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In the context of debates about truth, nihilism is the view that nothing is true. This is a very striking and (at first) implausible thesis, which is perhaps why it is seldom discussed. Truth without Truths applies nihilism to the philosophical debates on truth and paradox, and explores how a nihilist approach to truth is a serious contender. David Liggins demonstrates that a strong case for nihilism about truth is available. The main grounds for taking nihilism on truth seriously are the solutions it provides to a wide range of paradoxes involving truth, and its epistemological superiority to theories that posit truths. The discussion considers a wider range of paradoxes than usual-including the truth-teller paradox and other paradoxes of underdetermination. Liggins shows how the debate over truth and paradox can be advanced by drawing on metaphysical debates about realism and anti-realism. Truth without Truths is also a challenge to deflationism. Deflationists provide an austere, metaphysically lightweight account of truth. But there is one posit that all contemporary deflationists make: they posit truths. By showing that we can well do without truths, Liggins argues that deflationism is actually too lavish a position. Liggins's preferred form of alethic nihilism includes a Ramseyan analysis of the concept of truth, which uses quantification into sentence position, conceived of as non-objectual and non-substitutional. This book is part of a wider movement exploring the implications of admitting forms of non-objectual, non-substitutional quantification-sometimes called 'higher-order metaphysics'.
The Moral Universe explores central questions in metaethics concerning the nature of moral reality, its fundamental laws, its relation to the natural world, and its normative authority. It offers the most fully developed account of nonnatural moral realism to date.
Kevin Scharp proposes an original account of the nature and logic of truth, on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. He argues that truth is best understood as an inconsistent concept; develops an axiomatic theory of truth; and offers a new kind of possible-worlds semantics for this theory.
Robert Almeder provides a comprehensive discussion and definitive refutation of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for knowledge of the world, and to defend in detail an epistemic conception of truth without falling into the usual epistemological relativism or classical idealism in which all properties of the world turn out to be linguistic in nature and origin. There is no other book available that clearly and thoroughly defends the case for an epistemic conception of truth and alsoclaims success in avoiding idealism or epistemological relativism.
Normativity concerns what we ought to think or do and the evaluations we make. For scientific naturalists the moral is reached by reducing the normative to the nonnormative. For orthodox nonnaturalists the moral is found in the transcendent realm of norms. This book challenges both sides of this debate.
This volume tackles an array of complex and interrelated phenomena which are usually referred to as the post-truth condition – from confirmation bias to science denialism, misinformation, and the rise of polarized ‘epistemic tribes’ on social media. Based on a multi-disciplinary approach, the book seeks not just to chart the landscape of post-truth but to equip the readers with the intellectual tools to navigate and counteract its most detrimental aspects. ‘Post-truth’ denotes a cluster of phenomena that pose significant epistemic and societal challenges, including the proliferation of confirmation bias, denial of scientific findings, reinforcement of beliefs within echo chambers, and rampant spread of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and fake news—most notably via social media platforms. These phenomena have tangible effects, manifesting in a societal schism and contributing to public opinion polarization. Trust in scientific institutions and expertise is eroding, and the fragmentation of public opinion in opposed ‘epistemic tribes’ threatens the very foundations of democratic societies, undermining the role of scientific bodies in public discourse and policy-making. Drawing on diverse methodologies, theoretical frameworks, and expert insights, the contributions to this book scrutinize core post-truth phenomena through a multi-disciplinary lens and construct a nuanced understanding and an effective toolkit to confront the challenges posed to our social fabric. Tailored for a diverse readership, including scholars in social and traditional epistemology, semiotics, and related fields, as well as an informed general audience, this volume will be particularly relevant for individuals interested in fostering their understanding of phenomena such as post-truth, science denialism, societal polarization, and their impact on democratic processes and institutions. It was originally published as a special issue of Social Epistemology.
The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it says (only) that it is false. How, then, should we classify Liar sentences? Are they true or false? A natural suggestion would be that Liars are neither true nor false; that is, they fall into a category beyond truth and falsity. This solution might resolve the initial problem, but it beckons the Liar's revenge. A sentence that says of itself only that it is false or beyond truth and falsity will, in effect, bring back the initial problem. The Liar's revenge is a witness to the hydra-like nature of Liars: in dealing with one Liar you often bring about another. JC Beall presents fourteen new essays and an extensive introduction, which examine the nature of the Liar paradox and its resistance to any attempt to solve it. Written by some of the world's leading experts in the field, the papers in this volume will be an important resource for those working in truth studies, philosophical logic, and philosophy of language, as well as those with an interest in formal semantics and metaphysics.
"The book is required reading for anyone who wishes to understand dialetheism; (especially) for anyone who wishes to continue to endorse the old Aristotelian orthodoxy; and, more generally, for anyone who wishes to understand the role that contradiction plays in our thinking."--BOOK JACKET.
In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological contexts. The latter include, for instance, contexts that generate Liar Paradox. Their central claim is that truth is a circular concept. In support of this claim they provide a widely applicable theory (the "revision theory") of circular concepts. Under the revision theory, when truth is seen as circular both its ordinary features and its pathological features fall into a simple understandable pattern. The Revision Theory of Truth is unique in placing truth in the context of a general theory of definitions. This theory makes sense of arbitrary systems of mutually interdependent concepts, of which circular concepts, such as truth, are but a special case.
The author of this text explores the notion of truth and its role in our ordinary thought, as well as in logical philosophical and scientific theories.