Download Free How Effective Is Macroprudential Policy Evidence From Lending Restriction Measures In Eu Countries Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online How Effective Is Macroprudential Policy Evidence From Lending Restriction Measures In Eu Countries and write the review.

This paper assesses the effectiveness of lending restriction measures, such as loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios, in affecting developments in house prices and credit. We use data on 99 lending standard restrictions implemented in 28 EU countries over 1990–2018. The results suggest that lending restriction measures are generally effective in curbing house prices and credit. However, the impact is delayed and reaches its peak only after three years. In addition, the impact is asymmetric, with tightening measures having weaker association with target variables compared to loosening measures. The association is stronger in countries outside of euro area and for legally-binding measures and measures involving sanctions. The results have practical implications for macroprudential authorities.
The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.
This note provides guidance to facilitate the staff’s advice on macroprudential policy in Fund surveillance. It elaborates on the principles set out in the “Key Aspects of Macroprudential Policy,” taking into account the work of international standard setters as well as the evolving country experience with macroprudential policy. The main note is accompanied by supplements offering Detailed Guidance on Instruments and Considerations for Low Income Countries
Several countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe used a rich set of prudential instruments in response to last decade’s credit and housing boom and bust cycles. We collect detailed information on these policy measures in a comprehensive database covering 16 countries at a quarterly frequency. We use this database to investigate whether the policy measures had an impact on housing price inflation. Our evidence suggests that some—but not all—measures did have an impact. These measures were changes in the minimum CAR and non-standard liquidity measures (marginal reserve requirements on foreign funding, marginal reserve requirements linked to credit growth).
MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.
Using a recent IMF survey and expanding on previous studies, we document the use of macroprudential policies for 119 countries over the 2000-13 period, covering many instruments. Emerging economies use macroprudential policies most frequently, especially foreign exchange related ones, while advanced countries use borrower-based policies more. Usage is generally associated with lower growth in credit, notably in household credit. Effects are less in financially more developed and open economies, however, and usage comes with greater cross-border borrowing, suggesting some avoidance. And while macroprudential policies can help manage financial cycles, they work less well in busts.
Macroprudential policies – caps on loan to value ratios, limits on credit growth and other balance sheets restrictions, (countercyclical) capital and reserve requirements and surcharges, and Pigouvian levies – have become part of the policy paradigm in emerging markets and advanced countries alike. But knowledge is still limited on these tools. Macroprudential policies ought to be motivated by market failures and externalities, but these can be hard to identify. They can also interact with various other policies, such as monetary and microprudential, raising coordination issues. Some countries, especially emerging markets, have used these tools and analyses suggest that some can reduce procyclicality and crisis risks. Yet, much remains to be studied, including tools’ costs ? by adversely affecting resource allocations; how to best adapt tools to country circumstances; and preferred institutional designs, including how to address political economy risks. As such, policy makers should move carefully in adopting tools.
The paper proposes a simple, new, analytical framework for assessing the cost and benefits of macroprudential policies. It proposes a measure of net benefits in terms of parameters that can be estimated: the probability of crisis, the loss in output given crisis, policy effectiveness in bringing down both the probability and damage during crisis, and the output-cost of a policy decision. It discusses three types of policy leakages and identifies instruments that could best minimize the leakages. Some rules of thumb for policymakers are provided.
We analyze how regulatory constraints on household leverage—in the form of loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits—a?ect residential mortgage credit and house prices as well as other asset classes not directly targeted by the limits. Supervisory loan level data suggest that mortgage credit is reallocated from low-to high-income borrowers and from urban to rural counties. This reallocation weakens the feedback loop between credit and house prices and slows down house price growth in “hot” housing markets. Consistent with constrained lenders adjusting their portfolio choice, more-a?ected banks drive this reallocation and substitute their risk-taking into holdings of securities and corporate credit.