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On January 15, 2009, about 1527 eastern standard time, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320-214, N106US, experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from LaGuardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged beyond repair. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the ingestion of large birds into each engine, which resulted in an almost total loss of thrust in both engines and the subsequent ditching on the Hudson River.
How can a 10 pound bird bring down a 150,000 pounds aircraft? How would you feel if you were the captain on that aircraft, responsible for 155 souls? What would you do to prevent the disaster? How would you communicate with other crew members and the passengers? How would you determine where to try to ditch the plane in an unprecedented situation? How would training and experience influence your decision? What lessons can we learn from Captain Sullenberger's calm actions which incredibly saved all lives onboard? Successful Ditching of US Airways Flight 1549 on Hudson River by Captain Chesley Sullenberger and First Officer Jeff Skiles on January 15, 2009 - This edition provides all the details of this incredible event, transcripts of pilot's communications and the final results of a thorough investigation. They analyzed in great detail the aircraft, the accident, the damages; the personnel on board and on the ground, their training and their communications, their actions during the accident; the survival aspects, the birds, the meteorology and more. Finally they drew their conclusions and put together their recommendations based on the results of the examination, to prevent similar events in the future.
Basic Science and Art of Aircraft Wreckage Reconstruction is a unique title which addresses important aspects of investigating crashes, who does this kind of work, and how a healthy attitude and open mind are required to properly perform investigations. It also discusses what to expect from the on-scene part of the investigation, and the fundamental approaches to common types of wreckage reconstruction. Written by Don Knutson, a veteran of this industry, Basic Science and Art of Aircraft Wreckage Reconstruction is intended for the practitioner, student, or those who are simply curious about how aircraft wreckage is reconstructed. Full references are provided in the various chapters for additional reading and research. Many examples of aircraft crash scenarios and circumstances are presented in a "generic" form but relate to actual investigations, which should prove as a useful investigative resource whether you are an apprentice or an experience professional with a government aviation agency (NTSB, AAIB, FAA, etc.), an aircraft/engine/component manufacturer, military branch, insurance company, law enforcement agency, or a law firm. Basic Science and Art of Aircraft Wreckage Reconstruction is a must-read book for all who are passionate about the subject and want to understand how this activity actually happens in the field.
The Blame Machine describes how disasters and serious accidents result from recurring, but potentially avoidable, human errors. It shows how such errors are preventable because they result from defective systems within a company. From real incidents, you will be able to identify common causes of human error and typical system deficiencies that have led to these errors. On a larger scale, you will be able to see where, in the organisational or management systems, failure occurred so that you can avoid them. The book also describes the existence of a 'blame culture' in many organisations, which focuses on individual human error whilst ignoring the system failures that caused it. The book shows how this 'blame culture' has, in the case of a number of past accidents, dominated the accident enquiry process hampering a proper investigation of the underlying causes. Suggestions are made about how progress can be made to develop a more open culture in organisations, both through better understanding of human error by managers and through increased public awareness of the issues. The book brings together documentary evidence from recent major incidents from all around the world and within the Rail, Water, Aviation, Shipping, Chemical and Nuclear industries. Barry Whittingham has worked as a senior manager, design engineer and consultant for the chemical, nuclear, offshore oil and gas, railway and aviation sectors. He developed a career as a safety consultant specializing in the human factors aspects of accident causation. He is a member of the Human Factors in Reliability Group, and a Fellow of the Safety and Reliability Society.
How can a 10 pound bird bring down a 150,000 pounds aircraft? How would you feel if you were the captain on that aircraft, responsible for 155 souls? What would you do to prevent the disaster? How would you communicate with other crew members and the passengers? How would you determine where to try to ditch the plane in an unprecedented situation? How would training and experience influence your decision? What lessons can we learn from Captain Sullenberger's calm actions which incredibly saved all lives onboard? Successful Ditching of US Airways Flight 1549 on Hudson River by Captain Chesley Sullenberger and First Officer Jeff Skiles on January 15, 2009 - This edition provides all the details of this incredible event, transcripts of pilot's communications and the final results of a thorough investigation. They analyzed in great detail the aircraft, the accident, the damages; the personnel on board and on the ground, their training and their communications, their actions during the accident; the survival aspects, the birds, the meteorology and more. Finally they drew their conclusions and put together their recommendations based on the results of the examination, to prevent similar events in the future.
