Download Free How To Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online How To Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups and write the review.

Arguments for eliminating the double taxation of dividends apply only to dividends paid by corporations to individuals. The double (and multiple) taxation of dividends paid by one firm to another -- intercorporate dividends - was explicitly included in the 1930s as part of a package of tax and other policies aimed at eliminating United States pyramidal business groups. These structures remain the predominant form of corporate organization outside the United States. The first Roosevelt administration associated them with corporate governance problems, corporate tax avoidance, market power, and an objectionable concentration of economic power. Future tax reforms in the United States should mind the original intent of Congress and the President regarding intercorporate dividend taxation. Foreign governments may find the American experience of value should they desire to eliminate their business groups.
Arguments for eliminating the double taxation of dividends apply only to dividends paid by corporations to individuals. The double (and multiple) taxation of dividends paid by one firm to another -- intercorporate dividends - was explicitly included in the 1930s as part of a package of tax and other policies aimed at eliminating United States pyramidal business groups. These structures remain the predominant form of corporate organization outside the United States. The first Roosevelt administration associated them with corporate governance problems, corporate tax avoidance, market power, and an objectionable concentration of economic power. Future tax reforms in the United States should mind the original intent of Congress and the President regarding intercorporate dividend taxation. Foreign governments may find the American experience of value should they desire to eliminate their business groups.
For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.
This volume aims to explore the evolution of large enterprises in today's developed economies in the West. It focuses on the economic institution of the business group and understanding the factors behind its rise, growth, resilience, and/or fall; its behavioural and organizational characteristics; and its contributions to economic development.
Large business enterprises, from the railroad barons of nineteenth century America to Amazon and Google today, are often perceived as important for economic performance and, at the same time, as potential abusers of their political and economic power. In this study, we compare the experiences of four countries that implemented policies to curb the influence of one type of large corporate entities -- pyramidal business groups: The US in the 1930s; Japan during the American occupation (1945-1952); Korea following the Asian crisis (late 1990s); and Israel in the last decade (2010-2018). Novel regulatory measures, applied consistently in the US and Japan, where the extreme political circumstances were very favorable to economic reform, led to the demise of pyramidal business groups in these countries. Israel, where the reforms did not follow a severe crisis, also used specifically-designed regulatory tools over a decade-long period, resulting in a significant decline in the number and size of business groups. Korea, after experimenting with variety of regulatory measures, chose to rely primarily on corporate governance-focused reforms to curb the influence of the chaebol, but with limited effects; groups continue to dominate the Korean economy. Our findings point to the importance of specifically-designed regulatory tools, applied consistently over time, against the backdrop of a pro-reform political climate.
This handbook provides a comprehensive analysis of business groups around the world. It focuses on the adaptive and competitive capabilities of business groups and their evolutionary dynamics, as well as considering the historical and theoretical contexts of business groups.
This book addresses the increasing prominence of family-owned business groups and their potential to influence growth and development in the global economy. Family businesses are not necessarily converging towards unitary models of corporate governance or organizational designs, but remain heterogeneous in a global economy. Empirical evidence on the developmental effects of family-owned business groups is fragmented and inconclusive: are there tangible differences between family-owned business groups in emerging economies and developed countries? Are there important variations across and between industries? How have geopolitical circumstances shaped their activities? In this book, the author seeks alternative, pluralistic, and cross-disciplinary approaches through economic, management, and organizational perspectives. This book provides readers with a core understanding of how both corporate governance and business strategy are shaped by the institutional frameworks of markets, as well as knowledge into how institutional context shapes the governance and strategies of family business groups. It is an invaluable reference tool for scholars and students in the social sciences, as well as professionals involved in strategic management issues within a knowledge management context.
Business groups - large, diversified, often family-controlled organizations with pyramidal ownership structure, such as the Japanese zaibatsu, the Korean chaebol and the grupos economicos in Latin America - have played a significant role in national economic growth, especially in emerging economies. Earlier variants can also be found in the trading companies, often set up in Britain, which operated in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Business groups are often criticized as premodern forms of economic organization, and occasionally as symptomatic of corrupt 'crony capitalism', but many have shown remarkable resilience, navigating and adjusting to economic and political turbulence, international competition, and technological change. This Handbook provides a comprehensive analysis of business groups around the world. It examines the adaptive and competitive capabilities of business groups, and their evolutionary dynamics. 16 individual country chapters deal with business groups from Asia to Africa, the Middle East to Latin America, while overarching chapters consider the historical and theoretical context of business groups. With contributions from leading experts, The Oxford Handbook of business groups provides a comprehensive, empirically and theoretically rich guide for scholars and policy-makers.
We provide a rationale for pyramidal ownership (the control of a firm through a chain of ownership relations) that departs from the traditional argument that pyramids arise to separate cash flow from voting rights. With a pyramidal structure, a family uses a firm it already controls to set up a new firm. This structure allows the family to 1) access the entire stock of retained earnings of the original firm, and 2) to share the new firm's non-diverted payoff with minority shareholders of the original firm. Thus, pyramids are attractive if external funds are costlier than internal funds, and if the family is expected to divert a large fraction of the new firm's payoff; conditions that hold in an environment with poor investor protection. The model can differentiate between pyramids and dual-class shares even in situations in which the same deviation from one share - one vote can be achieved with either method. Unlike the traditional argument, our model is consistent with recent empirical evidence that some pyramidal firms are associated with small deviations between ownership and control. We also analyze the creation of business groups (a collection of multiple firms under the control of a single family) and find that, when they arise, they are likely to adopt a pyramidal ownership structure. Other predictions of the model are consistent with systematic and anecdotal evidence on pyramidal business groups.
This volume explores how Chinese institutions have adapted to the new challenges of 'state capitalism'.