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During the atomic, earthshaking first 120 days of Harry Truman's unlikely presidency, an unprepared, small-town man had to take on Germany, Japan, Stalin, and a secret weapon of unimaginable power--marking the most dramatic rise to greatness in American history.
Written by the former chairman and managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan, this book sheds new light on key topics in the history of U.S.-Taiwan relations. It fills an important gap in our understanding of how the U.S. government addressed Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait issue from the early 1940s to the present. One theme that runs through these essays is the series of obstacles erected that denied the people of Taiwan a say in shaping their own destiny: Franklin Roosevelt chose to return Taiwan to mainland China for geopolitical reasons; there was little pressure on the Kuomintang to reform its authoritarian rule until Congress got involved in the early 1980s; Chiang Kai-shek spurned American efforts in the 1960s to keep Taiwan in international organizations; and behind the ROC's back, the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations negotiated agreements with the PRC that undermined Taiwan's position. In addition to discussing how the United States reacted to key human rights cases from the 1940s to the 1980s, the author also discusses the Bush and Clinton administrations' efforts to preserve U.S. interests while accommodating new forces in the region. All these episodes have an enduring relevance for the people of Taiwan, and in his conclusion the author discusses where the relationship stands today. The book includes related documents that helped shape the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
This book details the evolution of General George Marshall's relationship with the atomic bomb—including the Manhattan Project and the use of atomic weapons on Japan—as it emerged as the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. The atomic bomb is not only the most powerful weapon ever used in the history of warfare: it is also the most significant in terms of its long-term impact on U.S. military power and policy, and as the reason behind the conflict that raged for four decades without actually happening—the Cold War. General George C. Marshall played an instrumental role in the development and use of the atomic bomb in World War II as well as in issues involving nuclear weapons in the post-World War II period. This book tells the story of Marshall's experience with the atomic bomb from his early skepticism of its effectiveness as a weapon, to his oversight of its development and deployment against Japan in World War II, to his recognition of the bomb as a weapon of such dire consequence that it should never be used again. Intended for a general audience as well as scholars with specific knowledge about the subject matter, this book presents a cohesive account of General Marshall's involvement with nuclear weapons and atomic power as Army chief of staff during World War II and as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the early years of the Cold War. Marshall's involvement with the use of nuclear weapons is set in the context of the Allies' efforts to force Japan to surrender and the initiation of the Cold War. Readers will gain insight into Marshall's quest for obtaining a Japanese surrender; his views on the use of the atomic bomb on Japan versus the use of conventional weapons, including fire bombing or poison gas; his interactions with Roosevelt and Truman on nuclear issues; and Marshall's diplomatic skillfulness in dealing with the issues surrounding the control and use of nuclear weapons as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the post-World War II era. These included consideration of the use of the atomic bomb during the Berlin crisis and the Korean war.
Examines the rapidly changing role of diplomacy
A gripping account of the final American bombing mission of World War II and how it prevented a military coup that would have kept Japan in the war. How close did the Japanese come to not surrendering to Allied forces on August 15, 1945? The Last Mission explores this question through two previously neglected strands of late—World War II history, whose very interconnections could have caused a harrowing shift in the course of the postwar world. On the final night of the war, as Emperor Hirohito recorded a message of surrender for the Japanese people, a band of Japanese rebels, commanded by War Minister Anami's elite staff, burst into the palace. They had plotted a massive coup that aimed to destroy the recordings of the Imperial Rescript of surrender and issue false orders forged with the Emperor’s seal commanding the widely dispersed Japanese military to continue the war. If this rebellion had succeeded, the military would have proceeded with large-scale kamikaze attacks on Allied forces, costing huge casualties and just possibly provoking the Americans to drop a third atomic bomb on Japan over Tokyo–and continue to drop more bombs as Japanese resistance stiffened. Meanwhile, in the midst of an “end-of-war” celebration on Guam, Air Force radio operator Jim Smith and his fellow crewmen received urgent orders for a bombing mission over Japan’s sole remaining oil refinery north of Tokyo. As a stream of American B-29B bombers approached Tokyo, Japanese air defenses, fearing the approaching planes signaled the threat of a third atomic bomb, ordered a total blackout in Tokyo and the Imperial Palace, completely disrupting the rebels’ plans. Smith and his fellow crewmembers completed the mission, and a few hours later, the Emperor announced the surrender over Japan’s airwaves, dictating the end of the war. The Last Mission is an insightful piece of speculative investigation that combines narrative storytelling with historical contingency and explores how two seemingly unrelated events could have profoundly changed the course of modern history.
