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This publication provides recommendations and guidance for meeting Requirement 32 of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, for optimal operator performance involving systematic consideration of human factors, including the human machine interface (HMI). The Safety Guide provides a structured approach and guidance on application of human factors engineering (HFE) in the design of the HMI, which is the basis for human physical and cognitive processes in nuclear power plants. It applies to application of HFE in the design, operation and maintenance of the HMI for new plants, as well as for modifications of the HMI of existing plants.
On the basis of the principles included in the Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, this Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements applicable to the design of nuclear power plants. It covers the design phase and provides input for the safe operation of the power plant. It elaborates on the safety objective, safety principles and concepts that provide the basis for deriving the safety requirements that must be met for the design of a nuclear power plant. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Applying the safety principles and concepts; 3. Management of safety in design; 4. Principal technical requirements; 5. General plant design; 6. Design of specific plant systems.
This book attempts to look into the genesis of security culture as a concept which emerged with the recognition of the role of the human factor in the context of security. It traces the rapid evolution of security culture into a multi-functional discipline reinforced by supplementary tools such as assessment and enhancement methodologies, reviews practical steps to harmonize nuclear safety and security culture as well as recommends its practical application to address insider threats and their consequences. In addition, it demonstrates how to tailor the generic model of nuclear security culture to meet specific needs of diverse facilities and activities in different countries. Finally, the book discusses several challenges which need to be addressed to make security culture a user-friendly, universal, and sustainable instrument to turn the perception of the human factor as a liability into an asset of nuclear security.
Nuclear Safety provides the methods and data needed to evaluate and manage the safety of nuclear facilities and related processes using risk-based safety analysis, and provides readers with the techniques to assess the consequences of radioactive releases. The book covers relevant international and regional safety criteria (US, IAEA, EUR, PUN, URD, INI). The contents deal with each of the critical components of a nuclear plant, and provide an analysis of the risks arising from a variety of sources, including earthquakes, tornadoes, external impact and human factors. It also deals with the safety of underground nuclear testing and the handling of radioactive waste. - Covers all plant components and potential sources of risk including human, technical and natural factors. - Brings together information on nuclear safety for which the reader would previously have to consult many different and expensive sources. - Provides international design and safety criteria and an overview of regulatory regimes.
As industries are rapidly being digitalized and information is being more heavily stored and transmitted online, the security of information has become a top priority in securing the use of online networks as a safe and effective platform. With the vast and diverse potential of artificial intelligence (AI) applications, it has become easier than ever to identify cyber vulnerabilities, potential threats, and the identification of solutions to these unique problems. The latest tools and technologies for AI applications have untapped potential that conventional systems and human security systems cannot meet, leading AI to be a frontrunner in the fight against malware, cyber-attacks, and various security issues. However, even with the tremendous progress AI has made within the sphere of security, it’s important to understand the impacts, implications, and critical issues and challenges of AI applications along with the many benefits and emerging trends in this essential field of security-based research. Research Anthology on Artificial Intelligence Applications in Security seeks to address the fundamental advancements and technologies being used in AI applications for the security of digital data and information. The included chapters cover a wide range of topics related to AI in security stemming from the development and design of these applications, the latest tools and technologies, as well as the utilization of AI and what challenges and impacts have been discovered along the way. This resource work is a critical exploration of the latest research on security and an overview of how AI has impacted the field and will continue to advance as an essential tool for security, safety, and privacy online. This book is ideally intended for cyber security analysts, computer engineers, IT specialists, practitioners, stakeholders, researchers, academicians, and students interested in AI applications in the realm of security research.
The present report is a revision of Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-3 (1988), updating the statements made on the objectives and principles of safe design and operation for electricity generating nuclear power plants. It includes the improvements made in the safety of operating nuclear power plants and identifies the principles underlying the best current safety policies to be applied in future plants. It presents INSAG's understanding of the principles underlying the best current safety policies and practices of the nuclear power industry.
Human error is implicated in nearly all aviation accidents, yet most investigation and prevention programs are not designed around any theoretical framework of human error. Appropriate for all levels of expertise, the book provides the knowledge and tools required to conduct a human error analysis of accidents, regardless of operational setting (i.e. military, commercial, or general aviation). The book contains a complete description of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which incorporates James Reason's model of latent and active failures as a foundation. Widely disseminated among military and civilian organizations, HFACS encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and elements of supervisory and organizational failure. It attracts a very broad readership. Specifically, the book serves as the main textbook for a course in aviation accident investigation taught by one of the authors at the University of Illinois. This book will also be used in courses designed for military safety officers and flight surgeons in the U.S. Navy, Army and the Canadian Defense Force, who currently utilize the HFACS system during aviation accident investigations. Additionally, the book has been incorporated into the popular workshop on accident analysis and prevention provided by the authors at several professional conferences world-wide. The book is also targeted for students attending Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University which has satellite campuses throughout the world and offers a course in human factors accident investigation for many of its majors. In addition, the book will be incorporated into courses offered by Transportation Safety International and the Southern California Safety Institute. Finally, this book serves as an excellent reference guide for many safety professionals and investigators already in the field.
This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology can become blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by perceptions. Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, the authors explore the complex interplay between evidence-based judgements and perceptions of intentions that frames the science of verification. The book provides new insights into the role and influence of human factors in the verification process, shedding light on this ‘blind spot’ of verification research. It is an invaluable resource for practitioners, academics and students working in arms control and disarmament.
The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.