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The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe's most important link with the largest country on the continent. This book analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 have misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow.
In 1945, when the Red Army marched in, eastern Germany was not "occupied" but "liberated." This, until the recent collapse of the Soviet Bloc, is what passed for history in the German Democratic Republic. Now, making use of newly opened archives in Russia and Germany, Norman Naimark reveals what happened during the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany from 1945 through 1949. His book offers a comprehensive look at Soviet policies in the occupied zone and their practical consequences for Germans and Russians alike--and, ultimately, for postwar Europe. In rich and lucid detail, Naimark captures the mood and the daily reality of the occupation, the chaos and contradictions of a period marked by rape and repression, the plundering of factories, the exploitation of German science, and the rise of the East German police state. Never have these practices and their place in the overall Soviet strategy, particularly the political development of the zone, received such thorough treatment. Here we have our first clear view of how the Russians regarded the postwar settlement and the German question, how they made policy on issues from reparations to technology transfer to the acquisition of uranium, how they justified their goals, how they met them or failed, and how they changed eastern Germany in the process. The Russians in Germany also takes us deep into the politics of culture as Naimark explores the ways in which Soviet officers used film, theater, and education to foster the Bolshevization of the zone. Unique in its broad, comparative approach to the Soviet military government in Germany, this book fills in a missing--and ultimately fascinating--chapter in the history of modern Europe.
The relationship between Russia and Germany has been pivotal in some of the most fateful events of the twentieth century: the two World Wars, the Cold War, and the emergence of a new Europe from the ashes of communism. This is the first book to examine the recent evolution of that tense and often violent relationship from both the Russian and German perspectives. Angela Stent combines interviews with key international figures--including Mikhail Gorbachev--with insights gleaned from newly declassified archives in East Germany and her own profound understanding of Russian-German relations. She presents a remarkable review of the events and trends of the past three decades: the onset of d tente, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of an uncertain new European order. Stent reveals the chaos and ambivalence behind the Soviet negotiating strategy that led--against Gorbachev's wishes--to that old Soviet nightmare, a united Germany in NATO. She shows how German strength and Russian weakness have governed the delicate dance of power between recently unified Germany and newly democratized Russia. Finally, she lays out several scenarios for the future of Russian-German relations--some optimistic and others darkened by the threat of a new authoritarianism. Russia and Germany Reborn is crucial reading for anyone interested in a relationship that changed the course of the twentieth century and that will have a powerful impact on the next.
This book is available as open access through the Bloomsbury Open Access programme and is available on www.bloomsburycollections.com. Having emerged from the end of the Cold War as a unified country, Germany has quickly become the second largest exporter in the world. Its economic might has made it the center of the Eurozone and the pivotal power of Europe. Like other geo-economic powers, Germany's foreign policy is characterized by a definition of the national interest in economic terms and the elevation of economic interests over non-economic values such as human rights or democracy promotion. This strategic paradigm is evident in German's relationship with China, the Gulf States and Europe, but it is most important in regard to its evolving policies towards Russia. In this book, Stephen F. Szabo provides a description and analysis of German policy towards Russia, revealing how unified Germany is finding its global role in which its interests do not always coincide with the United States or its European partners. He explores the role of German business and finance in the shaping of foreign policy and investigates how Germany's Russia policy effects its broader foreign policy in the region and at how it is perceived by key outside players such as the United States, Poland and the EU. With reference to public, opinion, the media and think tanks Szabo reveals how Germans perceive Russians, and he uncovers the ways in which its dealings with Russia affect Germany in terms of the importing of corruption and crime. Drawing on interviews with key opinion-shapers, business and financial players and policy makers and on a wide variety of public opinion surveys, media reports and archival sources, his will be a key resource for all those wishing to understand the new geo-economic balance of Europe.
The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe's most important link with the largest country on the continent. This book analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 have misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow.
The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe’s most important link with the largest country on the continent. But despite Germany’s unparalleled knowledge and historical experience, its policymakers struggle to accept that Moscow’s efforts to rebalance Europe at the cost of the cohesion of the EU and NATO are an attack on Germany’s core interests. This book explains the scale of the challenge facing Germany in managing relations with a changing Russia. It analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow. The book also examines what lies behind efforts to revise Merkel’s bold policy shift, including attitudes inherited from the GDR and the role of Russian influence channels in Germany.
19. Bartow, O.: A View from Below: Survival, Cohesion, and Brutality on the Eastern Front. Part IV: Soviet Politics and War Strategy, 1941. 20. Gorodetsky, G.: Stalin and Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union. 21. Hoffmann, J.: The Soviet Union's Offensive Preparations in 1941. 22. Kirshin, Y.Y.: The Soviet Armed Forces on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 23. Bonwetsch, B.: The Purge of the Military and the Red Army's Operational Capability during the "Great Patriotic War". 24. Chor'kov, A, G.: The Red Army during the Initial Phase of the Great Patriotic War. 25. Harrison, M.: "Barbarossa": The Soviet Response, 1941. 26. Pinkus, B.: The Deportation of the German Minority in the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. 27. Volkogonow, D.A.: Stalin as Supreme Commander. Part V: Germany and the Soviet Union in International Politics. 28. Schönherr, K.: Neutrality, "Non-belligerence", or War: Turkey and the European Powers' Conflict of Interests, 1939-1941. 29. Petracchi, G.: Pinocchio, the Cat, and the Fox: Italy between Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941. 30. Menger, M.: Germany and the Finnish "Separate War" against the Soviet Union. 31. Krebs, G.: Japan and the German-Soviet War, 1941. 32. Kimball, W.F.: "They don't come out where you expect": Roosevelt Reacts to the German-Soviet War. 33. Kettenacker, L.: Great Britain and the German Attack on the Soviet Union. 34. Bourgeois, D: Operation "Barbarossa" and Switzerland. 35. Wegner, B.: Facing the Global War: Germany's strategic Dilemma after the Failure of "Blitzkrieg".
A history of the German invasion of Russia in 1941, in the light of archival material. It challenges the view that Stalin was about to invade Germany when Hitler made a pre-emptive strike, arguing that Stalin was actually negotiating for peace in order to redress the European balance of power.