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Russia is committed to modernizing and adding new military capabilities to its nuclear forces. Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are controlled by the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF), and sea- and air-based strategic systems are managed by the Navy and Aerospace Force, respectively. Russia plans to upgrade the capacity of its strategic nuclear triad by 2020. In addition to its strategic nuclear weapons, Russia is adding new military capabilities to its large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces. The SRF operates three older ICBM systems for more than one-half of its land-based nuclear delivery vehicles: the silo-based SS-18 and SS-19, which respectively carry 10 and 6 MIRVs, and the single-warhead SS-25. These systems will be withdrawn from service and replaced with newer, more modern road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs as they reach the end of their operational lives by 2021.China continues to modernize and add new military capabilities to its nuclear forces by enhancing silo-based ICBMs and adding more survivable mobile delivery systems, including four Jin class ballistic missile submarines. China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world. Its ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles, with China developing advanced new mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs. The number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is likely to continue growing. In addition to strategic nuclear forces, China has long maintained theater nuclear forces and is in the process of improving delivery capabilities for these forces.China has the required industrial capacity to enrich uranium and produce plutonium for military needs. The China National Nuclear Corporation, the largest nuclear enterprise in China, operates several uranium enrichment facilities organized under three plants (plants 405, 504, and 814) that primarily support the nation's burgeoning nuclear power industry, but China could devote some enrichment capacity to support military needs. China's plutonium production reactors (plants 404 and 821) probably ceased operation in the 1980s; however, China's reprocessing facilities at plant 404 can extract plutonium from spent reactor fuel if required. China's only nuclear weapon design and production organization-the China Academy of Engineering Physics-is key in developing and maintaining China's nuclear force. It has tens of thousands of employees, and its scientists are capable of all aspects of nuclear weapon design research, including nuclear physics, materials science, electronics, explosives, and computer modeling.Contents: Global Nuclear Landscape 2018 * 2019 U.S. Intelligence Community Worldwide Threat Assessment.
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.
For 20 years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has provided Congress with an annual report on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China (PRC). These reports have assessed the contours of China's national strategy, its approach to security and military affairs, and potential changes in the PRC's armed forces over the next 20 years, among other matters. 2020 marks an important year for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as it works to achieve important modernization milestones ahead of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) broader goal to transform China into a "moderately prosperous society" by the CCP's centenary in 2021. As the United States continues to respond to the growing strategic challenges posed by the PRC, 2020 offers a unique opportunity to assess both the continuity and changes that have taken place in the PRC's strategy and armed forces over the past two decades.
With most of the world's advanced economies now stuck in recession; Western support for defense cuts and nuclear disarmament increasing; and a major emerging Asian power at odds with its neighbors and the United States; it is tempting to think our times are about to rhyme with a decade of similar woes—the disorderly 1930s.Might we again be drifting toward some new form of mortal national combat? Or, will our future more likely ape the near-half-century that defined the Cold War—a period in which tensions between competing states ebbed and flowed but peace mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual fear and loathing?The short answer is, nobody knows. This much, however, is clear: The strategic military competitions of the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has yet seen. Assuming U.S., Chinese, Russian, Israeli, Indian, French, British, and Pakistani strategic forces continue to be modernized and America and Russia continue to reduce their strategic nuclear deployments, the next arms race will be run by a much larger number of contestants—with highly destructive strategic capabilities far more closely matched and capable of being quickly enlarged than in any other previous period in history.
A leading international security strategist offers a compelling new way to "think about the unthinkable." The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons—a luxury that we can no longer indulge. It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age. In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises. Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.
World events in recent years have led observers, particularly since late 2013, to conclude that the international security environment in recent years has undergone a shift from the post-Cold War era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, also sometimes known as the unipolar moment (with the United States as the unipolar power), to a new and different situation that features, among other things, renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. The shift to renewed great power competition has become a major factor in the debate over future U.S. defense spending levels, and has led to new or renewed emphasis on the following in discussions of U.S. defense strategy, plans, and programs: * grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense budgets, plans, and programs; * nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;* new U.S. military service operational concepts;* U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;* capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., largescale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia; * maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons;* speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy;* mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia;* minimizing reliance in U.S. military systems on components and materials from Russia and China; and* capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.