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This book examines the role of the United States in Greek–Turkish relations and fills an important gap in alliance theory regarding the guardian’s dilemma. The strategy of a great power involves not only tackling threats from enemies, but also dealing with problems that arise between allies. Every time Greece and Turkey threatened to go to war against each other, the United States had to effectively restrain its two strategic allies without straining relations with either one of them. This book explores how the United States responded to the guardian’s dilemma in six crises during the Cold War, pursuing a policy of dual restraint to prevent an intra-alliance conflict, mitigate the consequences of each crisis, and maintain effective control of the Rimland Bridge. From a neoclassical-realist standpoint, the book examines how the United States responded to each Greek–Turkish crisis, for what reasons, and with what results. It will be of interest to scholars of foreign policy, security studies, geopolitics, and international relations.
This study of the Greek-Turkish Aegean dispute book shows that the dispute is resolvable and that the crux of the problem is not the incompatibility of interests but the mutual fears and suspicions, which are deeply rooted in historical memories, real or imagined.
This methodical analysis of Greece's strategy towards Turkey highlights important new findings about the role particular elements of a state's strategic culture play in explaining major and/or minor shifts in strategy. The book breaks new ground in exploring when and how states develop socialization strategies.
The causes of the current Greek-Turkish rapprochement progress are explored in this book in relation both to the international environment, which is increasingly conducive to this progress, and significant domestic changes.
Bahcheli analyzes the dispute over Cyprus from its emergence in the 1950s to the coup against President Makarios which brought Greece and Turkey to war in 1974. He considers the Cyprus issue within the narrow context of Greek-Turkish relations, and the broad context of international relations
An analysis of the issues and events related to the conflict between Greece and Turkey, with emphasis on the period after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The text attempts to trace the future evolution of Greek-Turkish relations, paying equal attention to domestic and international factors.
France and the Algerian War : strategy / Martin S. Alexander -- Operations and diplomacy / J.F.V. Keiger -- The French Army 'Centre for Training and Preparation in Counter-Gerrilla Warfare' (CIPCG) at Arzew / Frédéric Guelton -- A case of successful pacification : the 584th Bataillon du Train at Bordj de l'Agha (1956-57) / Alexander Zervoudakis -- Aerial intelligence during the Algerian War / Marie-Catherine Villatoux, Paul Villatoux -- The French Navy and the Algerian War / Bernard Estival-- The Gaullists, the French Army and Algeria before 1958 : common cause or marriage of convenience? / Stephen Tyre -- De Gaulle, the 'Anglo-Saxons' and the Algerian War / Irwin M. Wall -- France, the United States and the invisible Algerian outcome / Charles G. Cogan -- The British embassy in Paris and the Algerian War : an uncomfortable partner? / Christopher Goldsmith -- The British government and the end of French Algeria, 1958-62 / Martin Thomas.
In 1939, faced with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and a growing Italian threat in the Balkans, Turkey and Britain (and later France) signed an alliance in which Turkey linked itself politically and militarily with Britain and France in exchange for financial assistance for its rearmament program. Despite the agreement, however, when the war came to the Mediterranean, Turkey did not become involved. Presenting a new interpretation of why the alliance failed, Brock Millman explores Anglo-Turkish relations leading up to the alliance of 1939, taking into account the broader economic, military, and strategic issues. While previous accounts suggest that Turkey entered into the alliance reluctantly, Millman contends that it not only wanted an alliance but sought as close a relationship as Britain would concede in the prewar years. He attributes the failure of the alliance mainly to Britain's lack of support, namely its inability to fit Turkey into its strategy in the Mediterranean, its failure to produce a coherent operational plan that could encompass Turkish military co-operation, and its unwillingness to provide Turkey with timely and much-needed financial, material, and industrial assistance. Divided into three parts, The Ill-Made Alliance examines the roots and course of the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in the years 1934-38; the economic, military, and politic factors in 1938-39 that inhibited development of the emerging alliance to the point where it might have been fully functional; and the collapse of the alliance in 1939-40.
A bibliography and a collection of alphabetical entries on socioeconomic conditions, institutions, tourism, historic sites, history, politics, and the arts, with biographies of historical and modern key figures. Includes a chronology of events, an essay on historical continuities, and lists of kings, presidents, and prime ministers of the country, plus historical and administrative maps. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR