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In England, it has been possible since 2013 to convert an office building into residential use without needing planning permission (as has been required since 1948). This book explores the consequences of this central government driven deregulation on local communities. The policy decision was primarily about boosting the supply of housing, but reflects a broader neoliberal ideology which seeks to reform public planning in many countries to reduce perceived interference in free markets. Drawing on original research in the English local authorities of Camden, Croydon, Leeds, Leicester and Reading, the book provides a case study of the implementation of planning deregulation which demonstrates the lowering of standards in housing quality, the reduced ability of the local state to proactively steer development and plan for their places, and the transfer of wealth from the public to private spheres that has resulted. Comparative case studies from Glasgow and Rotterdam call into question the very need for the deregulation in the first place.
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
Labor market deregulation, intended to boost productivity and employment, is one plausible, yet little studied, driver of the decline in labor shares that took place across most advanced economies since the early 1990s. This paper assesses the impact of job protection deregulation in a sample of 26 advanced economies over the period 1970-2015, using a newly constructed dataset of major reforms to employment protection legislation for regular contracts. We apply the local projection method to estimate the dynamic response of the labor share to our reform events at both the country and the country-industry levels. For the latter, we employ a differences-in-differences identification strategy using two identifying assumptions grounded in theory—namely that job protection deregulation should have larger negative effects in industries characterized by (i) a higher “natural” propensity to adjust the workforce, and (ii) a lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. We find a statistically significant, economically large and robust negative effect of deregulation on the labor share. In particular, illustrative back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that job protection deregulation may have contributed about 15 percent to the average labor share decline in advanced economies. Together with existing evidence regarding the macroeconomic gains from job protection and other labor market reforms, our results also point to the need for policymakers to address efficiency-equity trade-offs when designing such reforms.
The airline industry has been buffeted by the forces of deregulation since themid-1970s. Many new firms have entered, some with different price and operating philosophies andsome of these have thrived. Other airlines have gone bankrupt. Overall the real cost of air travelhas declined considerably; however, the effects have varied dramatically from market to market.Exactly how was this massive experiment envisioned and planned? How has it worked? And how will itwork in the long run?Deregulating the Airlines narrates and analyzes the decisions taken by theCivil Aeronautics Board during the transition to deregulation and the reasoning behind the AirlineDeregulation Act of 1978. It provides many comparisons of the industry before and after deregulationand uses those data to test the various hypotheses that scholars and politicians have advanced abouthow markets would behave if regulation were removed. Its findings provide information on both thedemand and the cost side that will be important in molding the long-run equilibrium of the industry,and it discusses how quickly the industry is moving toward that equilibrium.For policymakers andstudents of regulation in particular, this study provides a unique case for contrasting theoperation of an industry under close regulatory control and its operation free of such controls. Itis able to make use of an unusually large volume of data on the costs, operations, and prices ofindividual firms to show how markets work and how regulation works.The book's in-depth analysis ofthe impact of policy changes in the airline industry is drawn in part from the authors' activeinvolvement in implementing the new policies. Elizabeth Bailey is Dean of the Graduate School ofIndustrial Administration at Carnegie-Mellon. Previously she was a commissioner and vice chairman atthe Civil Aeronautics Board. Daniel Kaplan is director of the Board's Office of Economic Analysis.David R. Graham, manager of the Defense Economics Program at the Institute for Defense Analysis, wasa Board economist.Deregulating the Airlines is tenth in the series, Regulation of Economic Activity,edited by Richard Schmalensee.
The standard wisdom among political scientists has been that "iron triangles" operated among regulatory agencies, the regulated industries, and members of Congress, all presumably with a stake in preserving regulation that protected the industries from competition. Despite almost unanimous agreement among economists that such regulation was inefficient, it seemed highly unlikely that deregulation could occur. Yet between 1975 and 1980 major deregulatory changes that strongly favored competition did take place in a wide range of industries. The results are familiar to airline passengers, users of telephone service, and trucking freight shippers, among others. Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk ask why this deregulation happened. How did a diffuse public interest prevail over the powerful industry and union interests that sought to preserve regulation? Why did the regulatory commissions, which were expected to be a major obstacle to deregulation, instead take the initiative on behalf of it? And why did influential members of Congress push for even greater deregulation? The authors concentrate on three cases: airlines, trucking, and telecommunications. They find important similarities among the cases and discuss the implications of these findings for two broader topics: the role that economic analysis has played in policy change, and the capacity of the American political system for transcending narrow interests.
The electricity market has experienced enormous setbacks in delivering on the promise of deregulation. In theory, deregulating the electricity market would increase the efficiency of the industry by producing electricity at lower costs and passing those cost savings on to customers. As Electricity Deregulation shows, successful deregulation is possible, although it is by no means a hands-off process—in fact, it requires a substantial amount of design and regulatory oversight. This collection brings together leading experts from academia, government, and big business to discuss the lessons learned from experiences such as California's market meltdown as well as the ill-conceived policy choices that contributed to those failures. More importantly, the essays that comprise Electricity Deregulation offer a number of innovative prescriptions for the successful design of deregulated electricity markets. Written with economists and professionals associated with each of the network industries in mind, this comprehensive volume provides a timely and astute deliberation on the many risks and rewards of electricity deregulation.
After 25 years of industry restructuring, regulatory reform and deregulation across many industrial sectors in many countries, it is an appropriate time to take stock of the impacts of these reforms on consumers, producers and overall economic performance. This book contains the latest thinking on these issues by a distinguished international group of scholars. It s a collection of essays for our time that is well worth reading. Paul L. Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US The most exciting development in the study of regulation in the past quarter century is research on the incentives that are created by the details of the procedures for creating and enforcing regulatory rules. This book brings together a rich collection of studies that collectively advance our understanding of the effect of regulatory governance on the performance of regulated firms, with important lessons about how to design more effective regulatory instruments and processes. Roger G. Noll, Stanford University, US Cycles of poorly-designed or weakly-enforced regulation, disappointing performance and political over-reaction are now familiar to students of regulated industries. Nourished by recent developments in the economics of incentives, including their transaction costs and property rights dimensions, and written by renowned experts in the field, Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation is a must-read for all those interested in the economics and politics of regulation. A timely book, the publication of which coincides with the designing of a post-subprime regulatory framework for the financial industry. Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics, France Building on Oliver Williamson s original analysis, the contributors introduce new ideas, different perspectives and provide tools for better understanding changes in the approach to regulation, the reform of public utilities, and the complex problems of governance. They draw largely upon a transaction cost approach, highlighting the challenges faced by major economic sectors and identifying critical flaws in prevailing views on regulation. Deeply rooted in sector analysis, the book conveys a central message of new institutional economics: that theory should be continuously confronted by facts, and reformed or revolutionized accordingly. With its emphasis on the institutional embeddedness of regulatory issues and the problems generated by the benign neglect of institutional factors in the reform of major public utilities, this book will provide a wide-ranging audience with challenging views on the dynamics of regulatory approaches. Economists, political scientists, postgraduate students, researchers and policymakers with an interest in institutional economics and economic organization will find the book to be a stimulating and enlightening read.
"Proposes experiments in deregulating and privatizing the country's transportation systems to rid them of inefficiencies and significantly improve their performance in moving goods and people around the United States; the book covers roads, airports and airport traffic control, mass transit, intercity buses and railway networks"--Provided by publisher.