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To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defence of the reliability of one's faculties, methods and opinions that does not beg the question. Moreover, he shows how this account of intellectual self-trust can be used to understand the degree to which it is reasonable to rely on alternative authorities. This book will be of interest to advanced students and professionals working in the fields of philosophy and the social sciences as well as anyone looking for a unified account of the issues at the centre of intellectual trust.
To what degree should we rely on our own resources and methods to form opinions about important matters? To what degree should we depend on various authorities, such as a recognized expert or a social tradition? In this novel and provocative account of intellectual trust and authority, Richard Foley argues that it can be reasonable to have intellectual trust in oneself even though it is not possible to provide a defense of the reliability of one's faculties, methods, and opinions that does not beg the question.
In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.
Trust is fundamental to epistemology. It features as theoretical bedrock in a broad cross-section of areas including social epistemology, the epistemology of self-trust, feminist epistemology, and the philosophy of science. Yet epistemology has seen little systematic conversation with the rich literature on trust itself. This volume aims to promote and shape this conversation. It encourages epistemologists of all stripes to dig deeper into the fundamental epistemic roles played by trust, and it encourages philosophers of trust to explore the epistemological upshots and applications of their theories. The contributors explore such issues as the risks and necessity of trusting others for information, the value of doing so as opposed to relying on oneself, the mechanisms underlying trust’s strange ability to deliver knowledge, whether depending on others for information is compatible with epistemic responsibility, whether self-trust is an intellectual virtue, and the intimate relationship between epistemic trust and social power. This volume, in Routledge’s new series on trust research, will be a vital resource to academics and students not just of epistemology and trust, but also of moral psychology, political philosophy, the philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy – and to anyone else wanting to understand our vital yet vulnerable-making capacity to trust others and ourselves for information in a complex world.
This book considers the presence of media illiteracy in a world in which we are supposedly consumed by media, live a media life, in a media ecosystem, surrounded by mediated communication. Unpacking this paradoxical situation, the author proposes that before venturing into media literacy, we must first understand the workings of how mystification occurs. Departing from the idea that aesthetics work on an agreed set of principles between art and society, the author applies this ideology of aesthetics to news-based narration. Using empirical cases from India, the author proposes demystification as a possible methodology to approach media illiteracy and recommends completely transformed media literacy programs that deliver to communities, drawing from the construct of critical pedagogy. The book offers the possibilities for a collectivistic, non-Western, postcolonialist model of learning by using the very collective and hierarchical identities of societies that must be critiqued. This vital and innovative book will be an important resource for scholars and students in the areas of media literacy and critical media literacy, media education, journalism, mass communication, aesthetics and media technology.
"Hope, trust, and forgiveness have the potential to enrich and empower human lives. Each is a facet of a life well lived, but each also possesses significant challenges from complex personal, interpersonal, and institutional forces. In Hope, Trust, and Forgiveness, John T. Lysaker draws our attention to the ways in which hope, trust, and forgiveness are capacities that intimately contend with the finitude of ethical life. Hope, Trust, and Forgiveness explores the contentions of each at length, clarifying those challenges and empowering us to meet them. In doing so, Lysaker grapples with the question of how a philosophical essay can offer ethical insight. He answers with an experimental, improvisational moral perfectionism that refuses the lure of universalized moral claims as well as the parochialism of conventional accounts of ethical life"--
If the secular university by definition is non-sectarian or non-denominational, then how can it accommodate a discipline like Christian theology? Doesn’t the traditional goal of theological study, which is to attain knowledge of the divine, fundamentally conflict with the main goal of secular academic study, which is to attain knowledge about ourselves and the world in which we live? So why should theology be admitted, or even care about being admitted, into secular academic life? And even if theology were admitted, what contribution to secular academic life could it make? Working from a Christian philosophical and theological perspective but also engaging a wide range of theologians, philosophers, and religious studies scholars, Christian Theology and the Secular University takes on these questions, arguing that Christian theology does belong in the secular university because it provides distinct resources that the secular university needs if it is going to fulfill what should be its main epistemic and educative ends. This book offers a fresh and unique perspective to scholars working in the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and religious studies, and to those in other academic disciplines who are interested in thinking critically and creatively about the place and nature of theological study within the secular university.
Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics.
This collection showcases the most influential published essays by philosopher Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. One of the most distinguished thinkers working in epistemology today, particularly where the theory of knowledge meets ethics and the philosophy of religion, Zagzebski is well-known for broadening epistemology and refocusing it on epistemic virtue and epistemic value. Her work has greatly influenced the trajectory of contemporary epistemology, opening up new fields in analytic epistemology. The papers collected here are organized into six sections to underline the scope of her impact on six key subject areas of epistemology: (1) knowledge and understanding, (2) intellectual virtue, (3) epistemic value, (4) virtue in religious epistemology, (5) intellectual autonomy and authority, and (6) skepticism and the Gettier problem.
Is it good to be proud? We sometimes happily speak of being proud of our achievements, ethnicities and identities, yet pride is also often described as the most serious of the seven deadly sins. This edited collection of original essays examines pride from a variety of perspectives in philosophy, psychology, sociology and anthropology. The volume seeks to explore such topics as the nature of pride, its connection to other human emotions, whether it is a virtue or vice (or both), and what role it might play in both our intellectual and moral lives. Containing diverse voices and viewpoints, this book aims to illuminate the various and complex dimensions of pride.