"In the Washington Merry-Go-Round, a nationally syndicated newspaper column that appeared in hundreds of papers from 1932 to 1969, as well as on weekly radio and television programs, the investigative journalist Drew Pearson revealed news that public officials tried to suppress. He disclosed policy disputes and political spats, exposed corruption, attacked bigotry, and promoted social justice. He pumped up some political careers and destroyed others. Presidents, prime ministers, and members of Congress repeatedly called him a liar, and he was sued for libel more often than any other journalist, but he won most of his cases by proving the accuracy of his charges. Pearson dismissed most official news as propaganda and devoted his column to reporting what officials were doing behind closed doors. He broke secrets-even in wartime-and revealed classified information. Fellow journalists credited him with knowing more dirt about more people in Washington than even the FBI and compared his efforts to Daniel Ellsberg with the Pentagon Papers or Edward Snowden with WikiLeaks, except that he did it daily. The Columnist examines how Pearson managed to uncover secrets so successfully and why government efforts to find his sources proved so unsuccessful. Drawing on a half century of archival evidence it assesses his contributions as a muckraker by verifying or refuting both his accusations and his accusers"--
Most Americans believe that the Second World War ended because the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan forced it to surrender. Five Days in August boldly presents a different interpretation: that the military did not clearly understand the atomic bomb's revolutionary strategic potential, that the Allies were almost as stunned by the surrender as the Japanese were by the attack, and that not only had experts planned and fully anticipated the need for a third bomb, they were skeptical about whether the atomic bomb would work at all. With these ideas, Michael Gordin reorients the historical and contemporary conversation about the A-bomb and World War II. Five Days in August explores these and countless other legacies of the atomic bomb in a glaring new light. Daring and iconoclastic, it will result in far-reaching discussions about the significance of the A-bomb, about World War II, and about the moral issues they have spawned.
“Some historians are great because they write great books, others because they write books that need to be written. Mark A. Stoler... has done both. Allies in War offers an accessible and gracefully written synthesis of the wealth of new and important scholarship... addressing American and British grand strategy during World War II. Allies in War presents a global overview of Anglo-American cooperation against the Axis powers with a chronological account of the major diplomatic and military events. It begins with a brief summary of World War I and the interwar years, continues through the capitulation of Japan in September 1945, and concludes with a short discussion of the origins of the Cold War... Stoler’s story also covers the world war like a world war... Each chapter covers major developments in every theater... [Stoler] makes particular effort to recognize the critical role of the Soviet Union in winning World War II and its impact on Anglo-American strategy. Allies in War is a versatile work with a lot of uses. Both students and professionals will find rewards. This volume will be an excellent tool for teaching survey and elective history courses. It will also aid in understanding the dynamics that attend coalition warfare.” — The Journal of American History “[A] decided tour de force... Stoler provides an excellent and readable overview on a global scale of the interrelated wartime military, strategic, and diplomatic decisions and contributions of the United States and Great Britain... Stoler’s forte is elegantly concise syntheses of massive outpourings of scholarship in both military and diplomatic history and judicious, balanced, and stimulating assessments of often controversial issues... Lucid, balanced, nuanced, and acute, giving equal space to the wars in both Europe and Asia, Stoler’s interpretive overview is a valuable and welcome addition to its field.” — The Journal of Military History “This is the work of a mature historian, comfortably in command of his material, using his considerable experience to construct a tightly controlled narrative that carries the reader forward with little effort on his or her part; a sure sign of considerable effort on the part of the writer... Stoler’s book is much more than the synthesis it might appear to be... It is a masterly summary of existing scholarship, but one enriched by his own knowledge of the archival and secondary material... this book shines when it comes to grand strategy; the reader wanting a potted (and accurate) evolution of Anglo-American grand strategy will find all he or she will need here.” — The International History Review “Mark Stoler... is supremely well qualified to undertake this volume... Previous studies of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War tend to focus on either the war in Europe or the war in the Pacific. The originality of Stoler’s approach is that he wants to cover both. He seeks as well to incorporate the results of relatively recent publications on the Second World War... The results are impressive... Stoler’s writing is a major strength of this book... Stoler provides admirable surveys of the major historical controversies of the Anglo-American war against the Axis powers, such as the efficacy of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, the utility of the Italian campaign, and the continuing debate over the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Anyone who teaches courses on the history of the Second World War will find this volume a valuable resource.” — The Journal of Modern History “Allies in War is... a solid survey of the war... [an] effective synthesis of the most troublesome aspects of the special [Britain-US] relationship.” — Naval History Magazine “An important new study by one of the leading scholars in the field.” — David Reynolds, University of Cambridge