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Since the early 1990s numerous countries have adopted or strengthened competition legislation. Kee and Hoekman investigate the impact of competition law on industry markups over time and across a large number of countries. They find both domestic and foreign competition to be major sources of market discipline in concentrated markets, but that the direct effect of competition law is insignificant. However, once allowance is made for the endogeneity of both domestic competiton (number of firms) and the adoption of a competition law, the authors find that competition laws have an indirect effect on equilibrium markups by promoting a larger number of domestic firms. This paper--a product of Trade, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to study the links between trade and competition policies.
Since the early 1990s numerous countries have adopted or strengthened competition legislation. Kee and Hoekman investigate the impact of competition law on industry markups over time and across a large number of countries. They find both domestic and foreign competition to be major sources of market discipline in concentrated markets, but that the direct effect of competition law is insignificant. However, once allowance is made for the endogeneity of both domestic competiton (number of firms) and the adoption of a competition law, the authors find that competition laws have an indirect effect on equilibrium markups by promoting a larger number of domestic firms.This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the links between trade and competition policies.
Explains process of importing goods into the U.S., including informed compliance, invoices, duty assessments, classification and value, marking requirements, etc.
The food industry is a notoriously complex economic sector that has not received the attention it deserves within legal scholarship. Production and distribution of food is complex because of its polycentric character (as it operates at the intersection of different public policies) and its dynamic evolution and transformation in the last few decades (from technological and governance perspectives). This volume introduces the global value chain approach as a useful way to analyse competition law and applies it to the operations of food chains and the challenges of their regulation. Together, the chapters not only provide a comprehensive mapping of a vast comparative field, but also shed light on the intricacies of the various policies and legal fields in operation. The book offers a conceptual and theoretical framework for competition authorities, companies and academics, and fills a massive gap in the competition policy literature dealing with global value chains and food.
Two tradeoffs have been widely seen to severely constrain the scope for attacking poverty using redistributive transfers in poor countries: An equity-efficiency tradeoff and an insurance-efficiency tradeoff. Ravallion provides a critical overview of recent theoretical and empirical work that has called into question the extent of these tradeoffs in poor countries. He argues that these aggregate tradeoffs are often exaggerated. Indeed, they may not even be binding constraints in practice, given market failures. There appears to be scope for using carefully designed transfer schemes as an effective tool against both transient and chronic poverty. However, the same factors that weaken the tradeoffs also suggest that efficient redistributive policies might look rather different to the programs often found in practice. This paper - a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to better understand the tradeoffs faced in development policymaking.
By the widely used difference-in-difference method, the Southwest China Poverty Reduction Project had little impact on the proportion of people in beneficiary villages consuming less than $1 a day-despite a public outlay of $400 million. Is that right, or is the true impact being hidden somehow? The authors find that impact estimates are quite sensitive to the choice of outcome indicator, the poverty line, and the matching method. There are larger poverty impacts at lower poverty lines. And there are much larger impacts on incomes than consumptions. Uncertainty about the impact probably made it hard for participants to infer the gain in permanent income, so they saved a high proportion of the short-term gain.
Abstract: Many fear China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will impoverish its rural people by way of greater import competition in its agricultural markets. Anderson, Huang, and Ianchovichina explore that possibility bearing in mind that, even if producer prices of some (land-intensive) farm products fall, prices of other (labor-intensive) farm products could rise. Also, the removal of restrictions on exports of textiles and clothing could boost town and village enterprises, so demand for unskilled labor for nonfarm work in rural areas may grow even if demand for farm labor in aggregate falls. New estimates, from the global economywide numerical simulation model known as GTAP, of the likely changes in agricultural and other product prices as a result of WTO accession are drawn on to examine empirically the factor reward implications of China's WTO accession. The results suggest farm-nonfarm and Western-Eastern income inequality may well rise in China but rural-urban income inequality need not. The authors conclude with some policy suggestions for alleviating any pockets of farm household poverty that may emerge as a result of WTO accession. This paper"a product of the Economic Policy Division, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network"is part of a larger effort in the network to assess the impact of China's WTO accession.
We examine the impact of bank supervision on the financing obstacles faced by almost 5,000 corporations across 49 countries. We find that firms in countries with strong official supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections and corruption in raising external finance, which is consistent with political/regulatory capture theories. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent of the government and banks mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Finally, we find that bank supervisory agencies that force accurate information disclosure by banks and enhance private monitoring tend to ease the financing obstacles faced by firms.