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There are still concerns over whether the MoD's Equipment Plan is affordable. The Ministry underspent by a huge £1.2 billion on the Equipment Plan in 2012-13. Yet it has no idea whether this is because of genuine savings or whether costs are simply being stored up for later years because of delays on projects. This underspending makes it tempting for the Treasury to take them as savings at the expense of the defence equipment capabilities our armed services need. The MoD also does not properly understand the costs of maintenance and technical support, despite the fact that such support costs, £87 billion over ten years, and accounts for over half of the spend on the Equipment Plan budget. It also does not know whether its contingency of £4.7 billion is a sufficient buffer against risks to the Plan. The affordability of the Equipment Plan is heavily reliant on achieving significant savings in some of its major programmes. For example, the MoD has assumed savings of over £2 billion in two large programmes, the Complex Weapons and Submarine Enterprise Performance Programmes, but achieving these will be a challenge. Any changes to these two programmes could jeopardise the expected savings and so put affordability at risk. Project teams do not yet have enough staff with the right skills to employ proper cost and risk management techniques. Treasury and Cabinet Office should look across Government at skills shortages and go for solutions that do not require bureaucratic reorganisations to recruit skilled people at market rates.
The Ministry of Defence has now reported on the affordability of its ten-year forward plan to purchase and support military equipment (the Equipment Plan) totalling some £159 billion, as well as its progress on delivering its largest projects in 2012. The Department has made a good start but there are concerns about over-optimistic assumptions, the completeness and robustness of support cost estimates, and risks to capability. The affordability of the Plan is based on an agreement between the Department and HM Treasury that it will receive a one per cent annual increase in its equipment budget over the period from 2015-16 to 2020-21. If this is now not achieved in the current fiscal circumstances then the current plan may well be unaffordable. The addition of a contingency provision of £4.8 billion is a positive step, however this may not be sufficient to absorb cost growth. In addition, the Department lacks a robust understanding of the support costs, and the associated risks, including the size of the budget that may be required to recover equipment from Afghanistan. The Department also faces a particular challenge in delivering projects to agreed timescales. Ultimately, the Department bears the risk of these delays in terms of military capability and we need greater transparency on these risks and how they are mitigated. This includes the Department being clear on the impact on capability if the £8 billion that is currently unallocated in the budget cannot be used for purchasing new equipment because it is needed to absorb cost growth
The analysis in this report is based on an examination of a sample of 16 of the largest defence projects. This year the NAO used the same sample of projects for this report as for the Equipment Plan 2013 to 2023 (HC 816 ISBN 9780102987591). The sample comprises 11 projects for which the Department has decided to invest. It confirms the findings of that report that the Department's work to address the affordability gap around the equipment budget and costs appears to have had a positive effect. However, there remain risks to affordability, most significantly around the half of the budget relating to equipment support costs which were not subjected these to the same level of detailed scrutiny as the procurement costs
The analysis in this report is based on an examination of a sample of 16 of the largest defence projects. This year the NAO used the same sample of projects for this report as for the Equipment Plan 2013 to 2023 (HC 816 ISBN 9780102987591). The sample comprises 11 projects for which the Department has decided to invest. It confirms the findings of that report that the Department's work to address the affordability gap around the equipment budget and costs appears to have had a positive effect. However, there remain risks to affordability, most significantly around the half of the budget relating to equipment support costs which were not subjected these to the same level of detailed scrutiny as the procurement costs
This Public Accounts Committee report examines the Education Funding Agency and Department for Education 2012-13 financial statements. Since it was set up in April 2012, the Education Funding Agency (the Agency) has succeeded in getting money to education providers on time. In 2012-13, the Agency distributed £51 billion of capital and revenue funding for 10 million learners to local authorities, academies, academy trusts, further education institutions, sixth-form colleges and other types of education providers. Between 2012-13 and 2015-16, the Agency expects that the number of all education providers it funds will increase by around 50% to almost 12,000, of which nearly 7,000 will be academies. At the same time, the Agency plans to reduce its administration costs by 15%, a huge challenge. It should improve efficiency, transparency and accountability in the education sector, especially in respect of the growing number of academies, but lacks the systems and data it needs. The Agency has not yet achieved an acceptable level of compliance with its reporting requirements and the Committee finds it is too reactive and does not spot risks or intervene in schools quickly enough. Not enough is known about conflicts of interest in academies and the risk they pose to the proper use of public money, not The Agency has no way of knowing whether academy chief executives and trustees are 'fit-and-proper persons', and there are flaws in the methodology used to consolidate the accounts of academies, as well as data quality issues, which undermine accountability.
