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The first comprehensive history of NATO in the 1960s, based on the systematic use of multinational archival evidence. This new book is the result of a gathering of leading Cold War historians from both sides of the Atlantic, including Jeremi Suri, Erin Mahan, and Leopoldo Nuti. It shows in great detail how the transformation of NATO since 1991 has opened up new perspectives on the alliance’s evolution during the Cold War. Viewed in retrospect, the 1960s were instrumental to the strengthening of NATO's political clout, which proved to be decisive in winning the Cold War – even more so than NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities. In addition, it shows that NATO increasingly served as a hub for state, institutional, transnational, and individual actors in that decade. Contributions to the book highlight the importance of NATO's ability to generate "soft power", the scope and limits of alliance consultation, the important role of common transatlantic values, and the growing influence of small allies. NATO's survival in the crucial 1960s provides valuable lessons for the current bargaining on the purpose and cohesion of the alliance. This book will be of much interest to students of international history, Cold War studies and strategic studies.
French foreign policy in the 1960's seemed unique because it was dominated by the anachronistic ideals of Charles de Gaulle. Edward L. Morse argues that in fact the foreign policies of all highly modernized states are so similar that they can be described and explained by a general theory of interdependence. He uses France as a case study of his theory, and shows that what makes French foreign policy in this period so fascinating is the way in which the behavior of the President brought into sharp focus the problems interdependence poses for nation-states. The book is divided into two parts. The first develops the theory of the conduct of foreign policy in any highly modernized society. The second part tests the theory by examining such characteristics of French foreign policy as: the erosion of the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs; the constraints put on foreign policy by the growth of international economic interdependence, which has also affected the autonomy of decision-making in a purely national context; the increased importance of foreign economic policy; the questioning of governmental priorities in foreign affairs; and the emergence of crisis management and manipulation as part of the routine procedures of foreign policy operations. Edward L. Morse's work is valuable both for the theory it offers and because it gives a balanced view of foreign policy in an important period in recent French history. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
As France begins to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the time has come to examine how French security policy has evolved since Charles de Gaulle set it on an independent course in the 1960s. Philip Gordon shows that the Gaullist model, contrary to widely held beliefs, has lived on--but that its inherent inconsistencies have grown more acute with increasing European unification, the diminishing American military role in Europe, and related strains on French military budgets. The question today is whether the Gaullist legacy will enable a strong and confident France to play a full role in Europe's new security arrangements or whether France, because of its will to independence, is destined to play an isolated, national role. Gordon analyzes military doctrines, strategies, and budgets from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also the evolution of French policy from the early debates about NATO and the European Community to the Persian Gulf War. He reveals how and why Gaullist ideas have for so long influenced French security policy and examines possible new directions for France in an increasingly united but potentially unstable Europe.
As France begins to confront the new challenges of the post-Cold War era, the time has come to examine how French security policy has evolved since Charles de Gaulle set it on an independent course in the 1960s. Philip Gordon shows that the Gaullist model, contrary to widely held beliefs, has lived on--but that its inherent inconsistencies have grown more acute with increasing European unification, the diminishing American military role in Europe, and related strains on French military budgets. The question today is whether the Gaullist legacy will enable a strong and confident France to play a full role in Europe's new security arrangements or whether France, because of its will to independence, is destined to play an isolated, national role. Gordon analyzes military doctrines, strategies, and budgets from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also the evolution of French policy from the early debates about NATO and the European Community to the Persian Gulf War. He reveals how and why Gaullist ideas have for so long influenced French security policy and examines possible new directions for France in an increasingly united but potentially unstable Europe.
The greatest threat to the Western alliance in the 1960s did not come from an enemy, but from an ally. France, led by its mercurial leader General Charles de Gaulle, launched a global and comprehensive challenge to the United State’s leadership of the Free World, tackling not only the political but also the military, economic, and monetary spheres. Successive American administrations fretted about de Gaulle, whom they viewed as an irresponsible nationalist at best and a threat to their presence in Europe at worst. Based on extensive international research, this book is an original analysis of France’s ambitious grand strategy during the 1960s and why it eventually failed. De Gaulle’s failed attempt to overcome the Cold War order reveals important insights about why the bipolar international system was able to survive for so long, and why the General’s legacy remains significant to current French foreign policy.