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For Russian households coping with economic hardship in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the choice of survival strategy has strongly depended on their human capital. The higher a household's level of human capital, the more likely it is to choose an active strategy.
For Russian households coping with economic hardship in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the choice of survival strategy has strongly depended on their human capital. The higher a household's level of human capital, the more likely it is to choose an active strategy. What strategies have Russian households used to cope with economic hardship in the wake of the recent financial crisis? Which coping strategies have been most effective in reducing poverty for different groups of households? And how have people been able to adapt to the dramatic drop in formal cash incomes?Lokshin and Yemtsov look at these questions using subjective evaluations of coping strategies used by household survey respondents to mitigate the effects of the Russian financial crisis on their welfare. The data come from two rounds (1996 and 1998) of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. The results of their analysis show that a household's choice of survival strategy strongly depends on its human capital: The higher its level of human capital, the more likely it is to choose an active strategy (such as finding a supplementary job or increasing home production).Households with low levels of human capital, those headed by pensioners, and those whose members have low levels of education are more likely to suffer social exclusion. To prevent poverty from becoming entrenched, the trend toward marginalization and impoverishment of these groups of households needs to be monitored and targeted policy interventions need to be undertaken to reverse the trend.This paper - a joint product of Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group, and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand household-level vulnerability to shocks and the ability of households to cope with crisis.
The extent of bureaucracy varies extensively across countries, but the quality of bureaucracy within a country changes more slowly than economic policies. The authors propose that the quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies - especially the imposition or removal of capital control. In their model, capital controls are an instrument of financial repression. They entail efficiency loss for the economy but also generate implicit revenue for the government. The results show that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. Even if capital controls and financial repression are otherwise inefficient, the government still has to rely on them to raise revenues to provide public goods. Among the countries for which the authors could get relevant data, they find that the more corrupt ones are indeed more likely to impose capital controls, a pattern consistent with the model's prediction. To deal with possible reverse causality, they use the extent of corruption in a country's judicial system, and the degree of democracy, as the instrumental variables for bureaucratic corruption. The instrumental variable regressions show the same result: more corrupt countries are associated with more severe capital controls. The results suggest that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalize their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.
Decentralization of fiscal responsibilities has emerged as a primary objective on the agendas of national governments, and international organizations alike. Yet there is little empirical evidence on the potential benefits of this intervention. The authors fill in some quantitative evidence. Using panel data on infant mortality rates, GDP per capita, and the share of public expenditures managed by local governments, they find greater fiscal decentralization is consistently associated with lower mortality rates. The results suggest that the benefits of fiscal decentralization are particularly important for poor countries. They suggest also that the positive effects of fiscal decentralization on infant mortality, are greater in institutional environments that promote political rights. Fiscal decentralization also appears to be a mechanism for improving health outcomes in environments with a high level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, however, the benefits from fiscal decentralization tend to be smaller.
Nonfarm income has a greater impact on poverty and inequality in Egypt than in Jordan. In rural Egypt the poor receive almost 60 percent of their income from nonfarm sources, while in rural Jordan they receive less than 20 percent. The reason for this difference is land: in rural Egypt, agricultural land is very productive, but access is quite limited, and so the poor are "pushed" into nonfarm work; while in rural Jordan, land is not very productive and access is not highly prized. In both countries the best way to reduce poverty and inequality might be to focus on nonfarm unskilled labor.
One side in the current debate about who benefits from growth has focused solely on average impacts on poverty and inequality, while the other side has focused on the diverse welfare impacts found beneath the averages. Both sides have a point.
Voters in India are more vigilant in monitoring government at the local than at the national level. In state assembly elections voters reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them for a rise in inequality, over their entire term in office. But in national elections voters behave myopically, rewarding growth in national income and a fall in inflation and inequality only in the year preceding the election.
The digital divide reflects a gap in telecom access, not lower propensity to use the internet in poor countries. Promoting access for poor households will help, but pro-competitive policy holds the key to rapid progress in narrowing the divide.
Outcomes on World Bank education projects are better when the quality of project appraisal is good.