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Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.
Electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railways, and water supply, are often vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies. This results in weak services, especially in developing and transition economies, and for poor people. Common problems include low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and investment shortfalls. Many countries over the past two decades have restructured, privatized and regulated their infrastructure. This report identifies the challenges involved in this massive policy redirection. It also assesses the outcomes of these changes, as well as their distributional consequences for poor households and other disadvantaged groups. It recommends directions for future reforms and research to improve infrastructure performance, identifying pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity, suggesting rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities, and proposing ways to increase poor people's access to these crucial services.
The transition from socialism to capitalism in former socialist economies has transformed the economic structure. This book provides an overview of research on the issues raised by the shift from collective to private ownership.
Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform.
Applying the new economics of organisation and relational theories of the firm to the problem of understanding cross-national variation in the political economy, this volume elaborates a new understanding of the institutional differences that characterise the 'varieties of capitalism' worldwide.
This volume contains papers presented at the 16th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, held at the European University Institute on 17-18 June 2011. This edition of the Workshop examined the emerging and increasingly important use of private rights of action before national courts, and the prospects for legislation and soft law initiatives at the level of the EU. The book has been updated and reflects the European Commission's private enforcement package of June 2013. Furthermore, the experiences of various national jurisdictions are discussed, both within Europe and in the US and Canada. As a whole, the volume explores how public and private enforcement might function harmoniously, as an 'integrated' system, to promote the public interest while ensuring that individual rights created in this field by the EU competition rules are vindicated. The contributors have, however, devoted significant analysis to the tensions between those two modes of enforcement. Authors contributing to this book include: Enno Ahlenstiel Donald Baker Jochen Burrichter Horst Butz Scott Campbell Brian Facey Tristan Feunteun Ian Forrester Andrew Foster Andrew Gavil Barry Hawk James Keyte Assimakis Komninos Bruno Lasserre Frédéric Louis Mel Marquis Veljko Milutinovic Luis Silva Morais Tom Ottervanger Silvia Pietrini Mark Powell John Ratliff J Thomas Rosch David Rosner Mario Siragusa James Venit
What the authors offer is a thoroughgoing analysis clearly demonstrating that, whatever economic path developing countries pursue, imposing Western-style antitrust regimes will engender uncertainty, chill economic behaviour, and foster an unhealthy climate for business. They employ the influential error-cost methodology to appraise the performance of competition policy and to show how such a policy creates irresolvable tensions in fragile economies with weak institutions - economies characterized by informal rules of business practice, long-standing symbiotic business-state relationships, and unpredictable state action. They mount a powerful critique of the arguments of neo-institutionalists (who fail to recognize the vulnerable nature of emerging market economies) and competition `advocates' (who presume to stand ready and vigilant to enforce competition policy on state entities). --
The international dimensions of competition law and policy are most often examined at the level of substantive law. In this legal area both intentional and spontaneous assimilation and harmonization trends can be recognized, which manifest themselves e.g. in comparable approaches to combating particularly harmful restraints (so-called "hardcore cartels"). However, the complex terrain of enforcement law has been mainly ignored up to date. Are there common approaches in this field as well? How are the various competition laws linked with each other in respect to procedural norms? This book conceptualizes "International Competition Enforcement Law" against the backdrop of these issues and at the level of comparative law. The ciphers "cooperation" and "convergence" will serve as the two principle ideas for this book.
The book examines the potential for regional competition law systems as enforcement tools in developing countries, based on a case study of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the Andean Community and the Caribbean Community. It analyses the allocation of enforcement competences between the regional/supranational and the national level and formulates detailed guidelines on the optimal degree of centralization or decentralization. The book addresses all readers that are interested in the enforcement of competition law in developing countries. Moreover, it provides practical insights for public institutions that wish to identify or prevent possible misallocation of competences within regional competition law systems.