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Government response to HC 436 (ISBN 9780215554772)
Further Government response to HC 923, session 2010-12 (ISBN 9780215559586). Earlier response published as HC 1477, session 2010-12 (ISBN 9780215561473)
Government response to the Committee's third report, HC 437, session 2010-11 (ISBN 9780215554895)
The Committee supports the aims of increasing transparency in lobbying and effectively and fairly regulating third-party campaigning, but finds that the Government's bill is seriously flawed, because of inadequate consultation and a lack of pre-legislative scrutiny. Moreover, the definition of "consultant lobbying" is so narrow that not only would it exclude in-house lobbyists, which was the Government's intention, but it would also exclude the vast majority of third-party lobbyists and particularly the larger organisations. Many companies undertake lobbying as part of a wider communications and public relations business, and they spend very little of their time meeting directly with Ministers and Permanent Secretaries, meaning they could argue they were exempt from registering. The register should be expanded to include in-house lobbyists, and to cover the provision of advice on lobbying, as well as direct contact with Ministers and Permanent Secretaries. Special Advisers and Senior Civil Servants should be included in the list of people with whom contact counts as lobbying. Part 2 of the Bill, on non-party campaigning, and particularly the definition of spending "for electoral purposes" is confusing. The Committee urges the Government temporarily to withdraw the Bill and support a motion in the House to set up a special committee to carry out pre-legislative scrutiny, using the text of the existing Bill as a draft. The special committee should be charged with producing an improved Bill within six months.
This report considers the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill which would remove the Prime Minister's power to call an election at the time of his choosing, and sets a five year fixed term, subject to the possibility of early dissolution following a vote by the House of Commons. It examines the key issues of the Bill's principals as well as the process by which it was brought forward. The Committee takes the view that the origins and content of the Bill owe more to short-term considerations than to a mature assessment of enduring constitutional principles or sustained public demand. In the view of the majority of the Committee, the shift from a five year maximum to five year norm would inconsistent with the Government's stated aim of making the legislature more accountable; with existing constitutional practice; and with the practice of the devolved institutions and the clear majority in international legislatures. However the Committee does accept that an elected government should have a full term in which to develop their policies and take their legislative programme through Parliament. It considers a four year term should be adopted for any fixed-term arrangement at Westminster. Potential date clashes with elections to the devolved institutions should also be avoided. Some form of safety valve which would allow for an early election in circumstances such as the government losing the confidence of the Commons or where a political or economic crisis has affected the country is also necessary. The report also makes several specific recommendations for amendments for the Bill.
House of Lords reform is a large and thorny issue on which it has proved very difficult to get political consensus. This inquiry focused on the incremental changes that could possibly be achieved outside the wider reforms that are doubtless required. Creating the power to remove Peers who have actually broken the law of the land and to remove persistent non-attendees will enjoy widespread support and would indicate that the unelected chamber was not opposed to sensible reform. Establishing a consensus about the principles that should determine the relative numerical strengths of the different party groups in the House of Lords, and for codifying such principles, is probably the most contentious of all the issues considered, but it is also the most crucial to any further progress. The Government and political parties in the Lords need to set out their positions on this matter and to engage in dialogue that will establish a consensus before the next General Election, so that both Houses can act upon an agreed reform
This is the 2nd report from the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (HCP 436, session 2010-11, ISBN 9780215554772), and examines the Fixed Terms Parliament Bill (HCB 64, session 2001-11, ISBN 9780215546296). The principle behind the Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill is that it is wrong that a Prime Minister should be able to time a general election to his own partisan advantage. Due to the speed of the Bill being expedited through Parliament, there has been no prior consultation on pre-legislation, which the Committee believes the issue deserves. If the Bill is enacted, the Committee expects that future Parliaments would run for their full fixed term, and that this will become an unremarkable aspect of our modern democracy. The proposed requirement for a super-majority in the House of Commons to vote for an early general election is novel for the United Kingdom, and the consequences of the provisions for confidence motions contained in the Bill are uncertain. The report proposes two options that the House may wish to explore as possible ways of simplifying the provisions in the Bill for ending the fixed term prematurely: (i) a super-majority might not be necessary if a Parliament following an early general election lasted for only as long as the remainder of the term of the previous Parliament; (ii) a super-majority could be dispensed with if an early general election could be called only with cross-party agreement. Dispensing with the super-majority could also arguably avoid the need for separate provision for an early general election where no government could be formed that commanded the confidence of the House. The Clerk of the House believes that the Bill as currently drafted could allow the courts to question aspects of the House's internal proceedings.
The Political and Constitutional Reform Committee publishes its own draft parliamentary resolution setting out the process that should be followed to consult Parliament on conflict decisions, to serve as an interim step towards putting Parliament's role in war making decisions on a legal footing. The Committee has repeatedly called on Government to make progress on the Foreign Secretary's commitment in 2011 to "enshrine in law for the future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action". The key points of the report are as follows: (1) The debate in the House of Commons on 29 August 2013 regarding Syria and the use of chemical weapons highlighted the important role Parliament plays in conflict decisions; (2) The Government needs to make a clear statement of how it intends to honour the Foreign Secretary's commitment of 2011, and give a specific Minister responsibility for making progress on this.; (3) A parliamentary resolution would serve as a useful interim step towards enshrining Parliament's role in law, by embedding the current convention and clarifying some of the ambiguities that exist under current arrangements.
Following the passage of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, the date of the next general election has been fixed by statute for 7 May 2015. Greater certainty about the date of the next general election has created a unique opportunity to consider how best this final year can be spent, and the Committee has heard that there is scope both to enhance the quality of public policy debate, and also to better prepare for the next Parliament. Key recommendations are: that this final year be used by the Government, Parliament and political parties to consider some of the long-term issues that will need to be addressed in the next Parliament; arrangements for pre-election contacts between the Civil Service and Opposition be formalised and authorised automatically in the final year of a Parliament, and that the Cabinet Manual should be updated to that effect; that parties work to develop a consensus, before the next general election, on how party policy could most effectively be costed ahead of future general elections - this would improve both policy formation and debate ahead of a general election. Achieving this will require active engagement from the Government, parliamentarians and political parties, and the Committee hopes they will all appreciate the potential for a constructive year ahead of the next general election, and support the recommendations.
Dated July 2013. Government response to the Committee's first report of session 2012-13 (HC 373, ISBN 9780215045744). An earlier Government response published as the Committee's second special report of session 2012-13 (HC 646, ISBN 9780215049575)