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The Supreme Court of India is a powerful institution at the forefront of public attention in India. It is often engaged in a bitter duel with the government on issues as diverse as the administration of cricket in India to whether liquor shops are allowed on highways. Despite such public prominence, very little attention has been paid to who the judges of the Supreme Court are, how they are appointed, transferred and removed, and what they do after retirement. This book provides an account of these four facets of judicial functioning and analyses the processes in operation today. It argues that each of these four aspects gives rise to significant concerns pertaining to judicial independence, accountability, or both. Its main argument is that both judicial independence and accountability are necessary for 'an effective judiciary', and these two values are not in conflict with each other as is commonly assumed.
The impartial administration of justice and the accountability of government officials are two of the most strongly held American values. Yet these values are often in direct conflict with one another. At the national level, the U.S. Constitution resolves this tension in favor of judicial independence, insulating judges from the undue influence of other political institutions, interest groups, and the general public. But at the state level, debate has continued as to the proper balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability. In this volume, constitutional scholar G. Alan Tarr focuses squarely on that debate. In part, the analysis is historical: how have the reigning conceptions of judicial independence and accountability emerged, and when and how did conflict over them develop? In part, the analysis is theoretical: what is the proper understanding of judicial independence and accountability? Tarr concludes the book by identifying the challenges to state-level judicial independence and accountability that have emerged in recent decades, assessing the solutions offered by the competing sides, and offering proposals for how to strike the appropriate balance between independence and accountability.
This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.
Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from political life. The central claim of this work is that far from standing apart from the political realm, judicial independence is a product of it. It is defined and protected through interactions between judges and politicians. In short, judicial independence is a political achievement. This is the main conclusion of a three-year research project on the major changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and the consequences for judicial independence and accountability. The authors interviewed over 150 judges, politicians, civil servants and practitioners to understand the day-to-day processes of negotiation and interaction between politicians and judges. They conclude that the greatest threat to judicial independence in future may lie not from politicians actively seeking to undermine the courts, but rather from their increasing disengagement from the justice system and the judiciary.
The Culture of Judicial Independence: Rule of Law and World Peace, is the third book by Shimon Shetreet on Judicial Independence. The first was Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate (edited by Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschênes, Nijhoff,1985). The second was The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges (Edited by Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth, Nijhoff, 2012). This volume contains essays by senior academics, judges and practitioners across jurisdictions offering an analysis of several central issues relative to the culture of Judicial Independence. These include judicial review, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and world peace, constitutional position of top courts, relations between the judiciary and the other branches of government, impartiality and fairness of the judicial process, judicial ethics, dispute resolution in arbitral awards and international investments, international courts and cross country issues, judicial selection. The volume also offers an update report on the International Project of Judicial Independence of the International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace, including the relations of top courts and international courts, administrative judges, culture of judicial independence and public inquiries by judges.
This book examines the role of parliaments in modern constitutionalism by comparing various European deliberative institutions.
The creation of a culture of Judicial Independence is of a central significance both in national domestic legal systems, as well as for the international courts and tribunals. The main aim of this volume is to analyze the development of a culture of Judicial Independence in comparative perspectives, to offer an examination of the conceptual foundations of the principle of judicial independence and to discuss in detail the practical challenges facing judiciaries in different jurisdictions. The proposed volume is based on the papers presented at the five conferences held in the framework of The International Project on Judicial independence. The editors of this volume and the contributors to it are leading scholars and distinguished experts on judicial independence and judiciaries.
In this 2010 book, Roger Masterman examines the dividing lines between the powers of the judicial branch of government and those of the executive and legislative branches in the light of two of the most significant constitutional reforms of recent years: the Human Rights Act (1998) and Constitutional Reform Act (2005). Both statutes have implications for the separation of powers within the United Kingdom constitution. The Human Rights Act brings the judges into much closer proximity with the decisions of political actors than previously permitted by the Wednesbury standard of review and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, while the Constitutional Reform Act marks the emergence of an institutionally independent judicial branch. Taken together, the two legislative schemes form the backbone of a more comprehensive system of constitutional checks and balances policed by a judicial branch underpinned by the legitimacy of institutional independence.