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This book examines India’s foreign intelligence culture and strategic surprises in the 20th century. The work looks at whether there is a distinct way in which India ‘thinks about’ and ‘does’ intelligence, and, by extension, whether this affects the prospects of it being surprised. Drawing on a combination of archival data, secondary source information and interviews with members of the Indian security and intelligence community, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian intelligence culture from the ancient period to colonial times and, subsequently, the post-colonial era. This evolutionary culture has played a significant role in explaining the India’s foreign intelligence failure during the occurrences of strategic surprises, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil War, while it successfully prepared for surprise attacks like Operation Chenghiz Khan by Pakistan in 1971. The result is that the book argues that the strategic culture of a nation and its interplay with intelligence organisations and operations is important to understanding the conditions for intelligence failures and strategic surprises. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations.
"This book examines India's foreign intelligence culture and strategic surprises in the 20th century. The work looks at whether there is a distinct way in which India 'thinks about' and 'does' intelligence, and, by extension, whether this affects the prospects of it being surprised. Drawing on a combination of archival data, secondary source information and interviews with members of the Indian security and intelligence community, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Indian intelligence culture from the ancient period to colonial times and, subsequently, the post-colonial era. This evolutionary culture has played a significant role in explaining the India's foreign intelligence failure during the occurrences of strategic surprises, such as the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1999 Kargil War, while it successfully prepared for surprise attacks like Operation Chenghiz Khan by Pakistan in 1971. The result is that the book argues that the strategic culture of a nation and its interplay with intelligence organisations and operations is important to understanding the conditions for intelligence failures and strategic surprises. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, Asian politics and International Relations"--
The book offers a novel conceptualization of Israeli national intelligence culture, describing the way in which Israelis perceive and practice intelligence. Different nations have different national intelligence cultures, relying on different ideas of intelligence, perceiving and practicing intelligence in different ways. Written by a former senior intelligence officer, this book is the first study dedicated to Israeli intelligence culture and the way it reflects Israeli strategic culture. Relying on more than 30 elite interviews with acting and former Israeli practitioners, the book highlights the Israeli aversion to intelligence theory and scientific methods, as well as to the structured management of the intelligence system at the national level. It describes the intelligence system's emphasis on contrarian thinking and moral courage as the foundations of intelligence professionalism, and the growing inclination of Israeli intelligence toward action and influence. Intelligence is perceived and practiced by Israelis as a tool for problem-solving, addressing unique Israeli challenges. While some traits of the Israeli national intelligence culture have contributed to its high reputation and its ‘success story’, others might have also contributed to its failure in anticipating the Hamas terrorist attack on October 2023 or have remained aspirational norms rather than realized practice. The October 2023 failure, as that of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, will undoubtfully influence Israeli national intelligence culture for many years to come. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, Israeli politics, strategic studies, and international relations.
IN THIS VOLUME: • Today’s Era is not of War - Lt Gen (Dr) JS Bajwa • Rethinking the Politics of Airpower - Gp Capt PK Mulay • How should India Exploit Space for Military Advantage? - Gp Capt AK Sachdev • Operational Capability of LCA Tejas Variants - Air Marshal Anil Chopra • Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Existential Threat to Humanity? Brig Arvind Dhananjayan • Kabaddi, Kaluchak and OP Prakram: Did India Dither? Lt Gen JBS Yadava • Significance of Joint Maritime Exercises - Vice Admiral MP Muralidharan • Role of the IAF: In Possible Conflagration in Ladakh - Air Marshal Anil Chopra • Air Superiority or Air Denial: The Truth about the Air War in Ukraine - Gp Capt PK Mulay • India-US Military Exercises and China’s Woes - Dr Rajasimman Sundaram • Countering China’s Global Secret Police Stations - Dheeraj Paramesha Chaya • Turkey’s Rise in the Security Sphere - Danvir Singh • Ukraine War: Russia’s Winter Strategy or Admission of Defeat - Col Utkarsh Singh Rathore • Escalating the level of crisis and widening geo-political Divides hitting vulnerable afghan people hard - Neelapu Shanti • Cost of National Defence Index (CNDI) - Navneet Bhushan • Quantum Technology: Gartner’s Hype Cycle and its Implications for National Security Policy - Dr Sharad S Chauhan • Aerospace And Defence News - Priya Tyagi • Tighter China-Saudi Embrace - Lt Gen Prakash Katoch • Book Review
This book sets out the big data landscape, comprising data abundance, digital connectivity and ubiquitous technology, and shows how the big data landscape and the emerging technologies it fuels are impacting national security. This book illustrates that big data is transforming intelligence production as well as changing the national security environment broadly, including what is considered a part of national security as well as the relationships agencies have with the public. The book highlights the impact of big data on intelligence production and national security from the perspective of Australian national security leaders and practitioners, and the research is based on empirical data collection, with insights from nearly 50 participants from within Australia’s National Intelligence Community. It argues that big data is transforming intelligence and national security and shows that the impacts of big data on the knowledge, activities and organisation of intelligence agencies is challenging some foundational intelligence principles, including the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence collection. Furthermore, the book argues that big data has created emerging threats to national security; for example, it enables invasive targeting and surveillance, drives information warfare as well as social and political interference, and challenges the existing models of harm assessment used in national security. The book maps broad areas of change for intelligence agencies in the national security context and what they mean for intelligence communities, and explores how intelligence agencies look out to the rest of society, considering specific impacts relating to privacy, ethics and trust. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, technology studies, national security and International Relations.
