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“Any historian or general lover of history in Hitler, or the importance of the Germany Navy in WWII, will find this book immensely informative.” —Nautical Research Journal Hitler's Armada examines the aborted German invasion of 1940 in a fresh and original manner by looking past the myths and legends which have subsequently surrounded it, in order to arrive at significant new conclusions. Presenting fascinating detail of Hitler's Operation SEALION, author and historian Geoff Hewitt analyzes the German campaign’s weaknesses, demonstrating that control of the sea, not the air, was the critical factor in the operation’s failure. Hewitt questions the traditional British view that the Battle of Britain was the key factor in the prevention of Nazi invasion. Presenting the often overlooked importance of the Royal Navy during this period, Hewitt brings into sharp focus, possibly for the first time, the strategic dispositions of the Royal Navy anti-invasion forces. By focusing on the conflict between air and sea power in the months leading up to the summer of 1940, Hewitt challenges the supremacy of air power during this stage of the war. Thought-provoking and controversial, Hitler’s Armada presents a compelling investigation of this historic turning point in the Second World War.
As this well researched work reveals, Hitlers handling the German Navy during the Second World War was full of contradictions.The seriousness of the U-boat threat was never in doubt and in the dark days of 1940 1942, the Donitzs daring strategy coupled with the courage and determined actions of the captains and crews became perilously close to starving Britain into submission.But, despite having built and nurtured a surface fleet with capital ships of formidable power, Hitler was uncharacteristically cautious of employing them aggressively. Examination of the reasons for this make for fascinating reading, possibly stemming from the early loss of the Graf Spee and the fact that, whenever possible, the Royal Navy threw all its weight regardless of cost at the Nazi threat; the loss of the Hood in the pursuit of the Bismarck being one example. Even Goebbels could not spin the loss of a battleship.The War against Hitlers Navy describes in fascinating detail the many fronts on which the adversaries faced each other and analyzes the reasons for the ultimate outcome.
This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.
On June 22, 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, one of the turning points of World War II. Within six months, the invasion bogged down on the outskirts of Moscow, and the Eastern Front proved to be the decisive theater in the defeat of the Third Reich. Ever since, most historians have agreed that this was Hitler’s gravest mistake. In Hitler’s Great Gamble, James Ellman argues that while Barbarossa was a gamble and perverted by genocidal Nazi ideology, it was not doomed from the start. Rather it represented Hitler’s best chance to achieve his war aims for Germany which were remarkably similar to those of the Kaiser’s government in 1914. Other options, such as an invasion of England, or an offensive to seize the oil fields of the Middle East were considered and discarded as unlikely to lead to Axis victory. In Ellman’s recounting, Barbarossa did not fail because of flaws in the Axis invasion strategy, the size of the USSR, or the brutal cold of the Russian winter. Instead, German defeat was due to errors of Nazi diplomacy. Hitler chose not to coordinate his plans with his most militarily powerful allies, Finland and Japan, and ensure the seizure of the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. Had he done so, Germany might well have succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union and, perhaps, winning World War II. Drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources (including many recently released), Hitler’s Great Gamble is a provocative work that will appeal to a wide cross-section of World War II buffs, enthusiasts, and historians.
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression in 2 volumes is a work by the Office of United States, Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. It presents a compilation of documentary facts and resources prepared by the American and British prosecuting teams for presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany in the case of the major trial against German officers of the Third Reich.
The first book to provide a comprehensive account of the anti-invasion defenses built in Scotland during World War II. Between May 1940 and the summer of 1941, the British people expected a German invasion that, had it succeeded, would have enslaved them into the Nazis’ racist war. This period saw an unparalleled effort to prepare the defense of the UK against invasion. Scotland’s nationally important heavy industries, vital Royal Navy bases, and one of the UK’s key ports, were very vulnerable to the sort of airborne attack that had devastated the defenses of Belgium. Everyone was certain that a Fifth Column of Nazi sympathizers and agents was working actively to spread rumors and despair, and to aid the invasion forces, and in reality, the country was far from united. Although the 1939-45 War is the most written-about war in history there is no account of the heroic efforts made in those months to prepare Scotland for the inevitable invasion, and how the defenses were intended to be used. This book tells that story, against the wider history of the period and its people, and describes what was built, and what now survives. “The book details transportation infrastructure and the construction of military bases and various structures and barriers, concentrating on defense efforts on coastal beaches and harbors. The study explores shows how defense plans changed in response to shifts in defense policy and the misconceptions of those planning the defenses, including misunderstanding of German military strategies. B&W historical and contemporary photos and maps are included.” —ProtoView
This book offers a unique perspective for understanding how and why the Second World War in Europe ended as it did—and why Germany, in attacking the Soviet Union, came far closer to winning the war than is often perceived. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe challenges this conventional wisdom in highlighting how the re-establishment of the traditional German art of war—updated to accommodate new weapons systems—paved the way for Germany to forge a considerable military edge over its much larger potential rivals by playing to its qualitative strengths as a continental power. Ironically, these methodologies also created and exacerbated internal contradictions that undermined the same war machine and left it vulnerable to enemies with the capacity to adapt and build on potent military traditions of their own. The book begins by examining topics such as the methods by which the German economy and military prepared for war, the German military establishment's formidable strengths, and its weaknesses. The book then takes an entirely new perspective on explaining the Second World War in Europe. It demonstrates how Germany, through its invasion of the Soviet Union, came within a whisker of cementing a European-based empire that would have allowed the Third Reich to challenge the Anglo-American alliance for global hegemony—an outcome that by commonly cited measures of military potential Germany never should have had even a remote chance of accomplishing. The book's last section explores the final year of the war and addresses how Germany was able to hang on against the world's most powerful nations working in concert to engineer its defeat.
The Battle for Britain is a provocative reinterpretation of both British air and naval power from 1909 to 1940. Anthony Cumming challenges the view that the Battle of Britain was a decisive victory won solely by the Royal Air Force through independent airpower operations. By re-evaluating the early stage of the Mediterranean conflict and giving special emphasis to naval battles such as Calabria and Taranto, Cumming argues that the Royal Navy played an equally important role in defeating Hitler’s early advances, buying critical time until the Americans could make a decisive contribution. His argument holds that the RAF’s role as an independent arm has been exaggerated and that contemporary strategists can learn from investing too much confidence in independent airpower.
Seventy-five years after the Battle of Britain, the Few's role in preventing invasion continues to enjoy a revered place in popular memory. The Air Ministry were central to the Battle's valorisation. This book explores both this, and also the now forgotten 1940 Battle of the Barges mounted by RAF bombers.