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Thirty years after its enactment, Congress has undertaken a review of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) as well as the broader organisation and structure of the contemporary Department of Defense (DOD) more broadly. Most observers agree that in principle a comprehensive review of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is warranted at this juncture. Further, a broad consensus appears to exist among observers that DOD must become considerably more agile while retaining its strength in order to enable the United States to meet a variety of critical emerging national security challenges. Agreement seemingly ends there. There appears to be little consensus on what should be changed within DOD and what specific direction reform ought to take. Discussions have begun to coalesce around a number of proposals, including reforming defense acquisition processes, further strengthening the Joint Staff, reducing Pentagon staffs, and better empowering the services in the joint arena. Ideas vary, however, on how, specifically, to achieve those outcomes. Disagreement also exists as to whether or not reorganising DOD alone will be sufficient. Some observers maintain that a reform of the broader interagency system on national security matters is needed. This book is intended to assist Congress as it evaluates the variety of reform proposals currently under discussion around Washington.
The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986 was the most sweeping legislation related to the Department of Defense (DoD) organizational reform after World War II. With an overarching objective of enhancing "jointness", unifying the direction of the armed forces under joint doctrine and policies for the employment of multi-service military forces, throughout the DoD, the practical purpose was to improve warfighting capabilities. This legislation was based upon implicit assumptions about threats and organizational needs which many feel have since changed. This report focuses on the joint officer personnel management aspects of the GNA legislation and on how officer personnel management has evolved as a result of the mandates of the Act. As currently administered, DoD predicts that it is nearing a time of reporting non-compliance with certain provisions of the law. In addition, DoD finds that the law prevents the recording of some significant joint experiences for certain officers, and that the law prevents the utilization of technological advances in distributive and distance learning in association with joint professional military education. The report offers options for congressional consideration which would continue the status quo, would allow for changes in the law to maintain the progress in joint officer management which was originally envisioned, or would allow for additional study. This report will not be updated.
Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, several changes were instituted by Congress in an effort to reform the U.S. military. Title IV, Joint Officer Management, of the Act was aimed at reforming the officer development of the services in an effort to eliminate the parochial service dispositions that had previously plagued U.S. military efforts. Title IV instituted policies to provide officers with joint education and joint experience in an effort to develop officers with a multi-service or joint perspective. In an effort to provide senior officers with joint experience, all officers promoted to the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral (07) must have completed a joint duty assignment prior to promotion. This dissertation looks specifically at the joint duty promotion requirement instituted under Title IV in an effort to analyze the U.S. military's ability to implement a congressional mandate. The implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement has been a source of concern for both the services and congressional policymakers.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is the most important legislation to affecting U.S. national defense in the last 50 years. This act resulted from frustration in Congress and among certain military officers concerning what they believed to be the poor quality of military advice available to civilian decision-makers. It also derived from the U.S. military's perceived inability to conduct successful joint or multi-service operations. The act, passes after four years of legislative debate, designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor to the President and sought to foster greater cooperation among the military services. Goldwater-Nichols marks the latest attempt to balance competing tendencies within the Department of Defense, namely centralization versus decentralization and geographic versus functional distributions of power. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has achieved prominence, but his assignment is somewhat contradictory: the spokesman and thus the advocate for the Commander in Chief, while simultaneously the provider of objective advice to the President. While the act did succeed in strengthening the CINCs' authority and in contributing to the dramatic U.S. achievements in the Gulf War, the air and ground campaigns revealed weaknesses in the CINCs' capability to plan joint operations. In addition, the increased role of the military in ad hoc peacekeeping operations has challenged the U.S. military's current organizational structure for the quick deployment of troops from the various services. Rapid technological advances and post-Cold War strategic uncertainty also complicate the U.S. military's organizational structure.
War is waged not only on battlefields. In the mid-1980s a high-stakes political struggle to redesign the relationships among the president, secretary of defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and warfighting commanders in the field resulted in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Author James R. Locher III played a key role in the congressional effort to repair a dysfunctional military whose interservice squabbling had cost American taxpayers billions of dollars and put the lives of thousands of servicemen and women at risk. Victory on this front helped make possible the military successes the United States has enjoyed since the passage of the bill and to prepare it for the challenges it must still face.Victory on the Potomac provides the first detailed history of how Congress unified the Pentagon and does so with the benefit of an insider's view. In a fast-paced account that reads like a novel, Locher follows the bill through congressional committee to final passage, making clear that the process is neither abstract nor automatic. His vivid descriptions bring to life the amazing cast of this real-life drama, from the straight-shooting chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Barry Goldwater, to the peevishly stubborn secretary of defense, Caspear Weinberger.Locher's analysis of political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting will fascinate anyone who has an interest in how government works, and his understanding of the stakes in military reorganization will make clear why this legislative victory meant so much to American military capability. James R. Locher III, a graduate of West Point and Harvard Business School began his career in Washington as an executive trainee in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has worked in the White House, the Pentagon, and the Senate. During the period covered by this book, he was a staff member for the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Since then, he has served as an assistant secretary of defense in the first Bush and the early Clinton administrations. Currently, he works as a consultant and lecturer on defense matters.
The Goldwater-Nicholas Reorganization Act of 1986 was the most sweeping legislation related to DOD reform since the enabling legislation following World War II. Its de jure purpose, inter alia, was to enhance the legal authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the unified commanders. Its practical purpose was to improve U.S. warfighting capability. As one might expect, implementation has been controversial in terms of shifting power from the Services to the Joint Staff and the CINCs, particularly as interpreted by the Joint Staff. It is worth noting the Joint Staff remained an organization which assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs vice transitioning to a general staff. Many point to the warfighting success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm as conclusive proof that Goldwater-Nicholas achieved its purpose. However, DOD is now entering a period of unsettled reshuffling of budget priorities as Congress and the President struggle with balancing the U.S. budget. This will undoubtedly mean far fewer resources, both dollars and people, for DOD as a whole. Goldwater-Nicholas was enacted under implicit assumptions about strategic threats and organizational needs of the U.S. military (e.g., the Soviet Union was still a viable political entity in 1986). This paper explores whether Goldwater-Nicholas went far enough in its reform efforts, particularly considering the increasing importance of military operations other than war and the inevitable pressures to further reduce the military budget. It focuses on relationships and divisions of labor between the Joint, Service, and CINC staffs.