The edited volume examines contemporary intelligence and tradecraft in Africa. The work offers a timely and empirically grounded account of African intelligence. It provides a multi-contributor narrative that explains contemporary dynamics without discounting historical and external influences, as well as explaining systemic dynamics borne by African agency. The volume features chapters on different issues and themes in intelligence studies, which include but are not limited to intelligence politicization, covert operations and subversion during political transitions, institutionalizing intelligence in post-conflict states, intelligence and counterterrorism, financial intelligence and complex crimes, intelligence professionalization, media and intelligence, intelligence humanization, environmental intelligence, and others. The volume is geographically representative and features case studies from the five regions of Africa: North Africa (the Maghreb), East Africa (or Horn of), Central Africa, West Africa, and Southern Africa. Without following a specific theoretical orientation, the book also aims to start a conversation around the prospects for a theory for African intelligence, with the various chapters paying attention to the political, social, and economic nuances that have a bearing on contemporary intelligence in Africa. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, African politics, security studies, and IR.
This book explores the conceptual, historical, and ethical issues of information conflict to present a detailed analysis of cognitive warfare. Is it possible for liberal democracies to deliberately use information on civilian populations to impact political and social institutions? While information conflict has been a part of political conflict, warfare, and international relations for as long as there has been political competition, given that our modern political and social lives are saturated by information, we are now faced with a pressing set of reasons to understand cognitive warfare, and to place it in a wider historical and technological context. This book identifies a series of conceptual and ethical challenges facing liberal democracies around modern information conflict. Drawing from historical practices, it suggests that two values – human dignity and political autonomy – can explain why some acts of cognitive warfare might be judged to be good while other acts are judged to be bad. This book will be of much interest to students and researchers of intelligence studies, ethics, security studies, and International Relations.
This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist’s view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.
Details how the intelligence community's history, structure, procedures, and functions affect policy decisions. This edition highlights: changes in the management of US intelligence and the fourth DNI in five years; Obama administration policies; developments in collection and analysis; and the killing of Bin Laden.
This is a monumental & epic work on India’s Military History. It seeks to answer the seminal question – ‘Is there an Indian Way of War-fighting and an Indian Strategic Culture?’ The author has traced the history of war-fighting in India from the Vedic & Mahabharatan period to the Mauryan & Mughal Eras and thereafter the British Period. It is a comprehensive audit of India’s combat performance in the ancient, medieval, modern and post-modern periods of Indian history. The focus of this work however, is on India’s Post-independence Military History. The author has analysed each of India’s wars with China & Pakistan as also its CI and CT campaigns in meticulous detail, to draw lessons for the future. The path-breaking contribution is the author’s thesis that there have been three local Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) in India, which shaped the course & flow of her history. Each of these RMAs helped to unify India under a great Empire and transformed it from a civilisational entity to a strong empire state. The first was the Mauryan RMA of using War Elephants in mass to generate shock & awe. This politically unified the whole of India and Afghanistan for the first time. The next RMA came with the Mughals who introduced Field Artillery, Muskets and Horsed Cavalry Archers with stirrups and cross bows. The Mughal horsed cavalry and artillery helped spawn the mighty Mughal Empire. The Third RMA came with the British who raised local Infantry Battalions on the European Pattern and drilled them to shoot in disciplined rhythms, to defeat all cavalry charges. This Infantry-based RMA helped establish the British Empire in India. The present Republic is a successor entity of the British Empire. The author has traced the evolution of India’s Strategic Culture to the Arthashastra of Kautilya. The surprise finding is that in the 1971 War – India unconsciously returned to this Kautilyan paradigm of using information dominance, covert war and Shock- Action military campaigns to defeat its adversaries. In the post-independence phase he traces the evolution of India’s war-fighting from the tactical phase of 1947-1962 when India’s capacity was confined to use of 2-3 Divisions alone. The 1965 War saw the graduation to the level of Operational Art, wherein 12 Divisions and a bulk of the Indian Air Force (IAF) saw active combat. The apogee came in 1971 – when India fought a brilliant, Quasi-Total, Tri-Service Campaign that broke Pakistan into two, put 93,000 prisoners of war in the bag and for the first time after the Second World War, created a new nation state with the Force of Arms. He traces the impact of nuclearisation on South Asia and prognosticates about the Future. The time has come, he asserts, for India to create a Fourth RMA in South Asia; and decisively shape outcomes. For this, economic power must be rapidly converted into usable military power. India must field dominant war fighting capabilities in South Asia.