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An illustrated survey of four centuries of gardening in America covers the subject from pre-Columbian Native American designs to the private gardens of America's suburban landscape.
In this book, Edward Westermarck grounds ethics in the biological underpinnings of emotion and makes arguments for both psychological and ethical relativism. According to Westermarck, conventional moral judgments are based on moral sentiments, which are neutral moral feelings. Because moral standards are rooted in emotion, Westermarck concludes that they cannot be objective.
Supplements to the Board's Annual report include the: Report of the medical officer
Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy.
The book offers a detailed account of Kant's views on judgments of taste, aesthetic pleasure, imagination and many other topics.
Revealing Bodies considers three thinkers not often read together, in order to ask a question: how is it that we claim to know the body? This book explores a question with wide-ranging stakes both for those with specialized interest in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture and with a broader interest in bodily representation.
Aesthetic Order challenges contemporary theories of aesthetics, offering the idea of beauty as quantitative yet different from the traditional discursive order. It will be of importance to all interested in aesthetic theory.
The Risk of Being attempts to forge a new language and a new way of reasoning about what it is like to be good and bad by focusing on existential phenomena that reveal what it means to be good and bad. It is thus a work that cannot be located among or compared to the more traditional theories of ethics or morality. What distinguishes this inquiry is not only the use of existential themes, such as outrage, temptation, and corruption, but the reasoning itself in an existential critique, which allows us to consider how and what we think as well as feel about being good and bad&—the logos and pathos of these existential phenomena&—and thus provides an access to the question about the reality of good and bad. Recognizing that we have done wrong may induce frustrated responses, such as, &"How could I have been so stupid?&" or &"Why was I so weak? &" or even, &"What has become of me? &" These reactions, Gelven argues, point to folly, weakness, and corruption as ways of being bad, which can then be countered in phenomena such as judgment, courage, and integrity of character, as ways of being good. The analyses of these phenomena can reveal a great deal of existential understanding that no mere ethical or moral approach can offer. The emphasis is on understanding that &"good&" and &"bad&" are not mere axiological terms, but can refer to ways of existing. By careful analysis, these ways can be forced to reveal the truth about goodness and badness. As Gelven's argument proceeds to show not only what it is &"like&" to be good and bad, but also what the reality of being good and bad must be, he offers new and often unorthodox insights into one of the great philosophical issues challenging the thinking mind.