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In the past few years there has been a large increase in portfolio capital flows into emerging markets, mostly fueled by mutual funds and other institutional investors. Based on a simple variance ratio test, this paper finds that emerging stock markets as a group experienced a sharp increase in autocorrelation in total returns at a time when institutional investors began to significantly expand their holdings in these markets. These results are consistent with the view that institutional investor sentiment toward emerging markets as an asset class can at times play a critical role in determining asset prices, with shifts in sentiment resulting in periods of bubble-like booms and busts and asset price overshooting.
Major institutional investors in five industrial countries invest cautiously, and very little, in emerging market securities. But only in Germany are regulations on foreign investment a significant constraint.
Portfolio flows to emerging markets (EMs) tend to be correlated. A possible explanation is the role global benchmarks play in allocating capital internationally, the so-called “benchmark effect.” This paper finds that benchmark-driven investors indeed play a large role in a key segment of the market—the EM local currency government bond market—, accounting for more than one third of total foreign holdings as of end-2014. We find that the prominence of these investors declined somewhat after the May 2013 taper tantrum, but remain high. This distinction is important in understanding the drivers of EM capital flows and their sensitivity to different types of shocks. In particular, a high share of benchmark-driven investors may result in capital flows that are more sensitive to global shocks and less sensitive to country factors.
Emerging market stock issuance relative to GDP rose in the late twentieth century to levels that roughly matched that of advanced, industrial markets. Nonetheless, the connection between owning shares of emerging market stock and the ability to influence the management of these firms remains fundamentally different from the analogous institutional connection that has evolved in industrial markets. The reasons for the differences in emerging markets are both historical and political in nature. That is, local equity markets have had the objective of providing for some degree of local ownership and control of large economic entities since the late nineteenth century. However, local markets have operated under different global political structures since that time, ranging from imperialism, to world wars, to sovereign developmental states, to neo-liberal states. Shares issued under these different structures have been reconfigured over time, resulting in a lack of convergence along either the Anglo-American or Continental models of corporate governance. The author uses a political science paradigm to explain the growth of emerging equity markets. She departs from conventional economic explanations and examines politics at the micro-level of large issues of emerging market stock. The second half of the book presents case studies dealing with emerging market countries in Latin America, Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The case studies connect the regional, state, and firm levels to detail the multiple ownership and control arrangements, and to dispel the notion that mere quantitative growth of these markets will lead to a convergence in financial institutional structures along the lines of the industrial core of the world economy.
The portfolio flows of institutional investors have been found to be highly persistent across countries and individual investment funds. This paper investigates the source of this persistence in emerging market equities. We employ the decomposition methodology of Froot and Tjornhom (2002), which decomposes the persistence of flows into four components: (i) own-country, own-fund persistence (which might arise from informed trading within each country by individual funds); (ii) own-country, cross-fund persistence (which might arise from asynchronicities across funds); (iii) cross-country, own-fund persistence (which might arise from asynchonicities within a fund) and (iv) cross-country, cross-fund persistence (which might arise from other reaction lags such as contagion across both countries and funds). We find evidence that all four components are positive in emerging markets. Our results differ from those in developed countries, in that we attribute approximately 10%-20% of total persistence to cross-country effects (iii) and (iv). These findings are consistent with stories of contagion, which suggest that demand shifts move predictably from one country to another. They cannot easily be explained by informed trading alone or by wealth effects.