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The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
The interplay between firms' internal organization and market behaviour is a long standing issue in industrial economics. This book examines firms' objectives in the comparatively new perspective shaped by globalization. The positive and normative aspects of theoretical analysis are developed and richly complemented by empirical studies.
Global Production is the first book to provide a fully comprehensive overview of the complicated issues facing multinational companies and their global sourcing strategies. Few international trade transactions today are based on the exchange of finished goods; rather, the majority of transactions are dominated by sales of individual components and intermediary services. Many firms organize global production around offshoring parts, components, and services to producers in distant countries, and contracts are drawn up specific to the parties and distinct legal systems involved. Pol Antràs examines the contractual frictions that arise in the international system of production and how these frictions influence the world economy. Antràs discusses the inevitable complications that develop in contract negotiation and execution. He provides a unified framework that sheds light on the factors helping global firms determine production locations and other organizational choices. Antràs also implements a series of systematic empirical tests, based on recent data from the U.S. Customs and Census Offices, which demonstrate the relevance of contractual factors in global production decisions. Using an integrated approach, Global Production is an excellent resource for researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates interested in the inner workings of international economics and trade.
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
This text provides an introduction to personnel economics, showing how economists can make specific predictions and prescriptions for personnel issues that arise in business on a daily basis. The author focuses on compensation and its relation to worker motivation, selection and teamwork.
This publication provides policy makers, board members, managers, equity providers, creditors and other stakeholders an overview of the issues to be addressed in establishing good corporate governance of non-listed companies.
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
A great deal of economics is about law - the functioning of markets, property rights and their enforcement, financial obligations, and so forth - yet these legal aspects are almost never addressed in the academic study of economics. Conversely, the study and practice of law entails a significant understanding of economics, yet the drafting and administration of laws often ignore economic principle. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law is uniquely placed by the quality, breadth and depth of its coverage to address this need for building bridges. Drawn from the ranks of academics, professional lawyers, and economists in eight countries, the 340 contributors include world experts in their fields. Among them are Nobel laureates in economics and eminent legal scholars. First published in 1998 and now available in paperback for the first time, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law has established itself as a classic reference work in this important field.
Within Post-Keynesian economics there is a spectrum of approaches to theories of the firm but what they have in common, to their great benefit, is a proper integration of the concept of radical uncertainty: data that cannot be known. This book revisits Kalecki’s theory of the firm is located to show that it constitutes fertile theoretical ground on which to systematically understand the resultant indeterminacy when firms operate under conditions of radical uncertainty. The author proposes a way of generalising radical uncertainty by integrating some of the separate approaches within Post-Keynesian economics centred around Kalecki’s work. Through this, it is shown that radical uncertainty does more than just change the ultimate motivation of firms (dropping short run profit maximisation; more complex motivation; interconnectivity with the environment), it is central to the emergence, existence and motivation of firms, and critically also firm strategy. It is argued that firms do not simply respond to uncertainty: it is the systematic cause of their intentional behaviour. Through developing these arguments, the book also contributes to the methodology of Kalecki and Shackle, as well as Kaleckian price theory. This book will be important reading for anyone interested in theories of the firm, Post-Keynesian economics and heterodox approaches to economics more broadly.