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Using a constructivist model, this study brings nuclear arms control and disarmament back into the debates on the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. Constructivism recognizes the independent impact of international norms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norm (NNPN), on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. Even though the NNPN does not legally bind them, it is reinforced at the global level, and may lead the South Asian rivals to move in the direction of nuclear arms control and disarmament, thus reducing the costs, dangers, and risks of an eternal strategic rivalry. After examining the main tenets of constructivism in international relations, the works delves into the proliferation debate, discussing nuclear reversal and U.S. policy toward the subcontinent since the G. W. Bush administration. It looks at the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia after the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008, and the nuclear abolitionist wave during the first Obama administration. It concludes with the contribution of social constructivism to understanding how changes in the India-Pakistan nuclear status quo can happen.
Chapter 1: South Asia in the Global Age -- Chapter 2: The Post-Cold War Geopolitical Shift in South Asia -- Chapter 3: Ethno-religious Conflicts in South Asia -- Chapter 4: India's Nuclear Doctrine and Diplomacy -- Chapter 5: India and Pakistan: Issues, Options, and Future Directions -- Chapter 6: India and other South Asian Countries: Political, Security, and Strategic Dimensions -- Chapter 7: India, the United States, and South Asia: Emerging Trends and Strategic Challenges -- Chapter 8: Rise of China: Strategic Implications for South Asia and India's Response -- Chapter 9: Conclusion.
"This book brings together the many pieces of India's nuclear puzzle and the ramifications for South Asia. The author examines the choices facing India from New Delhi's point of view in order to discern which future courses of action appear most appealing to Indian security managers. He details how such choices, if acted upon, would affect U.S. strategic interests, India's neighbors, and the world."--BOOK JACKET.
India has come a long way from being a nuclear pariah to a de facto member of the nuclear club. The transition in its nuclear identity has been accompanied by its transformation into a major economic power and underlines a pragmatic turn in its foreign-policy thinking. This book provides a historical narrative of the evolution of India’s nuclear policy since 1947, as the country continues its pursuit for complete integration into the global nuclear order. Situating India’s nuclear behaviour in this context, the book explains how India’s engagement with the atom is unique in international nuclear history and politics. Aided by declassified archival documents and oral history interviews, it focuses on how status, security, domestic politics, and the role of individuals have played a key role in defining and shaping India’s nuclear trajectory, policy choices, and their consequences.
India’s Nuclear Diplomacy After Pokhran II presents an analytical, perspective-based and narrative exposition of the facts and issues involved in international nuclear gamesmanship, taking every care to maintain objectivity and balance. This book breaks new ground by focusing on India’s nuclear diplomacy with the major global and regional powers, and the rationale of its stand vis-à-vis the NPT and CTBT. It unravels the intricacies and technicalities of the post-Pokhran II diplomacy in lucid and comprehensible phraseology.
This book examines the Indian nuclear policy, doctrine, strategy and posture, clarifying the elastic concept of credible minimum deterrence at the center of the country's approach to nuclear security. This concept, Karnad demonstrates, permits the Indian nuclear forces to be beefed up, size and quality-wise, and to acquire strategic reach and clout, even as the qualifier minimum suggests an overarching concern for moderation and economical use of resources, and strengthens India's claims to be a responsible nuclear weapon state. Based on interviews with Indian political leaders, nuclear scientists, and military and civilian nuclear policy planners, it provides unique insights into the workings of India's nuclear decision-making and deterrence system. Moreover, by juxtaposing the Indian nuclear policy and thinking against the theories of nuclear war and strategic deterrence, nuclear escalation, and nuclear coercion, offers a strong theoretical grounding for the Indian approach to nuclear war and peace, nuclear deterrence and escalation, nonproliferation and disarmament, and to limited war in a nuclearized environment. It refutes the alarmist notions about a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia, etc. which derive from stereotyped analysis of India-Pakistan wars, and examines India's likely conflict scenarios involving China and, minorly, Pakistan.
Rich with human detail and penetrating analysis, this insider account chronicles the remarkable negotiations between the United States and India after three nuclear devices shook the Thar Desert in 1998, initiating one of the most suspenseful diplomatic dramas of recent memory.
Since the economic liberalization of the early 1990s, India has been, on several occasions and at different forums, feted as a great power. This subject has been discussed in numerous books, but mostly in terms of rapid economic growth and immense potential in the emerging market. There is also a vast collection of literature on India's 'soft power '- culture, tourism, frugal engineering, and knowledge economy. However, there has been no serious exploration of the alternative path India can take to achieving great power status - a combination of hard power, geostrategics, and realpolitik. In this book, Bharat Karnad delves exclusively into these hard power aspects of India's rise and the problems associated with them. He offers an incisive analysis of the deficits in the country's military capabilities and in the 'software' related to hard power--absence of political vision and will, insensitivity to strategic geography, and unimaginative foreign and military policies--and arrives at powerful arguments on why these shortfalls have prevented the country from achieving the great power status.