fundamentals of intelligence operations and the intelligence process, discusses how intelligence supports joint and multinational planning, and describes intelligence dissemination via the global info. grid. Provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders. Illustrations. A print on demand edition of a hard to find report.
Intelligence Operations: Understanding Data, Tools, People, and Processes helps readers understand the various issues and considerations an intelligence professional must tackle when reviewing, planning, and managing intelligence operations, regardless of level or environment. The book opens by introducing the reader to the many defining concepts associated with intelligence, as well as the main subject of intelligence: the threat. Additional chapters examine the community of intelligence, revealing where intelligence is actually practiced, as well as what defines and characterizes intelligence operations. Readers learn about the four critical components to every intelligence operation--data, tools, people, and processes--and then explore the various operational and analytic processes involved in greater detail. Throughout, the text encourages discovery and discussion, urging readers to first understand the material, then break it down, adapt it, and apply it in a way that supports their particular operations or requirements. Unique in approach and designed to assist professionals at all levels, Intelligence Operations is an excellent resource for both academic courses in the subject and practical application by intelligence personnel. Erik Kleinsmith is Associate Vice President for Strategic Relations in Intelligence, National, Homeland and Cyber Security for American Military University. Culminating his military career as Chief of Intelligence for the U.S. Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, Erik pioneered the development of asymmetric threat analysis using data mining technology. In this capacity, he gained national prestige related to his involvement in the Able Danger program as the military lead of a team of analysts profiling and mapping Al Qaeda prior to 9/11. Erik continued his career in intelligence as a defense contractor, managing intelligence training with the U.S. Army for over a decade. His areas of expertise include intelligence, security-related training and analysis, counterintelligence, and information operations.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the Army's traditional methodology for finding and analyzing relevant information for its operations, is not effective for tackling the operational and intelligence challenges of urban operations. The authors suggest new ways to categorize the complex terrain, infrastructure, and populations of urban environments and incorporate this information into Army planning and decisionmaking processes.
This open access handbook is a major reference work in the field of Military Sciences. Its main purpose is to inform and enlighten those dealing with the military on the role and contributions of science in describing, understanding and explaining military life, knowledge and doings. The handbook provides a comprehensive thematic introduction to various sub-fields of Military Sciences. The handbook serves a broad audience in various capacities; academics studying the military and the broader defense and security sector, students at military and civilian schools preparing for service in the military, the government or other occupations with linkage to the military, professionals in the armed forces, decision makers in government, contractors who work alongside the military, NGOs whose work is influenced by military operations, journalists who write on matters concerning the sphere of the military or others with a particular interest towards the military as a phenomenon, organization or system of various kinds. About the Section EditorsLt. Col. Dr. Anders McD Sookermany, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: Philosophy of Military Sciences)Lt. Col. Dr. Harald Høiback, Norwegian Armed Forces Museums, Oslo, Norway (Section: Military Operations) Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark (Section: Military History)Prof. Dr. Patricia M. Shields, Texas State University, San Marcos, USA (Section: Military and Society)Dr. Carsten F. Rønnfeldt, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: International Relations and the Military)Associate Professor David Last, Royal Military College of Canada, Canada (Section: Military Profession)Dr. Irina Goldenberg, Canadian Department of National Defence, Nepean, Canada (Section: Military Behavioural Sciences)Dr. Michael Holenweger, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Prof. Dr. Martin Elbe, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany (Section: Military Leadership)Franz Kernic, MILAC at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Joseph Soeters, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands (Section: Military Management, Economics and Logistics)Prof Margaret Kosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA (Section: Military Technology)Dr. Ben Zweibelson, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, USA (Section: Military Design)Ms. Aubrey Poe (Section: Military Design)
This is an official work by the US Department of the Army Headquarters. It gives information on what Human Intelligence is and what role the department has in the US army. A reader learns the structure of Human Intelligence and gets an insight into their operations. Mainly, the book presents information about the planning and management of operations, their collection process, analytics, and tools.
Policymakers have long needed an improved analytic basis for their investment decisions regarding military intelligence assets. This report presents a new methodology for measuring the operational value of military intelligence, electronic warfare, and target acquisition (IEW/TA) and also describes two prototype models for studying IEW/TA in an operational context. The methodology enables the operational value of intelligence assets and activities to be expressed in quantifiable terms useful to resource acquisition decisionmakers, military planners, and operational managers. One application of the methodology is to help build the intelligence portion of the Army five-year program. The two prototype models were designed as aids for performing policy and other analysis of key issues. One is a spreadsheet model that can be used to assess the operational value of a given IEW/TA architecture at a point in time under various conditions; the other is a dynamic simulation that can be used to study how the value of IEW/TA changes through the course of an operation.
Foreword by Brig. Gen. Mike Ennis, USMC In this book Jeffrey Moore profiles the history and select operations of America's first effective, all source, joint military intelligence agency. Known as JICPOA for Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, the agency's nearly two thousand specialists are credited with giving Admiral Nimitz the intelligence he needed to win the Pacific War. Moore explains how JICPOA evolved and reveals some new facts about the war as he assesses the impact of intelligence on eight amphibious campaigns in the islands of the Central Pacific. He also demonstrates timeless intelligence lessons, faulty versus effective intelligence techniques, and intelligence-operational planning integration--subjects that continue to be pertinent to today's military operations, including the war on terror. For this unprecedented look at the little-known but groundbreaking organization, Moore draws on interviews with key personnel and internal documents. He supports his analysis of JICPOA's strengths and weaknesses, its successes and failures, with more than forty maps, charts, and illustrations. With a foreword by the head of Marine Corps intelligence, the book makes an excellent addition to World War II history and professional collections. Intelligence experts and operations planners will find its lessons useful and insightful. Readers with an interest in real-life thrillers will find it a fascinating study of basic intelligence work.
In the late eighties and early nineties, driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned during military operations, United States policy makers made intelligence support to the military the Intelligence Community's top priority. In response to this demand, the CIA and DoD instituted policy and organizational changes that altered their relationship with one another. While debates over the future of the Intelligence Community were occurring on Capitol Hill, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship in peacekeeping and nation-building operations in Somalia and the Balkans. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far. In Subordinating Intelligence: The DoD/CIA Post–Cold War Relationship, David P. Oakley reveals that, despite these concerns, no major changes to national intelligence or its priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers increasingly focused on tactical and operational actions. As policy makers became fixated with terrorism and the United States fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CIA directed a significant amount of its resources toward global counterterrorism efforts and in support of military operations.