This report summarises the key areas of the Committee's work over the past five years. It draws out the areas where progress has been made and where their successors might wish to press in future. The Committee has assiduously followed the taxpayer's pound wherever it was spent. Since 2010 they held 276 evidence sessions and published 244 unanimous reports to hold government to account for its performance. 88% of their recommendations were accepted by departments. In many cases they successfully secured substantial changes, for example with the once secret tax avoidance industry. They secured consensus from government and from industry that private providers of public services do have a duty of care to the taxpayer, and in pushing the protection of whistleblowers further up the agenda of all government departments. By drawing attention to mistakes in the Department for Transport's procurement of the West Coast Mainline, more recent procurements for Crossrail, Thameslink and Intercity Express have all benefited from more expert advice and a more appropriate level of challenge from senior staff. After discovery in 2012-13 that 63% of calls to government call centres were to higher rate telephone numbers, the Government accepted our recommendation that telephone lines serving vulnerable and low income groups never be charged above the geographic rate and that 03 numbers should be available for all government telephone lines. They also secured a commitment to close large mental health hospitals.
Despite the large sums available for promoting economic growth locally, little money has actually reached businesses. Of the £3.9 billion that has been allocated in total to these initiatives, only nearly £400 million had made it to local projects by the end of 2012-13. Under the Regional Growth Fund, the largest of the schemes, the Departments will need to spend £1.4 billion this year, compared to the £1.2 billion spent over the previous three years. Some £1 billion of the remaining £3.5 billion allocated to initiatives is currently parked with intermediary bodies such as local authorities, Local Enterprise Partnerships and banks - and the rest with the Departments. The Departments should introduce binding milestones for distributing funds and move quickly to claw back money not being spent - or spent disproportionately on administration - and redistribute it to better performers. Progress in creating jobs is falling well short of the Departments' initial expectations. The Departments' estimate of the cost per job created has also risen from £30,400 in Round One to £52,300 in Round Four - a 72% increase. The Departments also agreed that there is a risk of double-counting, with the same jobs scored more than once to different initiatives. The local growth initiatives have not been managed as a coordinated programme with a common strategy, objectives or plan. The recent creation by the Departments of a single growth directorate and a programme board is welcomed. Concern remains however that the Departments are not yet using the new oversight arrangements effectively.
The Ministry of Justice is implementing wholesale changes to how rehabilitation services for offenders are delivered in England and Wales on a highly ambitious timescale. It intends to introduce new private and voluntary providers, bring in a payment by results system, create a new National Probation Service and extend the service to short-term prisoners in a very short time period. This is very challenging and this report sets out a number of risks that need to be managed. The probation service in England and Wales supervised 225,000 offenders in our communities during 2012-13, at a cost of £853 million. The service is currently delivered by 35 Probation Trusts which are independent Non-Departmental Public Bodies, reporting directly to the National Offender Management Service. As part of the Ministry's Transforming Rehabilitation reforms, the Trusts will cease to operate from 31 May 2014 and will be abolished shortly afterwards, to be replaced by a National Probation Service and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies. The scale, complexity and pace of the reforms give rise to risks around value for money which need to be carefully managed. The Committee welcomes the Accounting Officer's assurances that the Ministry will not proceed with the arrangements unless it is safe to do so. The Ministry expects the new National Probation Service and the 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies to begin operating from 1 June 2014 with only a limited opportunity for parallel running of the new arrangements during April and May 2014. The movement of staff, records and implementation of the arrangements required to make the new structures operate are ongoing. Initially the Community Rehabilitation Companies will be in public ownership pending a share sale, expected in time to launch a payment by results mechanism in 2015.