Download Free Globalizing De Gaulle Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Globalizing De Gaulle and write the review.

French President Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969) has consistently fascinated contemporaries and historians. His vision_conceived out of national interest_of uniting Europe under French leadership and overcoming the Cold War still remains relevant and appealing. De Gaulle's towering personality and his challenge to US hegemony in the Cold War have inspired a vast number of political biographies and analyses of the foreign policies of the Fifth Republic mostly from French or US angle. In contrast, this book serves to rediscover de Gaulle's global policies how they changed the Cold War. Offering truly global perspectives on France's approach to the world during de Gaulle's presidency, the 13 well-matched essays by leading experts in the field tap into newly available sources drawn from US, European, Asian, African and Latin American archives. Together, the contributions integrate previously neglected regions, actors and topics with more familiar and newly approached phenomena into a global picture of the General's international policy-making. The volume at hand is an example of how cutting-edge research benefits from multipolar and multi-archival approaches and from attention to big, middle and smaller powers as well as institutions.
The greatest threat to the Western alliance in the 1960s did not come from an enemy, but from an ally. France, led by its mercurial leader General Charles de Gaulle, launched a global and comprehensive challenge to the United State’s leadership of the Free World, tackling not only the political but also the military, economic, and monetary spheres. Successive American administrations fretted about de Gaulle, whom they viewed as an irresponsible nationalist at best and a threat to their presence in Europe at worst. Based on extensive international research, this book is an original analysis of France’s ambitious grand strategy during the 1960s and why it eventually failed. De Gaulle’s failed attempt to overcome the Cold War order reveals important insights about why the bipolar international system was able to survive for so long, and why the General’s legacy remains significant to current French foreign policy.
De Gaulle was the first major Western leader to pursue a foreign policy designed consistently to break the vicious circle of the Cold War and the straitjacket of the nuclear balance of terror between Russia and the United States. At the same time, he sought to establish in France a new set of institutions designed to break another vicious circle: that of the divisive conflicts between French social groups and political parties, which led to weak governments and an ineffective state. This book studies the link between these two aims, both by examining de Gaulle's political aims and style in a political and cultural context, and by looking first at French policy towards the Atlantic alliance, and then at the impact of de Gaulle's foreign policy on domestic politics. As a result, many of the orthodox notions about de Gaulle are questioned.
This is the first detailed, scholarly study of French foreign policy during the relatively brief period at the end of World War II when General de Gaulle was President of the provisional French government. During these years de Gaulle took the vitally important step of returning French foreign policy to the pragmatic, nationalist tradition of Poincaré and Louis Barthou. De Gaulle's efforts on the international scene, although not strikingly successful in themselves, foreshadowed many of the aims and policies which were pursued in various ways by his successors in the Fourth Republic and which he himself has reaffirmed in the years since 1958. In the opening chapter, Mr. DePorte outlines French foreign policy between 1918 and 1940 and at the same time places de Gaulle firmly within that tradition of French diplomacy which rejected the notion that France could afford to be dependent on either Germany or Great Britain. In the second chapter, the author reviews de Gaulle's wartime experience, emphasizing his preoccupation with restoring France to full status as a Great Power and pointing out the extent to which his distrust of alliances preceded the problems he encountered with his allies as leader of the Free French. This discussion also includes a perceptive reevaluation of de Gaulle's difficulties with President Roosevelt. The remaining chapters of the book deal in detail with the working out of diplomatic policies and problems during de Gaulle's term in office. Domestic affairs are discussed when events at home had a bearing on policy abroad. Through the issues and attitudes of these years--the Franco-Soviet pact, the distrust of allies and their blocs, the attempts to organize other groupings around France, the proposals for a Western European entity in which at least part of Germany could find a place--runs the unifying theme of the constant thrust for recognition of France's standing as a major power. During this period de Gaulle suffered many setbacks, but it is noteworthy that his basic objective the acceptance of France's right to participate in the great decisions of peace and war--which he himself did not achieve, was attained by his successors.
This innovative account of Charles de Gaulle as a thinker and writer on nationalism and international relations offers a view of him far beyond that of a traditional nationalist. Centring on the way de Gaulle regarded nations as individuals the author frames his argument by rationalising de Gaulle’s nationalism within the existential movement that flowed as an intellectual undercurrent throughout early and mid-twentieth-century France. Graham O’Dwyer asserts that this existentialism of the nation and ‘the presence of the past’ allowed de Gaulle to separate the ‘nation’ from the ‘state’ when looking at China, Russia, Vietnam, and East European countries, enabling him to understand the idiosyncrasies of specific national characters better than most of his contemporaries. This was especially the case for Russia and China and meant that he read the Cold War world in a way that Washington and London could not, allowing him a unique insight into how they would act as individuals and in relation to other nations.
The essays in this volume examine selected national, regional European, and international policies of Charles de Gaulle, giving consideration to their significance in his own time, and today. Not everything de Gaulle did withstands the test of time. Nor, obviously, was everything beyond criticism in his own time. Nonetheless, a main finding, in the words of one essayist, is that de Gaulle had an 'uncanny sense of where history was going' and the skill to position his country accordingly. De Gaulle also stands as a testament to the power of individuals in history, a somewhat unfashionable viewpoint in modern university curriculums. Today, when France's destiny appears increasingly to depend on structures and institutions beyond its national control, including a Europe weakened by the sovereign debt crisis, and a global economic system accountable to no one, it seems timely to reconsider the record of the twentieth century's greatest Frenchman, whose skill at dealing with the problems of his time can inspire today's generation of politicians and statesmen.
In this definitive history, William R. Keylor traces the tumultuous relationship between Charles de Gaulle and a host of other key twentieth-century figures: his former mentor Marshal Philippe Pétain, who headed the collaborationist government in the southern French city of Vichy as the German army occupied the northern two-thirds of the country; Sir Winston Churchill, the British prime minister whose government supported and financed de Gaulle and the Free French, but who clashed with the French leader on a number of hot-button issues; and, most critically, the six American presidents from FDR to Nixon. Keylor uses the metaphor “thorn in the side” to emphasize the fact that challenges from the intrepid French leader were often an annoyance to the Americans, who all had many more important issues to deal with—World War II for Roosevelt and Truman, the Cold War for Eisenhower, and the Vietnam War for Kennedy and Johnson. Richard Nixon alone had an excellent relationship, but the two men overlapped for only four months before de Gaulle’s retirement. Thoroughly researched and deeply knowledgeable, this gripping book will appeal to all readers interested in contemporary French and US history.
This timely book explores the often stormy French-U.S. relationship and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969). The first work on this subject to draw on previously inaccessible material from U.S. and French archives, the study offers a comprehensive analysis of Gaullist policies toward NATO and the United States during the 1960s, a period that reached its apogee with de Gaulle's dramatic decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO's integrated military arm. This launched the French policy of autonomy within NATO, which has since been adapted without having been abandoned. De Gaulle's policy often has been caricatured by admirers and detractors alike as an expression of nationalism or anti-Americanism. Yet Frederic Bozo argues that although it did reflect the General's quest for grandeur, it also, and perhaps more important, stemmed from a genuine strategy designed to build an independent Europe and to help overcome the system of blocs. Indeed, the author contends, de Gaulle's actions forced NATO to adapt to new strategic realities. Retracing the different phases of de Gaulle's policies, Bozo provides valuable insight into current French approaches to foreign and security policy, including the recent attempt by President Chirac to redefine and normalize the France-NATO relationship. As the author shows, de Gaulle's legacy remains vigorous as France grapples with European integration, a new role within a reformed NATO, and relations with the United States.