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The danger of groupthink is now standard fare in leadership training programs and a widely accepted explanation, among political scientists, for policy-making fiascoes. Efforts to avoid groupthink, however, can lead to an even more serious problem—deadlock. Groupthink or Deadlock explores these dual problems in the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations and demonstrates how both presidents were capable of learning and consequently changing their policies, sometimes dramatically, but at the same time doing so in characteristically different ways. Kowert points to the need for leaders to organize their staff in a way that fits their learning and leadership style and allows them to negotiate a path between groupthink and deadlock.
Are good and bad outcomes significantly affected by the decision-making process itself? Indeed they are, in that certain decision-making techniques and practices limit the ability of policymakers to achieve their goals and advance the national interest. The success of policy often turns on the quality of the decision-making process. Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow identify the factors that contribute to good and bad policymaking, such as the personalities of political leaders, the structure of decision-making groups, and the nature of the exchange between participating individuals. Analyzing thirty-nine foreign-policy cases across nine administrations and incorporating both statistical analyses and case studies, including a detailed examination of the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the authors pinpoint the factors that are likely to lead to successful or failed decision making, and they suggest ways to improve the process. Schafer and Crichlow show how the staffing of key offices and the structure of central decision-making bodies determine the path of an administration even before topics are introduced. Additionally, they link the psychological characteristics of leaders to the quality of their decision processing. There is no greater work available on understanding and improving the dynamics of contemporary decision making.
Why did Tony Blair take Britain to war with Iraq? This book argues that he was following the core political beliefs and style - the Blair identity - manifest and consistent throughout his decade in power. It reconstructs Blair's wars, tracing his personal influence on British foreign policy and international politics during his tumultuous tenure.
The SAGE Handbook of Political Science presents a major retrospective and prospective overview of the discipline. Comprising three volumes of contributions from expert authors from around the world, the handbook aims to frame, assess and synthesize research in the field, helping to define and identify its current and future developments. It does so from a truly global and cross-area perspective Chapters cover a broad range of aspects, from providing a general introduction to exploring important subfields within the discipline. Each chapter is designed to provide a state-of-the-art and comprehensive overview of the topic by incorporating cross-cutting global, interdisciplinary, and, where this applies, gender perspectives. The Handbook is arranged over seven core thematic sections: Part 1: Political Theory Part 2: Methods Part 3: Political Sociology Part 4: Comparative Politics Part 5: Public Policies and Administration Part 6: International Relations Part 7: Major Challenges for Politics and Political Science in the 21st Century
This book provides a comprehensive summary of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and efforts to protect the United States from international terrorism. Homeland Security: A Reference Handbook covers the precursor events and laws from 1965 to 2000 that set the stage for the 2002 law that established the Department of Homeland Security. It identifies and discusses a dozen problems associated with homeland security policy objectively, allowing readers to come to their own conclusions. Additionally, it addresses all of the major units and agencies within the department. Comprehensive in scope and accessible in style, it discusses 46 organizations and profiles 50 actors. Unlike many books on the topic, it provides excerpts and summaries of data, presented in figures and tables and as documents from court decisions, presidential actions, and key laws to implement homeland security policy. It also annotates key secondary sources on the topic, including books, scholarly journals, films, and videos to guide the reader to further research on the subject.
Opponents rarely go to war without thinking they can win--and clearly, one side must be wrong. This conundrum lies at the heart of the so-called "war puzzle": rational states should agree on their differences in power and thus not fight. But as Dominic Johnson argues in Overconfidence and War, states are no more rational than people, who are susceptible to exaggerated ideas of their own virtue, of their ability to control events, and of the future. By looking at this bias--called "positive illusions"--as it figures in evolutionary biology, psychology, and the politics of international conflict, this book offers compelling insights into why states wage war. Johnson traces the effects of positive illusions on four turning points in twentieth-century history: two that erupted into war (World War I and Vietnam); and two that did not (the Munich crisis and the Cuban missile crisis). Examining the two wars, he shows how positive illusions have filtered into politics, causing leaders to overestimate themselves and underestimate their adversaries--and to resort to violence to settle a conflict against unreasonable odds. In the Munich and Cuban missile crises, he shows how lessening positive illusions may allow leaders to pursue peaceful solutions. The human tendency toward overconfidence may have been favored by natural selection throughout our evolutionary history because of the advantages it conferred--heightening combat performance or improving one's ability to bluff an opponent. And yet, as this book suggests--and as the recent conflict in Iraq bears out--in the modern world the consequences of this evolutionary legacy are potentially deadly.
This radically new work provides an innovative approach to the question of why the Suez Crisis erupted. Bertjan Verbeek here applies foreign policy analysis framework to British decision making during the crisis, providing the first full foreign policy analysis of this important event. Moreover, the book offers a new interpretation on British decision-making during the crisis. Many existing studies of Suez emphasise the role of the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, and often focus on the matter of collusion with Israel. This study demonstrates that small group dynamics in the institutional context of cabinet decision-making in the British political system are much more important. This study offers the possibility of determining more precisely the interrelationship between systemic constraints on states' behaviour and the actual behaviour of states under such constraints.
This book focuses on foreign policy decision-making from the viewpoint of psychology. Psychology is always present in human decision-making, constituted by its structural determinants but also playing its own agency-level constitutive and causal roles, and therefore it should be taken into account in any analysis of foreign policy decisions. The book analyses a wide variety of prominent psychological approaches, such as bounded rationality, prospect theory, belief systems, cognitive biases, emotions, personality theories and trust to the study of foreign policy, identifying their achievements and added value as well as their limitations from a comparative perspective. Understanding how leaders in world politics act requires us to consider recent advances in neuroscience, psychology and behavioral economics. As a whole, the book aims at better integrating various psychological theories into the study of international relations and foreign policy analysis, as partial explanations themselves but also as facets of more comprehensive theories. It also discusses practical lessons that the psychological approaches offer since ignoring psychology can be costly: decision-makers need to be able reflect on their own decision-making process as well as the perspectives of the others. Paying attention to the psychological factors in international relations is necessary for better understanding the microfoundations upon which such agency is based.
"The Greatest is Love." God wants us to love our neighbors. If this is the premise of being Christian, then why do thousands of denominations claim to be the "right and true" one, implying that all others are false? The author searches for truth and explores real world issues concerning Christians throughout history and today, and the future of Christianity in this ever-changing world. Join the author as he challenges you to think outside of your comfort zone and questions what you might have been told not to question about the Word of God. This book contains many facts and true stories, some you might recognize and some from the author's own life, as he logically discusses controversial subjects such as a Perfect Bible, sex, lying, killing, ethics, Christian leadership, Bible-thumping judgment, and women's rights. It is well documented and written in easy-to-understand language to arm you with the knowledge you need to discuss Scripture in an educated and meaningful way, and to develop a real-world perspective of Christianity; a must-read for all who profess to be Christian!
Mistakes, in the form of bad decisions, are a common feature of every presidential administration, and their consequences run the gamut from unnecessary military spending, to missed opportunities for foreign policy advantage, to needless bloodshed. This book analyzes a range of presidential decisions made in the realm of US foreign policy—with a special focus on national security—over the past half century in order to create a roadmap of the decision process and a guide to better foreign policy decision-making in the increasingly complex context of 21st century international relations. Mistakes are analyzed in two general categories—ones of omission and ones of commission within the context of perceived threats and opportunities. Within this framework, the authors discuss how past scholarship has addressed these questions and argue that this research has not explicitly identified a vantage point around which the answers to these questions revolve. They propose game theory models of complex adaptive systems for minimizing bad decisions and apply them to test cases in the Middle East and Asia.