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The integration of armored units within the U.S. Army's infantry divisions has historically been pivotal to the success of the infantry division in combat. Currently, none of the Army's tank or mechanized infantry battalions are organized or trained to directly support the Army's light, air assault or airborne infantry divisions. The 10th Mountain Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 101st Air Assault Division and the 82nd Airborne Division currently have to draw armored support from the Army's armored or mechanized infantry divisions. This organizational shortfall is compounded by training and doctrinal issues. The most important of which is that the tank and mechanized infantry battalions within the Army's heavy divisions do not routinely train in the role of providing support to the Army's light, air assault or airborne infantry divisions. The monograph initially examines the period from 1940 until 1947, which was characterized by increasing integration of the two arms. This provides a basis for comparison with the current Army in terms of organization, doctrine and training. Subsequently, the monograph examines the changes associated with the Army's adoption of the Army of Excellence in the 1980s. This examination provides insight into how the Army currently achieves integration of its armored units and infantry divisions with respect to organization, doctrine and training. The monograph then evaluates the Army's current level of integration largely based on the Army's lessons from the Second World War. This study recommends that the Army re-allocate armored forces to directly support the Army's infantry divisions, even if this must be done at the expense of existing heavy forces. The study further recommends changes to the Army's current armored-infantry training model in order to establish habitual relationships between supporting armored units.
DigiCat Publishing presents to you this special edition of "Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965" by Morris J. MacGregor. DigiCat Publishing considers every written word to be a legacy of humankind. Every DigiCat book has been carefully reproduced for republishing in a new modern format. The books are available in print, as well as ebooks. DigiCat hopes you will treat this work with the acknowledgment and passion it deserves as a classic of world literature.
The evolution of the services2 racial policies and practices between World War II and 1965 during the period when black servicemen and women were integrated into the nation2s military units.
From the Preface: The following pages provide a narrative analysis of the U.S. Army's development of armored organizations and their related doctrine, materiel, and training activities in the period 1917-1945. This period marked the emergence of clear principles of armored warfare that became the underpinning of the Armor Branch, influencing armored developments long after World War II ended. A unique style of mounted maneuver combat emerged that reflected a mix of tradition an innovation. In the process, American military culture changed, particularly through the adoption of combined-arms principles. Conversely, political actions, budgetary considerations, and senior leadership decisions also shaped the course of armor development. The emergence of an American armored force involved more than simply tank development. It included the creation of an armored division structure steeped in combined-arms principles, organizational flexibility, and revolutionary command and control processes. Parallel developments included the establishment of specialized units to provide antitank, reconnaissance, and infantry support capabilities. Several Army branches played a role in determining the precise path of armored development, and one of them-the Cavalry-became a casualty as a result.
The realities of World War II compelled the U.S. Army to activate the National Guard en masse. Federalizing the National Guard proved critical prior to potentially utilizing expeditionary military forces. At the time, the National Guard acted as the largest component of the Army and contained not only troop strength, but also provided command and control capabilities organic in its division headquarters. National Guard units became vital to quickly mobilize forces for national defense and eventually the execution of the largest expeditionary war the United States has ever seen. The 35th Infantry Division became one of these divisions first mobilized in 1940. The process of mobilizing, training, and integrating National Guard divisions into the Regular Army has not occurred in-scale, since World War II. This monograph strives to identify successes and shortfalls of activating the 35th Infantry Division during World War II for overseas service. The contemporary U.S. Army has a preponderance of forces in the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. In aggregate, U.S. Army resources amount to three corps headquarters and eighteen division headquarters to employ in large-scale combat operations. Cohesively, the three compositions (COMPOs), which are known as the Total Army include COMPO 1 Regular Army, COMPO 2 Army National Guard, and COMPO 3 Army Reserve. With eight division headquarters nested within the National Guard, synchronization of the Total Army becomes critical to U.S. Armed Forces' success in the next conflict against a near-peer adversary in a contested operational environment. The United States faces threats from competitors such as Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organization in a complex and interconnected world. The story of the 35th Infantry Division's preparation for the European Theater of Operations during World War II informs today's challenge to effectively integrate the Army National Guard with the Regular Army. Army National Guard and Regular Army divisions will meet these contemporary challenges.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Contents: Section 1: Introduction * Research Question * Hypothesis * Methodology * Criteria * Background/Significance * U.S. Army's Condition Prior to World War II * Section 2: Role of the 35th Infantry Division in World War II * Mobilization * Training * Integration versus Assimilation * Section 3: Lessons Learned * National Guard Division Mobilization for Large-Scale Combat Operations * Recommendations * ConclusionThis paper will include a case study analysis of the 35th Infantry Division's mobilization, training, and integration. This case study will incorporate a maximum utilization of primary sources from the attached bibliography. The body of literature concerning the mobilization, training, and integration of the 35th Infantry Division during World War II is adequate to explore the considerations for the rapid deployment of National Guard divisions during large-scale combat operations. Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, in addition to online archives, provide all primary resources. The following monograph will consist of three sections. Section 1 will include introductory material and will detail the significance of the proposed research. The backdrop of the U.S. Army's condition prior to World War II will be underscored for the audience. A working hypothesis will be linked to the research question at hand, which explores the 35th ID's capability to effectively integrate into the Regular Army.
Captures the multifaceted development of the Armored Force from its inauspicious beginnings in World War 1 to its fully mature, operational status at the close of World War 2. Provides an excellent case study in force transformation. Gives attention to training maneuvers conducted in the interwar period. Source material includes reports, memorandums, and correspondence of the majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels associated with armored development since World War I.
The author presents an extremely detailed record of the organization, doctrine, and equipment of the Armored Division of September 1943. He examines each unit of the division. A chapter is dedicated to the Tank Battalion, Armored Infantry Battalion, but also Maintenance and Medical Battalions. The author examines the organization and tactical doctrine of each unit and studies the doctrine of employment of the unit, as well as the duties of key personnel. Each sub-unit is presented by lists of personnel, weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The book includes 146 charts depicting the organization of all units. In each chapter, a special paragraph examines the modifications made in the field by armored division’s units, as found in unit reports, and histories, and veterans recollections. This is an essential reference for re-enactors, modellers, wargamers, researchers, and all those who require a detailed guide to the U.S. Armored Division during WWII.
"In the quarter century that followed American entry into World War II, the nation's armed forces moved from the reluctant inclusion of a few segregated Negroes to their routine acceptance in a racially integrated military establishment. Nor was this change confined to military installations. By the time it was over, the armed forces had redefined their traditional obligation for the welfare of their members to include a promise of equal treatment for black servicemen wherever they might be. In the name of equality of treatment and opportunity, the Department of Defense began to challenge racial injustices deeply rooted in American society. For all its sweeping implications, equality in the armed forces obviously had its pragmatic aspects. In one sense it was a practical answer to pressing political problems that had plagued several national administrations. In another, it was the services' expression of those liberalizing tendencies that were permeating American society during the era of civil rights activism. But to a considerable extent the policy of racial equality that evolved in this quarter century was also a response to the need for military efficiency. So easy did it become to demonstrate the connection between inefficiency and discrimination that, even when other reasons existed, military efficiency was the one most often evoked by defense officials to justify a change in racial policy." Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., received the A.B. and M.A. degrees in history from the Catholic University of America. He continued his graduate studies at the Johns Hopkins University and the University of Paris on a Fulbright grant. Before joining the staff of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1968 he served for ten years in the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.