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How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark is about the rise and recent fall of American antitrust. It is a collection of 15 essays, almost all expressing a deep concern that conservative economic analysis is leading judges and enforcement officials toward an approach that will ultimately harm consumer welfare. For the past 40 years or so, U.S. antitrust has been dominated intellectually by an unusually conservative style of economic analysis. Its advocates, often referred to as "The Chicago School," argue that the free market (better than any unelected band of regulators) can do a better job of achieving efficiency and encouraging innovation than intrusive regulation. The cutting edge of Chicago School doctrine originated in academia and was popularized in books by brilliant and innovative law professors like Robert Bork and Richard Posner. Oddly, a response to that kind of conservative doctrine may be put together through collections of scores of articles but until now cannot be found in any one book. This collection of essays is designed in part to remedy that situation. The chapters in this book were written by academics, former law enforcers, private sector defense lawyers, Republicans and Democrats, representatives of the left, right and center. Virtually all agree that antitrust enforcement today is better as a result of conservative analysis, but virtually all also agree that there have been examples of extreme interpretations and misinterpretations of conservative economic theory that have led American antitrust in the wrong direction. The problem is not with conservative economic analysis but with those portions of that analysis that have "overshot the mark" producing an enforcement approach that is exceptionally generous to the private sector. If the scores of practices that traditionally have been regarded as anticompetitive are ignored, or not subjected to vigorous enforcement, prices will be higher, quality of products lower, and innovation diminished. In the end consumers will pay.
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
The essays collected in this book concern the rise and recent fall of American antitrust. Of the 15 essays, almost all express a deep concern that conservative economic analysis is leading judges and enforcement officials toward an approach that will ultimately harm consumer welfare.
For decades, the debate about the tension between IP and antitrust law has revolved around the question to what extent antitrust should accept that IP laws may bar competition in order to stimulate innovation. The rise of IP rights in recent years has highlighted the problem that IP may also impede innovation, if research for new technologies or the marketing of new products requires access to protected prior innovation. How this 'cumulative innovation' is actually accounted for under IP and antitrust laws in the EU and the US, and how it could alternatively be dealt with, are the central questions addressed in this unique study by lawyer and economist Thorsten Käseberg. Taking an integrated view of both IP and antitrust rules – in particular on refusals to deal based on IP – the book assesses policy levers under European and US patent, copyright and trade secrecy laws, such as the bar for and scope of protection as well as research exemptions, compulsory licensing regimes and misuse doctrines. It analyses what the allocation of tasks is and should be between these IP levers and antitrust rules, in particular the law on abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and monopolisation (Section 2 Sherman Act), while particular attention is paid to the essential facilities doctrine, including pricing methodologies for access to IP. Many recent decisions and judgments are put into a coherent analytical framework, such as IMS Health, AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline (in the EU), Apple (France), Orange Book Standard (Germany), Trinko, Rambus, NYMEX, eBay (US), Microsoft and IBM/T3 (both EU and US). Further topics covered include: IP protection for software, interoperability information and databases; industry-specific tailoring of IP; antitrust innovation market analysis; and the WTO law on the IP/antitrust interface.
Over the past decade, we have witnessed an apparent convergence of views among competition agency officials in the European Union and the United States on the appropriate goals of competition law enforcement. Antitrust policy, it is now suggested, should focus on enhancing economic efficiency, which we are to believe will promote consumer welfare. Recent EU Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 101 TFEU appear to banish considerations that cannot be construed as having an economic efficiency value – such as the environment, cultural policy, employment, public health, and consumer protection – from the application of Article 101 TFEU. Arguing that the professed adoption of an exclusive efficiency approach to Article 101 TFEU does not preclude, but rather obfuscates the role of non-efficiency considerations, the author of this timely contribution accomplishes the following objectives: traces the genesis of the shift to an efficiency orientation in EU and US antitrust policy and dispels several ingrained misconceptions that underpin it; demonstrates the close interrelationship between evolving images of the purpose of antitrust, the development of related enforcement norms, and enforcement output; provides in-depth analyses of a number of analytically rich cases in the audiovisual sector (and particularly those related to sports rights); and explores what the role of non-efficiency considerations in the application of Article 101 TFEU could and should be under the modernized enforcement regime.
