Download Free Global Corporate Stress Tests Impact Of The Covid 19 Pandemic And Policy Responses Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Global Corporate Stress Tests Impact Of The Covid 19 Pandemic And Policy Responses and write the review.

Corporate sector vulnerabilities have been a central policy topic since the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper, we analyze some 17,000 publicly listed firms in a sample of 24 countries, and assess their ability to withstand shocks induced by the pandemic to their liquidity, viability and solvency. For this purpose, we develop novel multi-factor sensitivity analysis and dynamic scenario-based stress test techniques to assess the impact of shocks on firm’s ability to service their debt, and on their liquidity and solvency positions. Applying the October 2020 WEO baseline and adverse scenarios, we find that a large share of publicly-listed firms become vulnerable as a result of the pandemic shock and additional borrowing needs to overcome cash shortfalls are large, while firm behavioral responses and policies substantially help overcome the impact of the shock in the near term. Looking forward, while interest coverage ratios tend to improve over time after the initial shock as earnings recover in line with projected macroeconomic conditions, liquidity needs remain substantial in many firms across countries and across industries, while insolvencies rise over time in specific industries. To inform policy debates, we offer an approach to a triage between viable and unviable firms, and find that the needs for liquidity support of viable firms remain important beyond 2020, and that medium-term debt restructuring needs and liquidations of firms may be substantial in the medium-term.
To assess the resilience of India’s corporate sector against COVID-19-related shocks, we conducted a series of stress tests using firm-level corporate balance sheet data. The results reveal a differential impact across sectors, with the most severe impact on contact-intensive services, construction, and manufacturing sectors, and micro, small, and medium enterprises. On policy impact, the results highlight that temporary policy measures have been particularly effective in supporting firm liquidity, but the impact on solvency is less pronounced. On financial sector balance sheets, we found that public sector banks are more vulnerable to stress in the corporate sector, partly due to their weaker starting capital positions. When considering forward-looking multiperiod growth scenarios, we find that the overall corporate performance will depend on the speed of recovery. A slower pace of recovery could lead to persistently high levels of debt at risk, especially in some services and industrial sectors.
The spread of COVID-19, containment measures, and general uncertainty led to a sharp reduction in activity in the first half of 2020. Europe was hit particularly hard—the economic contraction in 2020 is estimated to have been among the largest in the world—with potentially severe repercussions on its nonfinancial corporations. A wave of corporate bankruptcies would generate mass unemployment, and a loss of productive capacity and firm-specific human capital. With many SMEs in Europe relying primarily on the banking sector for external finance, stress in the corporate sector could easily translate into pressures in the banking system (Aiyar et al., forthcoming).
We study the impact of the COVID-19 recession on capital structure of publicly listed U.S. firms. Our estimates suggest leverage (Net Debt/Asset) decreased by 5.3 percentage points from the pre-shock mean of 19.6 percent, while debt maturity increased moderately. This de-leveraging effect is stronger for firms exposed to significant rollover risk, while firms whose businesses were most vulnerable to social distancing did not reduce leverage. We rationalize our evidence through a structural model of firm value that shows lower expected growth rate and higher volatility of cash flows following COVID-19 reduced optimal levels of corporate leverage. Model-implied optimal leverage indicates firms which did not de-lever became over-leveraged. We find default probability deteriorates most in large, over-leveraged firms and those that were stressed pre-COVID. Additional stress tests predict value of these firms will be less than one standard deviation away from default if cash flows decline by 20 percent.
In far too many cases, recommendations of forensic reports on previous pandemics were ignored. Substantial weaknesses in the preparation by public health authorities and governments increased the health and economic costs of the COVID-19 pandemic relative to what they would have been if pre-existing recommendations had been followed and a wider set of plans had been put into place. We discuss parallels between the lack of preparation of financial system regulators prior to the global financial crisis and the lack of preparation by public health authorities and governments prior to COVID-19. These parallels relate to: required stocks (of capital or equipment), data collection and sharing, lending facilities, stress testing and war games, early warning indicators and systems, contagion from abroad, operational risks, a system-wide approach (including effects on the real economy), models incorporating the heterogeneity of individuals, and effects on less-regulated parts of the system. The recent COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated that, apart from the direct economic consequences from illness and death from the virus, the main costs have been due to the varying degrees of preventative measures taken by the public, firms, and governments that directly impacted health, as well as social, economic, and financial activity. We make recommendations for carrying out post mortems on the COVID-19 experience, planning for future pandemics, and establishing transparent and accountable governance systems. We then propose the use of regular, combined health, economic, and financial stress tests and exercises/war games in preparing for future pandemics and other major environmental shocks.
