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First Published in 2001. While classical Indian philosophy is incredibly rich in rigorous discussion s of topics in epistemology, logic and metaphysics, comparable discussions in the area s of ethics, politics and aesthetics were not as extensive as might have been expected. The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in the theory of value like the proper ends of life, the relation of dharma and moksa, liberation and pleasure, the sources of our knowledge of right and wrong, the ethics of non-violence, the status of the supra-moral. egoism and altruism, the theory of rasa, aesthetic experience and catharsis.
First Published in 2001. While classical Indian philosophy is incredibly rich in rigorous discussion s of topics in epistemology, logic and metaphysics, comparable discussions in the area s of ethics, politics and aesthetics were not as extensive as might have been expected. The selections in this volume discuss Indian treatments of topics in the theory of value like the proper ends of life, the relation of dharma and moksa, liberation and pleasure, the sources of our knowledge of right and wrong, the ethics of non-violence, the status of the supra-moral. egoism and altruism, the theory of rasa, aesthetic experience and catharsis.
Using recontructive ideas available in classical Indian original works, this book makes a departure in the style of modern writings on Indian moral philosophy. It presents Indian ethics, in an objective, secular, and wherever necessary, critical manner as a systematic, down-to-earth, philosophical account of moral values, virtues, rights and obligations. It thereby refutes the claim that Indian philosophy has no ethics as well as the counter-claim that it transcends ethics. It demonstrates that moral living proves that the individual, his society and the world are really real and not only taken to be real for behavioral purposes as the Advaitins hold, the self is amoral being a non-agent, moksa is not a moral value, and the Karmic theory, because of involving belief in rebirth, does not fuarantee that the doer of an action is also the experiencer of its results, contrary to what is commonly held, and Indian ethics can sustain itself even if such notions are dropped. Rajendra Prasad calls Indian ethics organismic because, along with ethical concerns, it also covers issues related to professions, politics, administration, sex, environment, etc. Therefore, in one format it is theoretical and applied, normative and metaethical, humanistic and non-humanistic, etc., of course, within the limits of the then cognitive enquiry.
Ethics and the History of Indian Philosophy, by Shyam Ranganathan, presents a compelling, systematic explication of the moral philosophical content of history of Indian philosophy in contrast to the received wisdom in Indology and comparative philosophy that Indian philosophers were scarcely interested in ethics. Unlike most works on the topic, this book makes a case for the positive place of ethics in the history of Indian philosophy by drawing upon recent work in metaethics and metamorality, and by providing a through analysis of the meaning of moral concepts and PHILOSOPHY itself- in addition to explicating the texts of Indian authors. In Ranganathan`s account, Indian philosophy shines with distinct options in ethics that find their likeness in the writings of the Ancient in the West, such as Plato and the Neo-Platonists, and not in the anthropocentric or positivistic options that have dominated the recent Western tradition.
As a system of realism, the Nyëya deserves special study to show that Idealism was not the only philosophical creed of ancient India. This book is an attempt to give a complete account of the Nyëya theory of knowledge in comparison with the rival theories of other systems, Indian and Western, and critical estimation of its worth. Though theories of knowledge of the Vedënta and other schools have been partially studied in this way by some, there has as yet been no such systematic, critical and comparative treatment of the Nyëya epistemology, The importance of such a study of Indian realistic theories of knowledge can scarcely be overrated in this modern age of Realism.
Article From Philosophy East And West V4, No. 4, January, 1955.
What can the philosophy of language learn from the classical Indian philosophical tradition? As recently as twenty or thirty years ago this question simply would not have arisen. If a practitioner of analytic philosophy of language of that time had any view of Indian philosophy at all, it was most likely to be the stereotyped picture of a gaggle of navel gazing mystics making vaguely Bradley-esque pronouncements on the oneness of the one that was one once. Much work has been done in the intervening years to overthrow that stereotype. Thanks to the efforts of such scholars as J. N. Mohanty, B. K. Matilal, and Karl Potter, philoso phers working in the analytic tradition have begun to discover something of the range and the rigor of classical Indian work in epistemolgy and metaphysics. Thus for instance, at least some recent discussions of personal identity reflect an awareness that the Indian Buddhist tradition might prove an important source of insights into the ramifications of a reductionist approach to personal identity. In philosophy of language, though, things have not improved all that much. While the old stereotype may no longer prevail among its practitioners, I suspect that they would not view classical Indian philoso phy as an important source of insights into issues in their field. Nor are they to be faulted for this.