Article 102 TFEU constitutes that a firm holding a dominant position in its market is not allowed to abuse this dominant market power through unilateral conduct. Although this provision is clearly of great importance in curbing the adverse effects of market power, it remains far from clear when dominant firms exclusionary conduct is in breach of this provision. This book presents an in-depth analysis of the limited case law, soft law, and theory in the field of law and economics on the matter, confronting the complex issues raised by the effects-based approach used to determine whether competition law has been breached, and clarifying how this approach can best be applied in future cases. Among the issues and topics covered are the following: – relevant case law, notably Post Danmark I, Tomra, and Intel; – analyses and discussions of when and how to apply the effect-based approach, including by object restrictions; – economic theories in the context of Article 102 TFEU; and – predation versus exclusion. While the book is grounded in the legal framework it also applies a law and economics based approach with the aim of supporting the legal arguments and conclusions, and thereby providing more robust arguments for the reached conclusions. As the first study to offer a much-needed clarification of the assessment relating to exclusionary conduct within Article 102 TFEU after the Post Danmark I case, this book provides suggestions on how to structure the approach, thus creating greater legal certainty for dominant firms (and their competitors) and providing a sound basis for both practice and research in this area. It is sure to be read and studied widely by practitioners and academics concerned with the application of Article 102 TFEU.
For all the turmoil that roiled financial markets during the Great Recession and its aftermath, Wall Street forecasts once again turned bullish and corporate profitability soared to unprecedented heights. How does capitalism consistently generate profits despite its vulnerability to destabilizing events that can plunge the global economy into chaos? The Great Levelerelucidates the crucial but underappreciated role of the law in regulating capitalism’s rhythms of accumulation and growth. Brett Christophers argues that capitalism requires a delicate balance between competition and monopoly. When monopolistic forces become dominant, antitrust law steps in to discourage the growth of giant corporations and restore competitiveness. When competitive forces become dominant, intellectual property law steps in to protect corporate assets and encourage investment. These two sets of laws—antitrust and intellectual property—have a pincer effect on corporate profitability, ensuring that markets become neither monopolistic, which would lead to rent-seeking and stagnation, nor overly competitive, which would drive down profits. Christophers pursues these ideas through a close study of the historical development of American and British capitalist economies from the late nineteenth century to the present, tracing the relationship between monopoly and competition in each country and the evolution of legal mechanisms for keeping these forces in check. More than an illuminating study of the economic role of law, The Great Leveler is a bold and fresh dissection of the anatomy of modern capitalism.
Compares Australia's new misuse of market power law with US and EU tests for monopolization and abuse of dominance.
Economic analysis rarely appears on the judicial horizon in intellectual property litigation. In competition cases, by contrast, economists are familiar figures in the courtroom and the language of economics is scattered throughout the judgments of even the highest courts. One might expect, therefore, that refusals to license intellectual property would generate the same fruitful symbiosis between law and economics when those refusals surface in competition proceedings. This however, has not been how the law on this subject has developed in most jurisdictions. Courts and enforcement agencies faced with a unilateral refusal to license have instead tended to retreat into sketchily articulated black letter rules and presumptions which then have to be fenced off from the rest of competition law by economically irrelevant qualifications and distinctions based on private law categorisations of, and rationales for, individual intellectual property rights. This bypassing of case-by-case analysis in favour of more traditional modes of legal reasoning is not entirely the fault of lawyers. Economists have contributed to this state of affairs by urging judges and regulators to convert empirically undernourished theories about the proper role of intellectual property in a market economy into rules of law and evidentiary presumptions intended to be binding in future cases. How this came about and what it means for the future of effective competition enforcement globally are the twin concerns of this book.
This outstanding collection of original essays brings together some of the leading experts in competition economics, policy and law. They examine what lies at the core of the .economic approach to competition law' and deal with its normative and institutional limitations. In recent years the more .economic approach' has led to a modernisation of competition law throughout the world. This book comprehensivelyexamines for the first time, the foundations and limitations of the approach and will be of great interest to scholars of competition policy no matter what discipline. Competition Policy and the Economic Approach will appeal to academics in competition economics and law, policy-makers and practitioners in the field of antitrust/competition law as well as postgraduate students in competition law and economics. Those interested in the interplay of law and economicsin the field of competition will also find this book invaluable.