"This book addresses the economic impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on Central and East European countries and examines the effect the pandemic has had on organizations in the region. It focuses on the widely understood business environment, covering companies' responses to the crisis, the role of institutions in stabilizing markets, and the reshaping of global business trends. The book is a complex and multidimensional work that draws its roots from distinct yet simultaneously interlinked research areas. All of the chapters, whether they refer to macro-, meso- or micro-perspectives, always highlight how crises - global and regional - change the global trends we have observed in business in the last 20 years. The book includes the most topical issues that delineate public discourse on firms' resilience. In this way, it 'connects the dots' and uncovers the missing links necessary for any reader wishing to understand the specificity of contemporary companies' responses to unexpected events such as pandemics or geopolitical crises. Further, it tackles questions such as what role institutions play in building the adaptive capacity of companies, how companies build their resilience capacity for 21st century crises and what the significance of the uncertainty, the information asymmetry, and the bounded rationality concept on the company's decision-making process is. The book will find a broad audience among academics and students across diverse fields of study, as well as practitioners and policymakers. It is a key reference for all those who want to better understand the complex nature of uncertainty, crisis management, and its implications, not only for CEE countries but, first and foremost, the business environment"--
COVID-19 is a seismic shock the likes of which have not been seen in living memory. What makes it different? For one, it is a rolling combination of a global health pandemic and an economic crisis that is unfolding at an unprecedented pace. The impact is already devastating at both the human and economic levels, in mutually reinforcing ways. Second, the crisis has turned truly global in record time, to an extent that the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) became only after half a year or later. The epicenter of the health crisis has shifted from China to Europe and now to the US. But the health and economic consequences are affecting every part of the inhabited world, with rising ferocity. Third, this is both a demand- and supply-side economic shock. The world has seen severe demand shocks (the Great Depression and the GFC) and severe supply shocks (the two World Wars, the Oil Crisis of the 1970s), but rarely the two at same time. The damage from the current crisis in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and elsewhere is deep and multifaceted, wherein the adverse outcomes can be put in three main categories: human suffering, economic recession, and financial and corporate sector distress. The COVID-19, a major health crisis, has also quickly turned into an economic crisis, and threatens to become a serious financial crisis, with each acting in mutually reinforcing ways. The immediate policy response must focus on containing the virus outbreak and managing it in its three dimensions (health, economic, and financial and corporate).
During two visits in 2023-24, the IMF mission implemented a set of recommendations made by a previous technical assistance mission in May 2022 which were aimed at improving the solvency stress model of the Superintendency of Banks, Panama (SBP). The mission also provided training on the design of a cash flow-based liquidity stress tool and another system-level liquidity stress testing methodology. During a follow-up mission, work was carried out on market risk and corporate risk, and the methodology for the liquidity stress test that was used during the 2023 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) with Panama was anchored at the SBP.
Near-term global financial stability risks have been contained as an unprecedented policy response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has helped avert a financial meltdown and maintain the flow of credit to the economy. For the first time, many emerging market central banks have launched asset purchase programs to support the smooth functioning of financial markets and the overall economy. But the outlook remains highly uncertain, and vulnerabilities are rising, representing potential headwinds to recovery. The report presents an assessment of the real-financial disconnect, as well as forward-looking analysis of nonfinancial firms, banks, and emerging market capital flows. After the outbreak, firms’ cash flows were adversely affected as economic activity declined sharply. More vulnerable firms—those with weaker solvency and liquidity positions and smaller size—experienced greater financial stress than their peers in the early stages of the crisis. As the crisis unfolds, corporate liquidity pressures may morph into insolvencies, especially if the recovery is delayed. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are more vulnerable than large firms with access to capital markets. Although the global banking system is well capitalized, some banking systems may experience capital shortfalls in an adverse scenario, even with the currently deployed policy measures. The report also assesses the pandemic’s impact on firms’ environmental performance to gauge the extent to which the crisis may result in a reversal of the gains posted in recent years.
The October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) identifies the current key vulnerabilities in the global financial system as the rise in corporate debt burdens, increasing holdings of riskier and more illiquid assets by institutional investors, and growing reliance on external borrowing by emerging and frontier market economies. The report proposes that policymakers mitigate these risks through stricter supervisory and macroprudential oversight of firms, strengthened oversight and disclosure for institutional investors, and the implementation of prudent sovereign debt management practices and frameworks for emerging and frontier market economies.