Download Free Gradual Failure The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965 1966 Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Gradual Failure The Air War Over North Vietnam 1965 1966 and write the review.

Of the many facets of the American war in Southeast Asia debated by U.S. authorities in Washington, by the military services and the public, none has proved more controversial than the air war against North Vietnam. The air war s inauguration with the nickname Rolling Thunder followed an eleven-year American effort to induce communist North Vietnam to sign a peace treaty without openly attacking its territory. Thus, Rolling Thunder was a new military program in what had been a relatively low-key attempt by the United States to win the war within South Vietnam against insurgent communist Viet Cong forces, aided and abetted by the north. The present volume covers the first phase of the Rolling Thunder campaign from March 1965 to late 1966. It begins with a description of the planning and execution of two initial limited air strikes, nicknamed Flaming Dart I and II. The Flaming Dart strikes were carried out against North Vietnam in February 1965 as the precursors to a regular, albeit limited, Rolling Thunder air program launched the following month. Before proceeding with an account of Rolling Thunder, its roots are traced in the events that compelled the United States to adopt an anti-communist containment policy in Southeast Asia after the defeat of French forces by the communist Vietnamese in May 1954.
The United States Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war.
The U.S. Air Force reached its nadir during the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Van Staaveren wrote this book near the end of his distinguished government service. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought.
This U.S. Air Force (USAF) publication, previously classified, tells the story of the opening two years of the Rolling Thunder air campaign in North Vietnam. The United States Air Force reached its nadir during this time. Never had the Air Force operated with so many restraints and to so little effect. These pages are painful but necessary reading for all who care about the nation's military power. Jacob Van Staaveren wrote this book in the 1970s near the end of his distinguished government service, which began during the occupation of Japan; the University of Washington Press published his book on that experience in 1995. He was an Air Force historian in Korea during the Korean War, and he began to write about the Vietnam War while it was still being fought. His volume on the air war in Laos was declassified and published in 1993. Now this volume on the air war in North Vietnam has also been declassified and is being published for the first time. Although he retired to McMinnville, Oregon, a number of years ago, we asked him to review the manuscript and make any changes that seemed warranted. For the most part, this is the book he wrote soon after the war. Chapter 1 - Flaming Dart * The United States Considers a Reprisal Attack * Flaming Dart I * Flaming Dart II * Chapter 2 - Planning * Paramilitary Activities and Bombing Plans * Rising Pressure from the Services to Bomb the North * Selecting Major North Vietnamese Targets * The Gulf of Tonkin Incident * Washington Forbids Follow-on Strikes * The Bien Hoa Incident * Beginning of a Limited, Two-Phase Program * Washington's Resistance to a Bombing Program Ends * Chapter 3 - Rolling Thunder Begins * The Air Challenge in North Vietnam * Command and Control of Air Resources * Preparations for a Rolling Thunder Program * The First Two Rolling Thunder Strikes * Initial Analysis of Aircraft Losses * An Air Strategy Emerges * Beginning of Weekly Rolling Thunder Strikes * Supporting Operations for Rolling Thunder * Contingency Planning for a Larger Conflict * Chapter 4 - Gradual Expansion * Further Decisions on Prosecuting the War * Initial Bridge-Busting Attacks * Countering the North's Air Defenses * The Honolulu Conference of April 1965 * Rolling Thunder's Moderate Pace Continues * Expansion of the Leaflet Program * Cautious Optimism on Bombing Results * Chapter 5 - Pause and Escalation * The First Bombing Halt * Rolling Thunder Resumes * Hanoi Expands its Air and Ground Defenses * The Air Force Organizes for Extended Combat * Washington Rejects a More Air-Oriented Strategy * Beginning of Two-Week Bombing Cycles * Chapter 6 - The SAM Threat * Initial anti-SAM Operations * The First Iron Hand Missions * Improving Detection of SAM Sites * Continued Air Strikes on non-SAM Targets * Establishment of a Target Intelligence Center * Deepening Service Concern about Strike Restrictions * The First SAM "Kill" and the anti-SAM Campaign in Late 1965 * The Air Force Increases its anti-SAM Capability * Chapter 7 - Toward the Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt * Additional Interdiction Changes and Planning for Negotiation * Continuation of the Leaflet Program * Beginning of a Thirty-seven Day Bombing Halt * Chapter 8 - Diplomacy Fails * Hanoi Rejects American Peace Overtures * Debate on Resuming the Bombing * Rolling Thunder 48 * More Deployment Planning * Rolling Thunder 49 * Chapter 9 - Rolling Thunder 50 * Westmoreland's "Extended Battlefield" Area * Selecting Rolling Thunder 50 Targets * Rolling Thunder 50 Begins * The Air Munitions Shortage * Circumventing Bad Weather With MSQ-77 Radar * Countering the North's Air Defense System * Improving MiG Watch and Border Patrol * Chapter 10 - The Strikes * The POL Debate * Approval of a Few POL Strikes * Gradual Expansion of POL Strikes * Strikes on Major POL Sites Begin * The Honolulu Conference, July 1966 * The POL Strangulation Campaign * Chapter 11 - Summary and Reappraisa
Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.
United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. Documents the Air Force's support of the ground war in South Vietnam from 1965 to early 1968. Includes sections on the air campaign conducted during the Communists' siege of the Marine camp of Khe Sanh. Also contains several appendices, a glossary, and bibliographical notes.
The Air Force instinctively disliked the slow, gradual way the United States prosecuted its war against the Vietnamese communists. While Americans undoubtedly delayed a communist victory in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia long enough to spare Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries a similar fate, the American public grew very tired of this war years before its dismal conclusion. Due to questionable political policies and decision-making, only sporadic and relatively ineffective use had been made of air power's ability to bring great force to bear quickly and decisively. The United States and its Air Force experienced a decade of frustration made more painful by the losses of its personnel killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Fighting resolutely and courageously, the Air Force played the decisive role in forcing North Vietnam to the peace table in 1973. The demands of the Vietnam War forced new developments such as laser-guided-bombs that would eventually radically transform the shape of air warfare.