Advanced technologies and increasing automation have forever changed how systems work and how people interact with them. Transportation systems, energy extraction and production systems, medical devices, and manufacturing processes are increasingly complex. With the use of these complex systems comes increased potential for harm to humans, property, and the environment. System safety is a widely accepted management and engineering approach to analyze and address risks in these complex systems. When used correctly, system safety methods can provide tremendous benefits, focusing resources to reduce risk and improve safety. But poor system safety analyses can lead to overconfidence, and can result in a misunderstanding of the potential for harm. The System Safety Skeptic describes critical aspects of the discipline of system safety, including: Safety planning Hazard identification Hazard risk assessment and associated risk decision making Risk reduction and hazard controls Risk reduction verification Hazard tracking and anomaly reporting Safety management and culture Accidents in multiple industries and organizations are used to illustrate potential missteps in the system safety process, including: Failure to plan and implement systematic safety efforts, and failure to plan for emergencies Failure to accurately identify the hazards and what can go wrong Underestimating the chances that an accident could happen Underestimating the worst possible outcomes Overestimating the effectiveness of safeguards Failure to properly verify that safeguards actually work Failure to learn from the past Failure of the organization to adequately manage system safety efforts This book provides hundreds of lessons learned in safety management and engineering, drawing from examples from many industries as well as the author's years of experience in the field. These real-world lessons help foster a healthy skepticism toward safety analysis and management in order to prevent future accidents.
When faced with a human error problem, you may be tempted to ask 'Why didn't they watch out better? How could they not have noticed?'. You think you can solve your human error problem by telling people to be more careful, by reprimanding the miscreants, by issuing a new rule or procedure. These are all expressions of 'The Bad Apple Theory', where you believe your system is basically safe if it were not for those few unreliable people in it. This old view of human error is increasingly outdated and will lead you nowhere. The new view, in contrast, understands that a human error problem is actually an organizational problem. Finding a 'human error' by any other name, or by any other human, is only the beginning of your journey, not a convenient conclusion. The new view recognizes that systems are inherent trade-offs between safety and other pressures (for example: production). People need to create safety through practice, at all levels of an organization. Breaking new ground beyond its successful predecessor, The Field Guide to Understanding Human Error guides you through the traps and misconceptions of the old view. It explains how to avoid the hindsight bias, to zoom out from the people closest in time and place to the mishap, and resist the temptation of counterfactual reasoning and judgmental language. But it also helps you look forward. It suggests how to apply the new view in building your safety department, handling questions about accountability, and constructing meaningful countermeasures. It even helps you in getting your organization to adopt the new view and improve its learning from failure. So if you are faced by a human error problem, abandon the fallacy of a quick fix. Read this book.
A year after the disappearance and commencement of the international search for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, no sign of the plane has been found—no debris, no bodies, no sign of the much-talked-about black box. Richard Belzer, George Noory, and David Wayne want to know why. Scrutinizing the theories the media and politicians claim are the “most likely” reasons the plane crashed, Belzer, Noory, and Wayne argue that if a year after a huge Boeing 777 has gone missing, and there’s still no sign of it whatsoever, it’s time to think outside the box. The public needs to stop being misled. If a plane and its passengers went "missing" once, what's to stop it from happening again? Some of the theories the authors consider seem implausible on the surface, but the thorough research they've done and the continual failure of politicians, aviation authorities, and military members around the world to give any indication they're wrong makes their arguments as good—if not better—than the more widely shared ones. The title of this thought-provoking volume, Someone is Hiding Something, is a line spoken by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad—perhaps the only government official to publicly acknowledge the true reason that neither Flight 370 nor the 239 people onboard have been found.
Air safety is right now at a point where the chances of being killed in an aviation accident are far lower than the chances to winning a jackpot in any of the major lotteries. However, keeping or improving that performance level requires a critical analysis of some events that, despite scarce, point to structural failures in the learning process. The effect of these failures could increase soon if there is not a clear and right development path. This book tries to identify what is wrong, why there are things to fix, and some human factors principles to keep in aircraft design and operations. Features Shows, through different events, how the system learns through technology, practices, and regulations and the pitfalls of that learning process Discusses the use of information technology in safety-critical environments and why procedural knowledge is not enough Presents air safety management as a successful process, but at the same time, failures coming from technological and organizational features are shown Offers ways to improve from the human factors side by getting the right lessons from recent events