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Petrified Intelligence offers the first comprehensive treatment of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, exploring its central place within his system, including its relation to his Logic, Philosophy of Mind, and moral and political thought. It highlights the contemporary relevance of Hegel's approach to nature, particularly with respect to environmental issues. Challenging the standard view that Hegel devalues nature relative to mind and culture, Alison Stone reveals the deep concern to re-enchant the natural world that pervades his entire philosophical project. Written in clear and nontechnical language, the book also provides a critical introduction to Hegel's metaphysics.
The second part of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in outline. Translated, and with an introduction by, MJ Petry.
Hegel's system of philosophy was not only the leading form of metaphysics during his lifetime, but it has taken on increasing significance in our own time. The main element in this compact collection of Hegel's thought is an eagerly awaited new translation of one of the most influential works of thought ever written, the "Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline." Also included is "Preface to the System of Philosophy" and "Solger's Posthumous Writings and Correspondence." (For other texts in German Philosophy, see vols. 5, 13, 23, 27, 40, 48, and 78)
Showing the relevance of Hegel's arguments, this book discusses both original texts and their interpretations.
Confirms that Hegel's philosophy of nature continues to have great significance for our understanding of the natural world.
Terry Pinkard draws on Hegel's central works as well as his lectures on aesthetics, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history in this deeply informed and original exploration of Hegel's naturalism. As Pinkard explains, Hegel's version of naturalism was in fact drawn from Aristotelian naturalism: Hegel fused Aristotle's conception of nature with his insistence that the origin and development of philosophy has empirical physics as its presupposition. As a result, Hegel found that, although modern nature must be understood as a whole to be non-purposive, there is nonetheless a place for Aristotelian purposiveness within such nature. Such a naturalism provides the framework for explaining how we are both natural organisms and also practically minded (self-determining, rationally responsive, reason-giving) beings. In arguing for this point, Hegel shows that the kind of self-division which is characteristic of human agency also provides human agents with an updated version of an Aristotelian final end of life. Pinkard treats this conception of the final end of "being at one with oneself" in two parts. The first part focuses on Hegel's account of agency in naturalist terms and how it is that agency requires such a self-division, while the second part explores how Hegel thinks a historical narration is essential for understanding what this kind of self-division has come to require of itself. In making his case, Hegel argues that both the antinomies of philosophical thought and the essential fragmentation of modern life are all not to be understood as overcome in a higher order unity in the "State." On the contrary, Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions do not resolve such tensions any more than a comprehensive philosophical account can resolve them theoretically. The job of modern practices and institutions (and at a reflective level the task of modern philosophy) is to help us understand and live with precisely the unresolvability of these oppositions. Therefore, Pinkard explains, Hegel is not the totality theorist he has been taken to be, nor is he an "identity thinker," à la Adorno. He is an anti-totality thinker.
Features original articles by some of the most distinguished contemporary scholars of Hegel's thought, The most comprehensive collection of Hegel scholarship available in one volume, Examines Hegel's writing in a chronological order, from his very first published works to his very last, Includes chapters on the newly edited lecture series Hegel conducted in the 1820s Book jacket.
A new Translation with Afterword of Hegel's Monumental work The Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) G.W.F. Hegel's "The Phenomenology of Spirit," published in 1807, is one of the foundational texts of German idealism. Through a narrative of historical and philosophical developments, Hegel explores the evolution of consciousness from immediate sensory experience to the highest form of self-aware Spirit. Engaging with a diverse array of figures and movements, from ancient Greek thought to his contemporary German Idealists, Hegel presents a complex analysis of human experience and its inherent contradictions, culminating in the realization of absolute knowing. The work's intricate dialectical method, wherein concepts evolve through thesis-antithesis-synthesis progressions, has greatly influenced modern philosophy and the humanities.
In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous, but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For whatever it might be suitable to state about philosophy in a preface - say, an historical sketch of the main drift and point of view, the general content and results, a string of desultory assertions and assurances about the truth - this cannot be accepted as the form and manner in which to expound philosophical truth. Moreover, because philosophy has its being essentially in the element of that universality which encloses the particular within it, the end or final result seems, in the case of philosophy more than in that of other sciences, to have absolutely expressed the complete fact itself in its very nature; contrasted with that the mere process of bringing it to light would seem, properly speaking, to have no essential significance. On the other hand, in the general idea of e.g. anatomy - the knowledge of the parts of the body regarded as lifeless - we are quite sure we do not possess the objective concrete fact, the actual content of the science, but must, over and above, be concerned with particulars. Further, in the case of such a collection of items of knowledge, which has no real right to the name of science, any talk about purpose and suchlike generalities is not commonly very different from the descriptive and superficial way in which the contents of the science these nerves and muscles, etc.-are themselves spoken of. In philosophy, on the other hand, it would at once be felt incongruous were such a method made use of and yet shown by philosophy itself to be incapable of grasping the truth. In the same way too, by determining the relation which a philosophical work professes to have to other treatises on the same subject, an extraneous interest is introduced, and obscurity is thrown over the point at issue in the knowledge of the truth. The more the ordinary mind takes the opposition between true and false to be fixed, the more is it accustomed to expect either agreement or contradiction with a given philosophical system, and only to see reason for the one or the other in any explanatory statement concerning such a system. It does not conceive the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive evolution of truth; rather, it sees only contradiction in that variety. The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for the fruit appears as its true nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole. But contradiction as between philosophical systems is not wont to be conceived in this way; on the other hand, the mind perceiving the contradiction does not commonly know how to relieve it or keep it free from its onesidedness, and to recognize in what seems conflicting and inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary moments.